Pioneer Trust Co. v. Currin

• Decision Date: 15 May 1957
• Parties: PIONEER TRUST COMPANY, Salem, Oregon, Guardian of the Estate of Joseph W. Vandecoevering, Incompetent, Appellant, v. H. W. CURRIN and Laura E. Currin, Respondents.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 445

311 P.2d 445

210 Or. 343

PIONEER TRUST COMPANY, Salem, Oregon, Guardian of the Estate

of Joseph W. Vandecoevering, Incompetent, Appellant, v. H. W. CURRIN and Laura E. Currin, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued and Submitted by Appellant Nov. 20, 1956.

Decided May 15, 1957.

Edward L. Clark, Jr., Salem, for appellant. On the brief were Marsh, Marsh & Dashney, Edward L. Clark, Jr., and Malcolm F. Marsh, Salem.

No appearance for respondents.

WARNER, Justice.

This is a suit by Pioneer Trust Company, as Guardian of the Estate of Joseph W. Vandecoevering, an incompetent person, to set aside a deed to real property by its ward, given to the defendants, H. W. Currin and Laura E. Currin, his wife, as grantees, prior to the institution of the guardianship. The guardian appeals from a decree dismissing its complaint. The prevailing defendants made no appearance in this court.

On May 22, 1953, Joseph W. Vandecoevering, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, executed the challenged deed conveying a quarter section of land in Washington County, Oregon, to the defendants Currin for a consideration of $2,000, cash. On September 3, 1953, a little more than three months later, plaintiff was committed to, and received at, the State Hospital, in Salem. There he remained for seven months before he was transferred to the U. S. Veterans Hospital, in Roseburg, Oregon, an institution especially equipped for the care and treatment of mentally-ill ex-servicemen. Since his initial commitment, he had been continuously confined in the state and federal hospitals under the original court order and was a patient in the latter hospital on July 12, 1955, the time of the trial in the case at bar.

It is the position of the appellant, as reflected by both complaint and brief, that the deed in question is void because of Vandecoevering's incompetency at the time of its execution, or, as appellant puts it in the alternative, 'the inadequacy of the consideration paid, the weakness of the ward's mind, and the unequal abilities of the parties to determine the value of the property, indicate fraud overreaching and inequitable conduct which would call for a court of equity to order that respondents hold the real property in question as constructive trustees for the ward.'

Summarizing the evidence, we find that plaintiff, in 1946, shortly after his discharge from the service, bought the subject property for $4,500. It is in a mountainous area of Washington County. Approximately 20 acres are tillable and fairly level. During his ownership, up to 1952 or 1953, plaintiff used from three to thirteen acres of the tillable area for raising strawberries. This he did with varying degrees of success from year to year, but by 1953 the strawberry plants were old and practically of no value.

The remaining 140 acres were in timber when he acquired the place. Three years during the period from 1949 or 1950 to 1952, inclusive, plaintiff sold parcels of his timber to three different logging operators. From them he received amounts aggregating $4,500, which, by coincidence, equals his original investment in 1946. These operations denuded the land of its merchantable timber and left it in condition referred to as 'stump range' and too steep to farm.

There is no doubt that plaintiff's mental illness began long before he executed his deed to the Currins. After his return from the war, in 1946, some of his relatives and friends noted some change in manner deviating from his normal mental standards. It is from these persons we learn that plaintiff's mental deterioration was gradual, but after the death of his mother in January, 1953, it worsened markedly. This manifestations of evident mental trouble took various forms at times such as: staring into space, talking to himself as he looked into the mirror, laughing and giggling and sometimes covering his face with his hands as he did so, and moody spells. A somewhat like performance followed when he was drinking; that is, he would look into the glass of beer and talk to it or himself. He was not responsive when called and walked the floors 'all night.' The changes in his condition eventually reached a point where a brother and a friend deemed it necessary to have him committed to the State Hospital as they did in September, 1953.

At the hospital plaintiff was received and examined by Dr. John Bower, a psychiatrist, who testified as one of plaintiffs's witnesses. Dr. Bower tells us that at that time plaintiff was a 'very disturbed person,' requiring full restraint. It was there plaintiff's condition was diagnosed as a paranoid form of schizophrenia, an insidious disease that comes over a long period of time.

Appellant cites numerous Oregon cases, beginning with Farley v. Parker, 1877, 6 Or. 105, 25 Am.Rep. 504, as authority for the proposition that a deed given by a person non compos mentis is void. But to rest on that statement, alone, is not enough. The test of the grantor's mentality is made as of the moment of the execution of the conveyance, not as his mental condition was before or after the completion of the challenged transaction. In short, the test raises the question of whether or not the grantor executed the contested instrument during a lucid interval. This is evident from a closer reading of the Farley case, supra, our first expression on the subject. We rested our holding in that case on the authority of New York decisions which are there cited. Referring to them, the court, 6 Or. at page 111, said:

'* * * it was further held that a deed executed by a person non compos mentis was not only voidable, but absolutely void. As we understand these decisions, they mean simply that a deed regular on its face will be declared void whenever the testimony submitted shows that the person executing it was at the time of its execution non compos mentis.' (Emphasis ours.)

It may be unnecessary to observe that the phrase 'non compos mentis' is a very general term, embracing all varieties of mental derangement, and means not of sound mind. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.) p. 1200. Also see Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary (1st ed.) p. 675.

Since the Farley case, we have consistently held that a deed of a person so afflicted is void unless executed during a lucid interval.

The rule with respect to the mental capacity of a grantor necessary to execute a valid deed is, as stated by Justice Burnett, in Wade v. Northup, 70 Or. 569, 578, 140 P. 451, 453. 'If at the time of the execution of the document the grantor has mental capacity sufficient to comprehend the nature of the business in which [he] was engaged, the instrument is valid.' (Emphasis ours.) Also see cases cited therein and Graham v. Allen, 116 Or. 501, 508, 241 P. 1007; Rowe v. Freeman, 89 Or. 428, 436, 172 P. 508, 174 P. 727; Laughlin v. Ludgate, 138 Or. 442, 450, 6 P.2d 20; First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 194 Or. 68, 72, 241 P.2d 135.

Those moments when the mentally ill recoup for the time being a mental capacity sufficient to comprehend the nature of the business or other matters in which they are then engaged, even though they shortly thereafter relapse to a status of incomprehension caused by their mental disorder, are known to both medicine and the law as 'lucid intervals.' It is in these temporary moments of emergence from mental darkness to the light of rational understanding, be they of long or short duration, when the mentally ill attain a competency sufficient to execute a valid instrument. Deeds or other conveyances and contracts made by insane persons during such lucid interval are valid and enforceable. 2 Black, Rescission and Cancellation (2d ed.), 734 § 261.

Lucid interval, as we use it, is defined in 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 2, p. 36 as follows:

'A lucid interval, as used in speaking of lucid intervals of insane persons, is not merely a cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, but a restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to enable the person soundly to judge of the act; such a full return of the mind to sanity as places the person in possession of the powers of his mind, enabling him to understand and transact his affairs as usual. The term does not necessarily mean complete or perfect restoration of the mental faculties to their original condition; and it is sufficient if there is such restoration that the person is able to comprehend and to do the act with such reason, memory, and judgment as to make it a legal act; * * *.'

Also see 2 Black, Rescission and Cancellation, supra, p. 734.

Plaintiff called five lay witnesses who testified as to plaintiff's mental condition prior to his hospitalization. One was his brother and one his sister. The other three were close friends and neighbors. It is from them we learn of the visual evidence of plaintif...