Pipkins v. Stewart ex rel. Landry

• Decision Date: 01 April 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACT. NO. 5:15-cv-2722
• Parties: RENEÉ PIPKINS, et al. v. JAMES E. STEWART, SR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF CADDO PARISH (FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA) STATE OF LOUISIANA ex rel. JEFF LANDRY, LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Intervenor
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

RENEÉ PIPKINS, et al. v. JAMES E. STEWART, SR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF CADDO PARISH

(FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA)

STATE OF LOUISIANA ex rel. JEFF LANDRY,

LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Intervenor

CIVIL ACT. NO. 5:15-cv-2722

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SHREVEPORT DIVISION

April 1, 2019

JUDGE DEE D. DRELL

MAG. JUDGE MARK L. HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) filed by defendant James E. Stewart, Sr., in his official capacity as District Attorney of Caddo Parish, First Judicial District of Louisiana ("District Attorney"), an Opposition (Doc. 37) filed by Plaintiffs,¹ a Reply (Doc. 46) filed by the District Attorney, a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49) filed by Jeff Landry, Attorney General for the State of Louisiana ("Attorney General"),² and an Opposition to the Attorney General's Supplemental Memorandum (Doc. 56) filed by Plaintiffs. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This suit alleges that the District Attorney systematically exercises (and therefore still exercises) peremptory strikes against African-American prospective jurors on the basis of their race for the purpose of empaneling criminal trial juries that are predominately white.

Each Plaintiff is an adult resident citizen of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, and each is qualified to serve a juror in criminal cases under Article 401 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.³ Each is a registered voter and is (or has been) on the list of eligible jurors maintained by the Caddo Parish Jury Commission.⁴ Plaintiffs Carter, Johnson, Horton, and Hawthorne were all excluded from jury service by the District Attorney's use of peremptory strikes within twelve months prior to the commencement of this suit.⁵

The centerpiece of this case is a statistical analysis conducted by Reprieve Australia ("Reprieve"), a non-profit organization not affiliated with Plaintiffs or their counsel. Reprieve acquired the records of 332 non-sealed criminal trials⁶ from January 28, 2003, through December5, 2012,⁷ pursuant to the Louisiana Public Records Act.⁸ According to Reprieve's data, forty-five different Assistant District Attorneys were involved as counsel for the prosecution of these 332 cases.⁹ Thirty of those Assistant District Attorneys were white and fifteen were African-American.¹⁰

In these 332 trials, 8,318 potential jurors were tendered to the District Attorney for peremptory challenge or acceptance as trial jurors.¹¹ These potential jurors survived the initial process of eliminating non-qualified jurors through the Parish Jury Coordinator's review of jury questionnaires and any challenges for cause.¹² Of the 8,318 qualified jurors, 2,908 were identified as African-Americans.¹³ The District Attorney exercised peremptory challenges against 1,338, or approximately 46%, of the qualified African-American jurors.¹⁴ By contrast, the District Attorney only used peremptory challenges against 830, or approximately 15%, of the 5,410 qualified jurors who were identified as non-African-Americans.¹⁵ The table below illustrates Reprieve's findings:¹⁶

Race

Accepted

Struck

Total

Black

1570

1338

2908

Not Black

4580

830

5410

Total

6150

2168

8318

Reprieve's statistical analysis of this ten-year history of peremptory strikes argues that, mainly through the various trial assistants,¹⁷ the District Attorney struck African-American potential jurors at three (3) times the rate he struck non-African-American prospective jurors.¹⁸ The statistics further show that, after controlling for various factors, the District Attorney struck African-American venirepersons from jury service at five (5) times the rate he struck potential jurors who were not African-American.¹⁹ According to Reprieve's analysis, when a defendant was white the District Attorney was 2.6 times more likely to strike an African-American juror than a non-African-American juror.²⁰ When a defendant was African-American, however, Reprieve's calculations indicate that the District Attorney was 5.7 times more likely to strike an African-American juror than a non-African-American juror.²¹ Interpreting these statistics, Plaintiffs conclude that the only plausible explanation for this disparity between the District Attorney's peremptory challenges against African-American jurors and those against non-African-American jurors is the race of the juror.²² They further allege that this systemic use of peremptory strikes bythe District Attorney has been "admitted by former members of the District Attorney's office," though they do not specifically identify any such former members.²³

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on November 19, 2015.²⁴ The case was originally assigned to Judge Elizabeth Foote but she recused herself on December 4, 2015.²⁵ An order reassigning the case to the Court was filed on December 9, 2015.²⁶ Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on December 30, 2015,²⁷ and a second amended complaint on April 14, 2016.²⁸ A third and final amended complaint was filed with the consent of the District Attorney on April 21, 2016.²⁹

A motion to certify class³⁰ was filed on January 8, 2016, and dismissed as premature on June 2, 2016.³¹ The District Attorney filed the instant motion to dismiss on May 5, 2016.³² On October 10, 2016, the Attorney General filed a motion to intervene³³ and a motion to adopt the District Attorney's motion to dismiss and to file a supplemental memorandum,³⁴ both of which were granted.³⁵ Oral argument was held on February 16, 2017.³⁶

In their third amended complaint, Plaintiffs seek the certification of a class of all African-American citizens of Caddo Parish who are eligible to serve as jurors in criminal trials.³⁷ They also plead for the entry of declaratory judgments stating that: (1) the District Attorney has, andcontinues to, systematically exercise peremptory strikes in a discriminatory fashion; and (2) several provisions of the Louisiana law providing for the use of peremptory strikes are unconstitutional.³⁸ Plaintiffs further request a variety of kinds of injunctive relief aimed at enjoining any discriminatory use, and likely eliminating any use, of peremptory strikes by the District Attorney.³⁹ Finally, Plaintiffs Carter, Johnson, Horton, and Hawthorne seek an award of nominal and compensatory damages for violations of their constitutional rights.⁴⁰

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

The District Attorney counters that: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing; (2) Plaintiffs' claims are moot; (3) the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction; (4) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel; (5) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 243; (6) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by prosecutorial immunity; (7) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by qualified immunity; and (8) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.⁴¹ Additionally, the Attorney General argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Court will address each of these arguments in turn. However, a brief overview of the case law regarding the rights of prospective jurors will provide much needed context.

A. PROSPECTIVE JUROR RIGHTS

1. Introduction

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "[W]ith the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunityto participate in the democratic process." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991). The Supreme Court has found that "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased person from the petit jury solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a significant opportunity to participate in civic life." Id. at 409.

"An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race." Id. However, as the Supreme Court explained in a previous case, "[d]efendants in criminal proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection." Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970). "People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion." Id. Accordingly, the Powers Court found that "individual jurors subjected to racial exclusion have the legal right to bring suit on their own behalf." Powers, 499 U.S. 400 at 414 (citing Carter, 396 U.S. at 329-30).

To begin, we refer to an observation by Justice Scalia, who stated that "the existence of such a right [by a challenged juror] would call into question the continuing existence of [peremptory strikes,] a centuries-old system that has important beneficial effects." Powers, 499 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Truthfully, we have only begun to consider the possible, likely or probable consequences of a right which allows a challenged juror to claim damages. A few we can see clearly, however. Exactly how is such a claim or suit to be managed? Here, Plaintiffs want a class action in favor of all similarly situated persons. If a class were to be certified, how in the world would one determine the real reason why a particular juror was challenged on a particular day in a trial that is past? The question is especially poignant where the trial record does not reflecteven a discussion of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), or Powers as to a particular juror. Does it mean that the prosecutor, defense counsel or judge could be deposed in such a suit? Could they be required to disclose internal memos, trial notes or the like to determine (maybe)...