Pioneer Trust and Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect
Decision Date | 19 May 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 36151,36151 |
Citation | 176 N.E.2d 799,22 Ill.2d 375 |
Parties | PIONEER TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK, Trustee, et al., Appellees, v. VILLAGE OF MOUNT PROSPECT et al., Appellants. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Robert J. Downing, and Robert G. Lussier, Chicago (Raskin & Downing, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
Albert J. Horrell, Chicago (Horrell & Borde, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
Plaintiffs brought a mandamus proceeding in the circuit court of Cook County to compel the corporate authorities of the village of Mount Prospect to approve a plat of a subdivision which complied with all the provisions of the official plan of the municipality except that requiring a dedication of land for public use. The case was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts. The court entered an order finding the land dedication requirements of the village's official plan invalid and directed the issuance of a writ of mandamus commending the corporate authorities to approve the plat. The trial court has certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved and that the public interest requires a direct appeal.
Article 53 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act authorizes municipalities to establish plan commissions with authority to recommend to the corporate authorities the adoption of an official plan. Section 53-2 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 24, par. 53-2) provides that the plan may 'establish reasonable standards of design for subdivisions and for resubdivisions of unimproved land and of areas subject to redevelopment, including reasonable requirements for public streets, alleys, ways for public service facilities, * * * parks, playgrounds, school grounds, and other public grounds.' Section 53-3 provides that no plat of subdivision 'shall be entitled to record or shall be valid unless the subdivision shown thereon provides for streets, alleys, * * * and public grounds in conformity with the applicable requirements of the official plan.'
The village of Mount Prospect has established a plan commission and has adopted by ordinance an official plan as recommended by the commission. Section 6 of article II of that plan contains a requirement for the dedication of public grounds as follows:
Plaintiff Salvatore Dimucci is engaged in the business of subdividing real estate for residential purposes and caused a plat of the subdivision to be submitted to the plan commission for approval which complied in all respects with the aforesaid ordinance except as to the dedication of some 6.7 acres of land which would be required under the language of section 6 of article II quoted above. The plaintiffs have refused to dedicate land, and, in view of that refusal, the village board has refused to approve the plat of the subdivision. It is established in the record that the 6.7 acres of land sought to be required to be dedicated or donated would be for the use of an elementary school and for the use of the Mount Prospect Park District as an elementary school site and a secondary use as a playground. The proposed subdivision shows some 250 residential units.
The issue here presented for determination is the validity of the quoted section of the ordinance, and no provision of the ordinance other than that requiring the dedication is under attack by the plaintiffs in this proceeding.
The statute from which the village derives its authority has been before us on two previous occasions. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371; Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230. In each of these cases the issue presented for decision was narrowly circumscribed, and in neither case did we pass upon the precise point that is involved here. The Petterson case did not involve any question of required dedication of land, but rather concerned the reasonableness of a requirement that the subdivider provide curbs and gutters for the streets of the subdivision. We sustained the validity of such a requirement, stating that 'the power to prescribe reasonable requirements for public streets in the interest of the health and safety of the inhabitants of the city and contiguous territory includes more than a mere designation of the location and width of streets.' (9 Ill.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 378) The Rosen case involved a portion of an ordinance of the village of Downers Grove which required subdividers to dedicate land for educational facilities but also provided that if the plan commission should deem that the dedication of such land would not of itself meet the reasonable requirements of providing educational facilities for the proposed subdivision, then the plan commission might require any additional means for providing reasonable facilities. Acting under this ordinance, the municipality attempted to require subdividers to pay a certain sum per lot for educational purposes. We held this attempt invalid because the specific technique employed was not...
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