Pion v. Southern New England Telephone Co.
Citation | 691 A.2d 1107,44 Conn.App. 657 |
Decision Date | 08 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 15632,15632 |
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Parties | Jarrett PION v. SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY. |
Timothy C. Spayne, Groton, and Donald E. Leone, Norwich, filed a brief, for appellant (plaintiff).
Eugene A. Cooney and Sharone G. Kornman, Hartford, filed a brief, for appellee (defendant).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and SPEAR and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.
The plaintiff appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff claims that genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude judgment for the defendant as a matter of law. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The relevant uncontroverted facts are those that follow. The plaintiff Jarrett Pion filed this action, through his parents, alleging that on August 8, 1990, he sustained multiple injuries when, while riding his bicycle, the "bicycle drifted" and he "violently struck a repeater box and cross arm support braces that were mounted" on a telephone pole owned, controlled and maintained by the defendant. The investigative report by the state police contained information that between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., the plaintiff was riding his bicycle south on Day Street in the town of Brooklyn. He was accompanied by a friend, Daniel Turner, who was also riding a bicycle. The weather was clear, but the roads were wet in spots from an earlier rain shower. The plaintiff and Turner were riding downhill at a high rate of speed when the plaintiff veered off to the right side of the road and collided with an electric signal repeater box and the telephone pole on which it was mounted, both of which were owned and operated by the defendant. The plaintiff sustained serious head injuries when he made impact with the wooden cross beams that supported the repeater box. The repeater box and cross beams were located four feet from the ground. The telephone pole was located on private property.
Turner was the only eyewitness to the accident. He gave a statement to the police, and was also deposed. Turner testified in his deposition that he and the plaintiff had ridden their bicycles down the hill on Day Street hundreds of times, and that neither of them had ever veered off the road before. Turner described the telephone pole as being on a strip of grass between a white fence and the road. He stated that the distance from the fence to the shoulder of the road is three feet. Turner also stated that there are some trees on the strip of grass between the grass and the road, so that it would be nearly impossible to ride a bicycle on the grass. He also stated that the ordinary place to ride a bicycle on Day Street was in the road and not on the shoulder.
The plaintiff filed a two count complaint. The first count alleged that the defendant was negligent in its placement of the repeater box and in failing to warn adequately of its presence. The second count is identical to the first, except that it alleges that the defendant was reckless, wanton and wilful. The defendant raised two special defenses to both counts, contributory negligence and the barring of both claims by the applicable statute of limitations.
The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 202, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995); see also Practice Book § 384.
The defendant attached the police report and Turner's deposition to its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's opposition referred to a statement made by Turner on February 22, 1991, to Turner's deposition and to the police report. The parties agree as to the circumstances surrounding the accident, the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and the location and characteristics of the telephone pole.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, the defendant did not owe the plaintiff any duty. The issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law. (Citations omitted.) Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 826, 676 A.2d 357 (1996).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 45, 675 A.2d 852 (1996).
Foreseeability of the mere possibility of such an accident does not create a duty. ...
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