Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., Inc.

Citation637 A.2d 367
Decision Date15 February 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-80-M,93-80-M
PartiesDarrell PION v. BESS EATON DONUTS FLOUR CO., INC. P.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Carrillo & Cordeiro, Warwick, for plaintiff
OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This matter came before this court on the petition of an employee, Darrell Pion (Pion), for certiorari. Pion seeks review of a final decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court (Appellate Division) that affirmed the decree of the trial judge. We affirm the final decree of the Appellate Division.

When the Workers' Compensation Court trial judge heard this case on December 20, 1991, both Pion and the employer, Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., Inc. (Bess Eaton), stipulated to the following facts: On April 11, 1991, Pion sustained an injury to his left foot, left leg, and lower back. His first day of incapacity was April 12, 1991, and he was "incapacitated totally" starting on that date. Pion had a spouse dependent on him for support. They also stipulated that the only issue was that of "suitable alternative employment." To clarify, the parties agreed that the issue was whether Pion's return to work met the definition of suitable alternative employment set forth in the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), thereby qualifying Pion for certain protections in the event of the termination of his employment.

Pion testified that on the date of his injury he was employed by Bess Eaton as a Bess Eaton Donuts store manager. His duties included operating the store, ensuring that products were out on display, and attending to such responsibilities as hiring, firing, dealing with employees' problems, and ordering stock. His managerial tasks also involved lifting one-hundred-pound bags of sugar and tanks of iced coffee that weighed approximately fifty to sixty pounds, as well as carrying the trash out to the trash containers. He estimated that the trash, which contained coffee grounds, weighed approximately forty to fifty pounds. His job required him to perform these lifting and bending activities on a daily basis.

Pion further testified that after his injury, he contacted Bess Eaton and returned to his regular job on or about July 9, 1991. In response to a query by the trial judge regarding whether he had received "any offers or anything from Bess Eaton," he replied in the negative. In response to another question by the trial judge, Pion explained why he went back to work: "Actually I was getting too tired of sitting home. I'm very fidgety. I like working. The cat thought I was a piece of furniture. So I had to get out of the house."

After starting back at the same job, he experienced pain and difficulty lifting heavy objects and performing his duties. One day in September, he left work for an appointment with his doctor and notified the district manager, Dennis Medeiros (Medeiros), who advised Pion to "talk to your doctor and then come back to me and we'll try to work something out."

Pion went to the doctor and obtained a note for light-duty work, which he gave to Medeiros. Medeiros discussed Pion's situation with Bess Eaton representatives, and Pion testified that "what they did is they changed my position for the time being. I was actually [trouble-] shooting stores, going into them working with the stores to get their percentage up, increase sales." This position did not require any lifting at all because other people worked for him. He was then working seventy to eighty-five hours a week. His job title was still listed as manager, but he had become a travel manager, working with more than one store.

Medeiros had Pion sign a letter, which stated at the top, "Limited Duty/Doctor[']s Note." The body of the letter provided:

"Darrell based on the letter Bess Eaton received from your doctor, be here advised to remain true to the demands of care. As of this date you are urged to refrain from any lifting that would place undue strain on your lower back or left knee. This means filling buckets, ice coffee, * * * [l]arge [s]ugar bags, or boxes of any items, [i.e.,] cups. Thank you for your strict compliance."

Pion was the sole witness at trial. After both sides had rested, the trial judge issued a bench decision, noting that the only issue for him to resolve was the effect of Pion's return to work. The trial judge made several findings of fact, including the following: that Pion sustained an injury to his back, knee, and foot on April 11, 1991, that arose out of and in the course of his employment with Bess Eaton; that he was a store manager at the time and was injured when a dumpster fell on his left foot and caused him to fall backward; that Pion was "totally incapacitated" from April 12, 1991 through July 8, 1991, whereupon he became "partially incapacitated"; and that Pion returned to work at an average weekly wage equal to or exceeding his preinjury earnings and was considered under the WCA to be "no longer disabled." He ordered Bess Eaton to pay workers' compensation benefits for total incapacity from April 12 to July 8, 1991, and all reasonable medical, hospital, and surgical bills pursuant to the WCA.

He also reasoned through Pion's and Bess Eaton's arguments regarding suitable alternative employment. He stated that Pion asserted that his return to work in this case constituted acceptance of an offer of suitable alternative employment. Bess Eaton countered with the contention that Pion was working within his restrictions but that this was not suitable alternative employment that would entitle him to certain protections under G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment) § 28-33-18.2. The trial judge concluded that this situation did not involve an offer of suitable alternative employment.

Pion appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial judge by a two-to-one vote. The majority of the three-member panel concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial judge's findings and that the trial judge had committed no error. The majority framed the dispositive issue as "whether when the petitioner returned and was assigned lighter duties, his job may be viewed as suitable alternative employment pursuant to § 28-33-18.2." The Appellate Division characterized what Pion sought as "a relationship that may be referred to as 'constructive suitable alternative employment.' " They reasoned as follows:

"It is obvious from the section entitled 'Suitable Alternative Employment,' the [L]egislature has prescribed a method by which this type of employment may be offered and has also outlined the perameters [sic ] within which said offer must be made. It is our belief that if the [L]egislature had anything less intended it would have so stated in the section."

The dissenter believed that the statutory definition was met and relied on his conclusion that the parties had "mutually agreed" to the employee's performing suitable alternative employment. He also discussed the statutory definition of suitable alternative employment and interpreted it to mean that such employment may be "either (1) post-injury alternate employment that the employee seeks out and applies for, or (2) some type of different or alternate employment duties from the duties engaged in at the time of injury, which different employment is offered by the employer."

In the dissenter's view, a controlling case was Anthony & Associates v. Theodore, W.C.C. 88-8809 (App. Div. Sept. 1991), in which the Appellate Division held that postinjury lighter work that the injured employee had sought was suitable alternative employment. We note that the dissenter wrote Anthony & Associates. He reasoned that the record in this matter established that Pion's postinjury work for Bess Eaton was "(1) by agreement, (2) was suitable, as evidenced by the medical report of the employee's physician * * *, and (3) was alternate, as evidenced by the letter of the employer's district manager, Medeiros."

Pion raises several arguments before this court. He claims that the Appellate Division misinterpreted and misapplied § 28-33-18.2 in two ways: (1) the Appellate Division erred by not finding that the "subsequent offer of employment" by Bess Eaton met the statute's definition of suitable alternative employment and (2) the Appellate Division failed to construe the statute's language liberally in accordance with the statute's requirements. He also contends that the legislative intent underlying suitable alternative employment does not support the Appellate Division's interpretation, that the lower court's decision conflicts with the goals of the WCA, and that the facts of this case do not support the trial judge's view that Pion's earning capacity has been restored. Finally, he argues that the facts of this case satisfy the statutory elements required to establish suitable alternative employment: the position of traveling manager was agreed to by Pion and Bess Eaton, it was suitable to Pion's physical limitations, and it was "alternate" to his preinjury position.

We believe that these arguments for the most part address various facets of the same central contention: that the Appellate Division erred in its application and interpretation of § 28-33-18.2 by finding that Pion's postinjury return to work did not meet the statutory definition of suitable alternative employment. It is this contention that we discuss. We emphasize that our review of the Appellate Division's decree in this case is limited to determining whether it erred in deciding a question of law. See Lacroix v. Nulco Manufacturing Co., 618 A.2d 1285, 1287 (R.I.1993) (citing § 28-35-30(a)(3)).

By way of background we note that workers' compensation benefits are entirely statutory creations, not based on common-law principles. See John P. Ludington et al., Modern Workers Compensation...

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