Pipkin v. Lentz

Decision Date07 April 1961
Citation354 S.W.2d 87,49 Tenn.App. 206
PartiesGordon PIPKIN v. Curtis LENTZ. 49 Tenn.App. 206, 354 S.W.2d 87
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

[49 TENNAPP 207] Thurman Thompson, Lewisburg, for plaintiff.

J. Shelby Coffey, Jr., Columbia, for defendant.

SHRIVER, Judge.

The parties will be referred to as complainant and defendant as they appeared in the Court below.

I

The defendant, Gordon Pipkin, seeks to have two separate conveyances of real estate declared void for fraud and for such inadequate consideration as to shock the conscience of the Court.

As is alleged in the bill, the complainant was born Gordon Howell but on February 7, 1939 he was adopted by Homer F. Pipkin and wife Louise Pipkin and his name changed to Gordon Pipkin.

It is alleged and shown that in January 1947 Louise Pipkin acquired the real estate involved in this litigation by warranty deed from C. W. Brewer and wife and the deed was recorded in Maury County. Thereafter, on December 10, 1947, the said Louise Pipkin died intestate[49 TENNAPP 208] seized and possessed of this real estate and complainant Gordon Pipkin was her only heir at law. One child was born to Homer F. and Louise Pipkin but it lived only a few hours, therefore Gordon Pipkin, took the real estate subject to the curtesy right of Homer F. Pipkin who is still living.

It is alleged and shown that the land in question is a 65 acre tract in Maury County which was purchased by Louise Pipkin for $9,000.00 in January 1947. It is further alleged that the defendant, Curtis Lentz, procured and persuaded the complaint, a minor, 19 years of age to file a petition in the Chancery Court of Maury County to have his disability of minority removed and, as a result, a decree generally removing his disability of minority was entered on April 19, 1954.

It is alleged that on the following day, April 20th, 1954, said defendant persuaded complainant to execute and deliver to him a deed purporting to convey to the defendant seven acres of the 65 acre tract of land inherited from Louise Pipkin, for a consideration of $1,200.00. Said deed was noted for registration at 9:20 A.M. on April 21, 1954 and is set out in the original bill. It covenants that complainant was lawfully seized and possessed of the described real estate, had a good legal right to sell and convey same, and that it was unincumbered.

It is further alleged that on November 29, 1955, defendant, Curtis Lentz, persuaded complainant to execute and deliver to him a deed to his interest in the remaining part of the 65 acres subject to the life estate of Homer F. Pipkin, the recited consideration in said deed is $10.00 and other good and valuable considerations, [49 TENNAPP 209] but it is shown in the proof that the actual consideration was $550.00.

It is to be noted that in said latter deed it is recited,

'I, Gordon Pipkin, a single person now residing in the State of Texas, have bargained and sold and by these presents do hereby sell, transfer and convey unto Curtis Lentz his heirs and assigns all right, title and interest, being a one-half share and interest in and to a certain tract or parcel of land situated in the Ninth Civil District of Maury County, State of Tennessee, and bounded and described as follows;' (Here follows the description by metes and bounds)

It is, thus, insisted by complaint that, in any event, he only conveyed a one-half interest in the 58 acre tract conveyed by the second deed hereinabove described.

The last paragraph of the bill summarizes as follows:

'Complainant alleges and avers that the conduct of the defendant in pursuading and procuring the removal of his disability of minority and then while under twenty-one years of age, and without judgment or business experience, pursuading him to execute and deliver to defendant the two deeds hereinbefore copied for such an inadequate consideration, constitutes fraud.'

The prayers of the bill are (1) for subpoena; (2) that the deeds from the complainant to the defendant be cancelled and declared void upon the payment to the defendant of the amount of the actual consideration therefor or upon such other terms as the Court might consider just and equitable; (3) that, in any event, the [49 TENNAPP 210] rights and interests of the parties be determined and judicially declared and that the 65 acres be sold by Court order on such terms as are just and equitable and the proceeds divided as determined by the Court; (4) for general relief.

A demurrer to the bill was overruled except as to the third ground which pointed out that the bill on its face did not allege particular acts or facts and circumstances as constituting fraud. As to this ground the Court required the bill to be amended in order to cure said defect. The amendment to the original bill avers that Curtis Lentz knowing that the complainant was a minor without much education and with little or no business judgment or experience, and without knowledge of the true value of the real property that he had inherited from Louise Pipkin, and knowing that said real estate was very valuable, and scheming and planning to defraud complainant out of his said inheritance, did fraudulently and corruptly procure and persuade said Homer F. Pipkin to file a petition to have his disability of minority removed and, thereafter, fraudulently and corruptly procured and persuaded complainant to execute and deliver to him a deed purporting to convey to said defendant seven acres of land described in the bill for a consideration which the defendant knew at the time was only a small fraction of its true value.

The answer of the defendant to the original and amended bills denied all allegations of fraud and of inadequate consideration.

The case was heard by the Chancellor on depositions and documentary evidence and resulted in a decree in which the Chancellor found as follows:

[49 TENNAPP 211] 'This cause came on for final hearing on this, the 5th day of August, 1960, before the Honorable Knox Bigham, Chancellor, upon the original bill, demurrer thereto, the amended bill, the answer of the Defendant to both the original and amended bills, the depositions and exhibits on file and the entire record in the cause and, after hearing all of the proof read and argument of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that the Complainant did not introduce any proof of actual fraud on the part of the Defendant and the purpose of the petition for the removal of the disability of minority of Complainant was so that Complainant could pursue his claim against the East Tennessee Natural Gas Company and the proof does not show any persuasion, procurement or deception on the part of the defendant in the filing and obtaining of the removal of the disability of minority of Complainant; that the Defendant had optioned a total of 255 acres for sale at a price of $260.00 per acre and two-thirds of the value of the fee simple interest in seven acres was paid Complainant upon his execution of the deed dated April 20, 1954, for his remainder interest in the seven acres and, consequently, did not constitute grossly inadequate consideration, as alleged; that, in regard to the deed executed by Complainant on November 29, 1955, for his remainder interest in the remaining 58 acres, the preponderance of the evidence is that the consideration paid was $550.00, that Complainant was not inequitably treated in the transaction and he was the moving party in the sale of his remainder interest in the 58 acres and should have had some conception of [49 TENNAPP 212] its value since he had previously made a sale of seven acres for $1,200.00; and the Court is further of the opinion that the deed dated November 29, 1955, executed by Complainant to Defendant, conveyed all of the right, title, interest and estate of the Complainant in said 58 acres and not a mere one-half undivided interest as alleged by Complainant; and that the allegations of the original and amended bills are not sustained by the proof and should be dismissed.'

II

It was asserted in the pleadings and shown in the proof that the complainant, Gordon Pipkin, left home when he was about seventeen years of age and obtained work in Texas, thus, he had been away from Columbia, Tennessee for a number of years and was employed by the United States Steel Company in Lubbock, Texas, when he returned to Columbia in April 1954 on a visit.

He found that the East Tennessee Natural Gas Company had run two gas transmission lines across the 65 acre tract and, upon telling the defendant, who was a friend of many years standing, about this and that he had never been paid for the running of the lines across the land, defendant recommended that he see Mr. J. Shelby Coffey, Jr., an attorney, and have him look into the matter. Mr. Coffey's investigation revealed that the boy's father, Homer F. Pipkin had executed a right-of-way easement to the Gas Company in July 1950 for a consideration of $46.50, and in July 1953 another 50 foot easement for a consideration of $214.00. Mr. Coffey advised complainant that he had a legitimate claim [49 TENNAPP 213] against the Gas Company and agreed to and did write to said company in Knoxville, Tennessee, demanding damages in the amount of $3,000.00 on behalf of complainant.

Upon advice of Mr. Coffey a petition was filed to remove the disability of minority of the complainant in order that he would have authority to settle his claim against the Gas Company which claim was subsequently settled for $1,500.00.

It was shown to the satisfaction of the Chancellor in the instant case that the defendant had nothing to do with the removal of the disability of minority of the complainant and that the allegations of fraud in that respect were not sustained by proof.

In this conclusion, we concur.

It is further shown that the complainant approached the defendant on April 20, 1954 offering to sell him the 65 acre tract of land giving as his...

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13 cases
  • In re Coleman, CIV.A. 1:03CV00002.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • September 30, 2003
    ...standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. See Jones v. Seal, 56 Tenn.App. 593, 409 S.W.2d 382 (1966); Pipkin v. Lentz, 49 Tenn.App. 206, 354 S.W.2d 87 (1961); Anderson v. Nichols, 39 Tenn.App. 503, 286 S.W.2d 96 (1955); Bevins v. Livesay, 32 Tenn.App. 1, 221 S.W.2d 106 (1949); W......
  • Estate of John Acuff, Sr. v O'linger, 99-00680
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 2001
    ...and convincing evidence" standard. Jones v. Seal, 56 Tenn. App. 593, 409 S.W.2d 382 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966); Pipkin v. Lentz, 49 Tenn. App. 206, 354 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); Anderson v. Nichols, 39 Tenn. App. 503, 286 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955); Bevins v. Livesay, 32 Tenn. App. 1......
  • Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • November 13, 1975
    ...must show proof of fraud; that it, fraud is never presumed but must be proven by the party asserting the fraud. Pipkin v. Lentz, 49 Tenn.App. 206, 354 S.W.2d 87, 94, (1961); Bevins v. Livesay, 32 Tenn. App. 1, 221 S.W.2d 106, 109 (1949). In the instant case, the defendant asserts that the a......
  • In re Coleman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • October 7, 2003
    ...to these cases, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. See Jones v. Seal, 56 Tenn. App. 593 (1966); Pipkin v. Lentz, 49 Tenn. App. 206 (1961); Anderson v. Nichols, 39 Tenn. App. 503 (1955); Bevins v. Livesay, 32 Tenn. App. 1 (1949); Williams v. Spinks, 7 Tenn. App. 488 (1......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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