Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice
| Decision Date | 30 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 18-486 (RC),Re Document 146,149,150 |
| Parties | JEREMY PINSON, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Jeremy (“Grace”) Pinson (“Pinson” or “Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, challenges her[1] transfer from Federal Medical Center Rochester (“FMC Rochester”) in Minnesota to United States Penitentiary, Tucson (“USP Tucson”), as well as other alleged mistreatment at the hands of prison officials during her incarceration. In March 2022, this Court granted in part and denied in part Pinson's request to file a further amended complaint, allowing Pinson to bring certain new claims and expand upon existing ones while also disallowing her from bringing others. Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 18-cv-486, 2022 WL 703924, at *4-11 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2022).[2] As permitted by the Court, the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ultimately maintained claims arising under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; added claims alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., and the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq.; and dropped the First Amendment claims included in Pinson's original Complaint. See generally SAC, ECF No. 138.
Following the Court's grant of leave to file the SAC, Defendants-the United States, various federal officials, and several federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and Department of Justice (“DOJ”)-moved to dismiss Pinson's SAC. In turn, Pinson has filed two additional motions seeking an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss, appointment of counsel, sanctions against defense counsel and Defendants, a preliminary injunction to enjoin certain disciplinary action, and leave to file a supplemental complaint. The Court grants Pinson's request for an extension of time to file her opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss nunc pro tunc, such that her opposition is deemed timely filed. For the reasons set forth below, however, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the SAC; denies Pinson leave to file a supplemental complaint; and denies the remainder of Pinson's motions seeking sanctions, a preliminary injunction, and the appointment of counsel.
The Court presumes familiarity with its prior opinions in this matter, which recounted the factual background of this case. See, e.g., Pinson v. Dep't of Justice, No. 18-cv-486, 2018 WL 5464706, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2018); Pinson v. Dep't of Justice, No. 18-cv-486, 2020 WL 1509517, at *2-13 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2020). It thus confines its discussion here to the facts and procedural background necessary to resolve the motions at issue.
On August 29, 2022, Defendants moved for dismissal of Pinson's SAC, which encompasses claims arising under RICO, the FTCA, and the Privacy Act. First, Defendants assert that Pinson's RICO claims must fail because, among other reasons, she has not established the existence of an “enterprise” as required under RICO and has accordingly failed to state a claim for relief. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 8-10, ECF No. 146. Second, Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Pinson's FTCA claims given that she has not first administratively exhausted those claims and the Court thus lacks jurisdiction. See id. at 11-13. Third, Defendants argue Pinson's Privacy Act claims fail because, to the extent that the documents in question contain any inaccuracies, the documents are not even subject to the Privacy Act and cannot form the bases of alleged violations of that statute. See id. at 14-17.
Pinson originally sought an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss. See Pl.'s Mot. for Sanctions, Appointment of Counsel, and Enlargement of Time (“Pl.'s Mot. for Sanctions”) at 2, ECF No. 149. Pinson eventually filed her opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss on January 17, 2023. See generally Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.'s Opp'n Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 154. Defendants then filed a reply in further support of their motion to dismiss. See generally Defs.' Reply Supp. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 155.
Pinson has several motions pending with this Court that raise a number of requests. First, Pinson seeks leave to file a supplemental complaint to her SAC to re-assert a First Amendment claim in light of alleged additional retaliation by Defendants and to remedy what she describes as a “clerical error.” Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Appt. of Counsel, and Leave to File Supp. Compl. ( ) at 3, 16, ECF No. 150. Pinson claims that she never intended to drop her First Amendment claims in her SAC; rather, she inadvertently included her Fifth Amendment claim twice and omitted her First Amendment claim, which should have been clear to this Court because it “plainly understood retaliation to be a theme through its reading of the proposed SAC” and “[r]etaliation falls under the First not Fifth Amendment[].” Id. at 16.
Second, Pinson seeks a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from taking certain disciplinary action against her, Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 18, even though the relevant incident report has been expunged from Pinson's record, see Ex. A to Defs.' Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 153-1. Third, Pinson seeks sanctions against both Defendants and defense counsel in this case. Pinson requests the imposition of sanctions against Defendants for allegedly threatening her and certain witnesses in her cases. See Pl's. Mot. for Sanctions at 2. She then also requests that the Court sanction defense counsel for allegedly filing a false declaration in this case. Id.
Finally, two of Pinson's pending motions seek the appointment of counsel, see Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 18; Pl's. Mot. for Sanctions at 2-a request that this Court has denied repeatedly, see, e.g., Pinson, 2018 WL 5464706, at *8-9; Pinson v. Dep't of Justice, No. 18-cv-486, 2019 WL 1284595, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2019); Min. Order (May 28, 2019); Pinson, 2020 WL 1509517, at *26-27. Pinson asserts that COVID-19-related prison lockdowns, placement in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), and a lockdown due to a shooting at USP Tucson on November 13, 2022, have blocked her access to the law library, witnesses, legal files, pens, and paper in the “face of a dispositive motion.” See Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 3-8, 18.
To meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering such a motion, a court must construe the complaint “liberally in the plaintiff's favor with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Further, a court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id., nor presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and must therefore address jurisdiction as a “threshold matter,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). To determine whether jurisdiction exists, a court may “undertake an independent investigation to assure itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction” and “consider facts developed in the record beyond the complaint.” CFA Inst. v. Andre, 74 F.Supp.3d 462, 465 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal citations omitted). “Under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Grell v. Trump, 330 F.Supp.3d 311, 316 (D.D.C. 2018).
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it, or within a specified amount of time if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's consent or the court's leave. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Moreover, a court may, “[o]n motion and reasonable notice [and] on just terms, permit a party to serve a...
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