Pinto v. Guardado-Pinto

Decision Date24 March 2023
Docket Number84909-COA
PartiesVANESSA PINTO, Appellant, v. FRANCIS A. GUARDADO-PINTO, Respondent.
CourtNevada Court of Appeals

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Gibbons, C. J.

Vanessa Pinto appeals from a divorce decree and an order granting joint physical and legal custody. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr., Judge.

Vanessa Pinto and Francis Guardado-Pinto were married in February 2007.[1] They have two surviving minor children A.P., age 8 at the time of trial, and J.P., age 5 at the time of trial.[2] While they were married, Vanessa and Francis maintained separate bank accounts where they deposited their earnings. During their marriage they acquired three properties: a residence on Kensington Street (Kensington property) in 2010, a residence on Lodge Pole Court (Lodge Pole property) in 2012, and a residence on Colour Magic Street (Colour Magic property) in 2015. Vanessa claims that each property was purchased as her sole and separate property. She admitted that Francis was made a joint tenant on the Kensington property in 2012 but has maintained that Francis gave up his interest in the Colour Magic property when he signed a quitclaim deed assigning his interest in the property to her when it was purchased.

Vanessa and Francis began to experience marital troubles, and Francis filed a complaint for divorce in April 2021 and sought a division of property acquired during the marriage as well as joint legal and joint physical custody of the children. Vanessa filed an answer and counterclaim in May 2021 and sought sole legal and sole physical custody of the children. In August 2021, the district court entered a temporary order granting joint legal custody and set a parenting time schedule. Under the schedule, Francis had parenting time with the children beginning on Fridays at 9:00 a.m. and ending Sundays at 7:00 p.m. Vanessa had parenting with the children during the remainder of the week.

The matter proceeded to a three-day trial. During the trial, the district court heard testimony from only Vanessa and Francis. Vanessa testified that she was the sole owner of the Colour Magic property and the Lodge Pole property and that her student loans, acquired during the marriage, should be divided between the two parties. She also testified that Francis owned property in Honduras and that he sent $40,000 of community property funds to his family in Honduras during the marriage. Finally, Vanessa testified that Francis had possession of $20,000 worth of her jewelry. Francis agreed that the Lodge Pole property was Vanessa's sole and separate property but disputed the rest of her claims.

After the trial, the district court issued two orders. First, it issued a decree of divorce determining that the Kensington property and Colour Magic property were community property. It awarded Francis the Kensington property and imputed the value of the Colour Magic property to Vanessa because it was community property and she had transferred the property to her mother the day before Francis filed for divorce. The district court found that the Lodge Pole property was Vanessa's sole and separate property and found that Vanessa failed to prove that Francis owned any property in Honduras. Additionally, the district court found that Francis sent $20,000 to support his family in Honduras, that Vanessa's student loans were her sole and separate debt, and that Vanessa had failed to prove that Francis had possession of her jewelry.

Second, the district court issued a child custody order analyzing and applying the best interest of the child factors and determining that joint legal custody and joint physical custody with a week on/week off schedule was in the best interest of the children. Vanessa's appeal followed.

On appeal, Vanessa argues that the district court abused its discretion in the distribution of assets and debt and that the district court abused its discretion when it determined child custody. We disagree and address each issue in turn.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it distributed assets

Vanessa raises several arguments alleging that the district court abused its discretion in the distribution of assets and her student loan debt. We disagree and address each argument in turn.

We review district court decisions regarding the characterization and disposition of property in divorce proceedings for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004); Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence. Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Substantial evidence is evidence that "a sensible person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Williams, 120 Nev. at 556, 97 P.3d at 1129.

First, Vanessa argues that the district court erred in its handling of the Colour Magic property because it was not community property, Francis relinquished his rights to the property, and it is now owned by a third party, Vanessa's mother. In Nevada, all property acquired after marriage by either spouse is considered community property unless a written agreement specifies otherwise. NRS 123.220(1); see also Pryor v. Pryor, 103 Nev. 148, 150, 734 P.2d 718, 719 (1987) (property acquired after marriage is presumed to be community property). The party claiming the property is separate property can rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Pryor, 103 Nev. at 150, 734 P.2d at 719. Vanessa rebutted this presumption with the quitclaim deed Francis signed. See Kerley v. Kerley, 112 Nev. 36, 37, 910 P.2d 279, 280 (1996) (holding that spouse-to-spouse conveyance of real property creates the presumption of a gift). Therefore, the burden was on Francis to rebut the presumption that the Colour Magic property was separate property by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

The district court found that Francis' testimony about the quitclaim deed, his lack of understanding of English, and his intent to maintain his interest in the property was more credible than Vanessa's testimony, and that Francis rebutted the presumption created by the quitclaim deed with clear and convincing evidence. Appellate courts do not reweigh the credibility of witnesses on appeal. Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 103, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004). Therefore, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it found that Francis rebutted the presumption and the property remained community property. Additionally, to the extent that Vanessa argues she paid for the mortgage and utilities of the property with her sole and separate funds, she has failed to identify a written agreement or other evidence that the earnings used to pay these costs were her sole and separate property. See NRS 123.220(1). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the property was community property.

As far as Vanessa argues that the Colour Magic property is currently owned by a third party, her mother, Vanessa provides no authority to support her argument that imputing the community property interest in the property to her was impermissible or was an error. Therefore, we need not consider her argument. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (explaining that this court need not consider an appellant's argument that is not cogently argued or lacks the support of relevant authority). We also note that Vanessa is still living in the Colour Magic property.

Second, Vanessa argues that the district court (1) made an unequal distribution of property by awarding Francis the Kensington property; (2) erred when it found that Vanessa "gifted" the Kensington property to community property by deeding it to the parties as joint tenants after it was initially purchased in her name;[3] and (3) erred by failing to identify the equity that Vanessa had acquired in the property before she transferred it to Francis. Francis responds that the Kensington property was community property, and that the district court did not err by awarding him the Kensington property to offset his one-half interest in the Colour Magic property.

The district court found that the Kensington property was community property because it was purchased during the marriage with community funds. See NRS 123.220 (1); see also Pryor, 103 Nev. at 150, 734 P.2d at 719. The court was required to make an equal disposition of community property if practicable. NRS 125.150(1)(b). Since the value of the Colour Magic property was imputed to Vanessa and she currently resides there, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to award Francis the Kensington property after determining that the properties had the same net community property value, and her other arguments are unpersuasive. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Francis the Kensington property and Vanessa has not shown how any error affected her substantial rights. C/. NRCP 61 ("Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence - or any other error by the court or a party - is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.").

Third Vanessa argues that the district court erred by finding that the earnings and income of the parties during their marriage was community property.[4] Francis responds...

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