Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Action No.: 12–1872 (RC)
| Decision Date | 23 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 12–1872 (RC) |
| Citation | 313 F.Supp.3d 122 |
| Parties | Jeremy PINSON, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Theodore C. Whitehouse, Catherine Fata, Kristian L. Hinson, Mirela Emilova Missova, Robert A. Gomez, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Washington, DC, Samuel P. Philipsek, Pro Hac Vice, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Damon William Taaffe, Eric Joseph Young, Carl Ezekiel Ross, Daniel Patrick Schaefer, Jesse Dyer Stewart, U.S. Attorney's office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pro se Plaintiff Jeremy Pinson has filed multiple Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, requests with various components of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"). At issue here are two requests she1 submitted to the Executive Office of the United States Attorneys ("EOUSA"). Pinson has challenged EOUSA's prior responses to these requests, but she has not challenged the latest response. This Court has already granted in part and denied in part three motions for summary judgment concerning her requests. See generally Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 145 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015) ; Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 189 F.Supp.3d 137 (D.D.C. 2016) ; Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , No. 12-cv-1872, 2017 WL 6887041 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2017).
Now before the Court are DOJ's renewed motions for summary judgment as to two of Pinson's remaining FOIA requests. Defs.' Renewed Mot. Summ. J. ( ), ECF No. 409; Defs.' Renewed Mot. Summ. J. ( ), ECF No. 412. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both motions for summary judgment.
The Court has explained the factual background of this case in detail in its prior Memorandum Opinions. See Pinson , 145 F.Supp.3d at 5–7 ; Pinson , 189 F.Supp.3d at 141–45 ; Pinson , 2017 WL 6887041, at *1–7. The Court therefore confines its discussion to the facts most relevant to the two requests at issue in the present motion.
Pinson submitted a FOIA request seeking, inter alia , "copies of all discovery material" in the case of United States v. Garcia , No. 11–cr–68–EJL, in the District of Idaho. Luczynski Decl. (Oct. 20, 2016), Ex. I, ECF No. 332–3. Pinson limited her request to "no more than 150 pages ... and no more than 2 hours search time." Id. After EOUSA informed Pinson that it could not release the information because such third-party information was protected, Pinson limited the scope of her request to "seek only public records." Luczynski Decl. (Feb. 23, 2015), Ex. UUU, ECF No. 170–5; see also Luczynski Decl. (Feb. 23, 2015) ¶¶ 82–83, ECF No. 170–4.
After this Court denied DOJ's third motion for summary judgment,2 EOUSA submitted with its renewed motion a declaration from the FOIA contact who conducted the search for Pinson's requested materials. See Narkin Decl. (Oct. 24, 2017), ECF No. 409–3. Legal Administrative Specialist Narkin conducted the search using Courtlink, LexisNexis's docket research tool, and retrieved the docket for United States v. Apodaca , in which two of the eleven co-defendants had the surname Garcia. See id. ¶ 9. After searching for two hours and limiting results to only public records, Narkin located 949 pages related to the Apodaca case. Id. ¶ 10. DOJ claims that all 949 pages relating to Pinson's request for materials concerning the 11–cr–68 case were released. Defs.' Statement of Material Facts ( ) ¶ 6, ECF No. 409–2. However, the materials DOJ submitted with its renewed motion indicate that 949 pages relating to a case with the docket number 12–cr–236 were released. Luczynski Decl. (Dec. 13, 2017) at 2 & Ex. A, ECF No. 409–4. DOJ again moves for summary judgment, this time on the basis that Pinson has received the materials she requested. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.' MSJ ( ) at 3, ECF No. 409–1. Pinson did not submit an opposition to the motion.
In a letter dated February 26, 2012, Ms. Pinson requested the "production of all documents, email, or records" for, inter alia , cases 10–cv–949 and 11–cv–1906. Luczynski Decl. (Dec. 11, 2015), Ex. Y, ECF No. 254–4. Pinson did not explicitly limit the number of pages to be produced or the search time to be occupied by this request. See id. She did later clarify that this request also sought public records, but was not limited to them. Luczynski Decl. (Dec. 11, 2015), Ex. T, ECF No. 254–4.
After this Court denied DOJ's third motion for summary judgment,3 EOUSA submitted with its renewed motion an updated declaration from the FOIA contact who conducted the search for the materials Pinson requested. Matuszewski Decl. (Dec. 20, 2017) ¶ 15, ECF No. 412–3. Matuszewski's updated declaration repeats information from her original declaration regarding all the records systems that were searched, why those systems were likely to contain all responsive records, and the amount of material produced. Compare Matuszewski Decl. (Dec. 20, 2017) with Matuszewski Decl. (Oct. 12, 2016), ECF No. 332–3. Additionally, Matuszewski declares that she searched the computerized docketing case management system Caseview using the terms "Jeremy Pinson" and civil case file numbers 11–cv–1906, 11–cv–1346, and 10–cv–949 to produce 197 pages of responsive material. See Matuszewski Decl. (Dec. 20, 2017) ¶¶ 16, 18–20. She maintains that "all documents" found were forwarded to EOUSA. See id. ¶¶ 18–19. DOJ again moves for summary judgment, contending that Matuszewski's updated declaration sufficiently demonstrates that EOUSA's search was reasonably calculated to locate all responsive documents, and that all such responsive documents were released. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.' MSJ ( ) at 5, ECF No. 412–2. Pinson has not opposed this motion either.
"[T]o prevail in a Freedom of Information Act suit, ‘the defending agency must prove that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable or is wholly exempt from the Act's inspection requirements.’ " Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 627 F.2d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC , 479 F.2d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ). At the summary judgment stage, the agency does this by showing "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This showing requires the agency to demonstrate that its search was adequate and that all responsive records were either released or properly withheld.
Under FOIA, an adequate search is one that is "reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents." Morley v. CIA , 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "To meet that burden, the agency may submit, and [the Court] may rely on, reasonably detailed affidavit[s], setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials ... were searched." Aguiar v. DEA , 865 F.3d 730, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The affidavit must do more than state in conclusory fashion that the agency "conducted a review of [the files] which would contain information that [the plaintiff] requested" and did not find anything responsive to the request. Weisberg , 627 F.2d at 370–71. On the other hand, once the agency has provided a reasonably detailed affidavit describing its search, the burden shifts to the FOIA requester to produce "countervailing evidence" suggesting that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the adequacy of the search. Morley , 508 F.3d at 1116 (citation omitted).
In a case such as this one, where the requester initially challenges the agency's response but does not consistently articulate specific objections to the agency's releases, the Court is mindful that summary judgment cannot be granted as conceded and that it must independently evaluate whether any issues of material fact exist. "Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment cannot be ‘conceded’ for want of opposition." Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean , 843 F.3d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Grimes v. District of Columbia , 794 F.3d 83, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Griffith, J., concurring) ). "The burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why summary judgment is warranted." Id. "The nonmoving party's failure to oppose summary judgment does not shift that burden," and "[t]he District Court ‘must always determine for itself whether the record and any undisputed material facts justify granting summary judgment.’ " Id.
DOJ's renewed motions for summary judgment argue that it has performed adequate searches with respect to Request Nos. 13–1085 and 12–1757 and released all non-exempt documents. Pinson has not raised any objections to these motions, but the Court nonetheless considers whether DOJ has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment.
DOJ asserts that EOUSA adequately searched and properly released records responsive to Request No. 13–1085. Defs.' Mem. (409) at 3. EOUSA's declaration provides a general description of the search, including details of the records system that was searched, the amount of time used to conduct the search, and the scope of the search, which was limited to public records. See Narkin Decl. (Oct. 24, 2017) at 2–3. However, the record does not clearly indicate which docket number was used to conduct the search, and even suggests that the wrong docket number may have been used. See, e.g. , Luczynski Decl. (Dec. 13, 2017) at 2. For this reason, the Court denies EOUSA's motion for summary judgment as to Request No. 13–1085.4
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