Piper v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 3:95-CV-51.,3:95-CV-51.
• Citation: 970 F.Supp. 566
• Parties: Linda PIPER, Plaintiff, v. KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

Page 566

970 F.Supp. 566

Linda PIPER, Plaintiff, v. KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 3:95-CV-51.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Paris Division.

July 14, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert S. Davis, Copper, Flowers, Davis, Fraser & Derryberry, L.L.P., Tyler, TX, for Plaintiff.

John E. McFall, John G. Harrison, McFall Law Firm, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SCHELL, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on Defendant Kimberly-Clark Corporation's ("Defendant") Motion for Reconsideration and Resubmission of Its Motions for Summary Judgment filed on February 18, 1997.¹ Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff Linda Piper's ("Plaintiff") claims of violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Texas Labor Code § 451.001. Plaintiff filed a response and a request for a jury trial on March 20, 1997. The court signed the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Motions for Summary Judgment ("Order") on March 21, 1997. Pursuant to the court's Order, Plaintiff filed her Second Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on April 30, 1997. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and applicable law, the court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Kimberly-Clark manufactures diapers and training pants at its facility in Paris, Texas. Plaintiff Linda Piper began work for Defendant on July 10, 1989. Plaintiff worked as an Assistant Operator from the time of her hire until October 1992. From October 1992 until her termination in July 1994, Plaintiff worked as a Stores Clerk.

Stores Clerks are production support personnel who provide materials, tools, and parts for the mechanics and engineers on the production lines. Stores Clerks are responsible for receiving the large volume of parts and equipment delivered to the facility, for cataloguing and maintaining the inventory, and for filling orders (or picks) from the mechanics or engineers who are in the constant process of repairing or maintaining the seventeen production lines. Plaintiff's job operated on a 12-hour shift, required her to be on her feet "6-8 hours stocking parts, retrieving parts, or working with customers to identify parts", and required bending, reaching, and lifting. Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ.J. at 2 (citing Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 5 (Physical Assessment of Job Function)).

In March 1994, Plaintiff injured her back while working in Defendant's Paris plant. On June 8, 1994, Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. George Wharton, imposed the following medical restrictions on her ability to return to work: "Light/medium lifting," "No repetitive bending;" and "Not more than 8 hrs. per day." On or about July 2, 1994, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment allegedly because there were no jobs available at the facility that were consistent with her permanent eight-hour restriction.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that there is no genuine issue of fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10. Because Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial on the issues of discrimination and retaliatory discharge, Defendant is not required to produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; rather Defendant's burden is only to point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmovant's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If Defendant's motion demonstrates such an absence of evidence, "the nonmovant must come forward with evidence which would be sufficient to enable it to survive a motion for directed verdict at trial." Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir.) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). The test is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

DISCUSSION

I. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

A. Applicable Law

Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the individual's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Unlawful discrimination includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that she has been the victim of illegal discrimination based on her disability. Aikens v. Banana Republic, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 1031, 1036 (S.D.Tex.1995). A plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of an ADA violation by showing that: (1) she suffers from a disability; (2) she is qualified for the job; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) she was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees. Daigle v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir.1995). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must come forward with evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. Thereafter, as in all discrimination cases, any inferences arising from a prima facie case disappear, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's articulated reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc).

B. Analysis

With regard to Plaintiff's ADA claim, Defendant moves for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Plaintiff is not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, (2) Plaintiff is not "qualified" for her past position of Stores Clerk; and (3) Plaintiff has not produced evidence that Defendant's articulated reason for her discharge was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Because the court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated by competent summary judgment evidence that she is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, the court need not address the second and third grounds for summary judgment.

Plaintiff contends that she has a "disability"² within the meaning of the ADA because she has "a physical ... impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).³ Plaintiff claims a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working.⁴ To demonstrate that an impairment "substantially limits" the major life activity of working, an individual must show "significant[ ] restrict[ion] in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1996) (emphasis added). "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Id.⁵

When determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the court reviews the record for evidence of six factors set forth in the ADA regulations. See Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1152, 115 S.Ct. 1104, 130 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1995).⁶ The first three factors "should be considered" when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2), and the additional three factors "may be considered" when determining whether an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).

The three factors that "should be considered" when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity are: "(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." Id. § 1630.2(j)(2).

The three additional factors that "may be considered" when an individual claims substantial limitation in the major life activity of working are:

(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;

(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that, geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or

(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).

Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii); see Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 & n. 3 (10th Cir.1994) (affirming district court's...