Pippin v. Commonwealth
Citation | 117 Va. 919,86 S.E. 152 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Decision Date | 09 September 1915 |
Parties | PIPPIN. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
Error to Circuit Court, Russell County. Charles Pippin was convicted of manslaughter, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Plaintiff in error, Charles Pippin, was tried at the February term, 1915, of the circuit court of Russell county upon an indictment for the murder of William R. Dorton. The jury found the accused guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and ascertained the term of his confinement in the state penitentiary at two years, and the court sentenced him accordingly. To that judgment this writ of error was granted.
Two bills of exception were taken at the trial, and two grounds of error are assigned here:
I. The first assignment involves the action of the court in admitting as evidence the dying declarations of the deceased.
II. The second assignment alleges that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence.
There is a singular lack of conflict in the testimony of the witnesses. The material divergence arises out of the opposing theories of the case. The contention of the commonwealth, founded on the dying declarations of the deceased, being that the homicide was intentional, while that of the accused, based on his own testimony, is that it was accidental.
A summary of the facts will throw light on the situation and relations of the parties. They are fairly stated in the brief of the Attorney General and his assistant as follows:
The witness B. H. Salyer testified to the dying declarations as follows:
The statement of A. B. Vermillion, in respect to the dying declarations, substantially corroborates the testimony of Salyer.
The accused testified that the shooting was accidental, and occurred as follows:
That he "meant to step out of the door, I meant to get the shells out and got one out, and it fell on the floor, and Buck reached out and grabbed the gun and jerked it, and the gun fired."
He represents himself at the time as standing with one foot on the porch floor and the other on the doorsill, 10 inches higher; that he had the gun "broke down" to remove the shells, when Dorton seized the barrels with his right hand, discharging the gun and inflicting the wound which caused his death.
Finney & Wilson and W. W. Bird, all of Lebanon, for plaintiff in error.
The Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.
WHITTLE, J. (after stating the facts as above). As remarked in the statement of facts, there are but two assignments of error, and they will be considered in the order of their statement.
The doctrine of the admissibility of dying declarations as evidence is confined to eases of homicide where the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry. It con-stitutes an exception to the general rule which excludes the admission of hearsay evidence, and is justified on grounds of public necessity. Such declarations were admissible at common law.
In 1 East's Pleas of the Crown, p. 153, it is said:
"Evidence of this sort is admissible on the fullest necessity; for it happens that there is no third person to be an eyewitness of the fact, and the usual witness in occasions of other felonies, namely, the party injured himself, is gotten rid of."
In a note to 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (14th Ed.) § 156, it is stated that Rex v. Reason, 1 Strange, 499. (14 How. St. Tr. 1) decided in 1722, is the earliest reported English case on the subject. As is now well known, the doctrine is ingrafted on the jurisprudence of the United States and of all the states of the Union.
In Bull's Case, 14 Grat. 620, it is said: Vass' Case, 3 Leigh, 786, 24 Am. Dec. 695; Hill's Case, 2 Grat. 595. But, when admitted, the weight or credit to which such declarations are entitled is a question for the jury.
The testimony of Salyer and...
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Satterwhite v. Commonwealth Of Va.
...the “usual witness in occasions of other felonies, namely, the party injured himself, is gotten rid of.” Pippin v. Commonwealth, 117 Va. 919, 925, 86 S.E. 152, 154 (1915); 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown § 124, at 353 (1806). To qualify as a dying declaration, the victim's statement must be m......
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Connor v. State
...31 So. 942; State v. Fielding, 1907, 135 Iowa 255, 112 N.W. 539; State v. Klute, 1913, 160 Iowa 170, 140 N.W. 864; Pippin v. Commonwealth, 1915, 117 Va. 919, 86 S.E. 152; Finley v. State, 1922, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 543, 244 S.W. 526.3 Ordinarily it would appear that in a murder case a simple instru......
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Evans v. Commonwealth
...109 S.E. 201. "When admitted the weight or credit to which such declarations are entitled is a question for the jury." Pippen Commonwealth, 117 Va. 919, 86 S.E. 152, 154. "After a dying declaration, or any other evidence, has been admitted, the weight to be given to it is a matter exclusive......
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Evans v. Commonwealth
...S. E. 201. "When admitted, the weight or credit to which such declarations are entitled is a question for the jury." Pippen v. Commonwealth, 117 Va. 919, 86 S. E. 152. 154. "After a dying declaration, or any other evidence, has been admitted, the weight to be given to it is a matter exclusi......