Piquet v. Town of Chester

• Citation: 306 Conn. 173,49 A.3d 977
• Decision Date: 28 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18723.,18723.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Elise PIQUET v. TOWN OF CHESTER et al.

306 Conn. 173

49 A.3d 977

Elise PIQUET

v.TOWN OF CHESTER et al.

No. 18723.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 17, 2012.

Decided Aug. 28, 2012.

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were David McCarry, New Haven, and Mark A. Balaban, Middletown, for the appellant (plaintiff).

John S. Bennet, Essex, for the appellees (defendants).

Mark K. Branse, Glastonbury, filed a brief for the Planning and Zoning Section of the Connecticut Bar Association as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH, HARPER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.^*

ZARELLA, J.

This is a certified appeal by the plaintiff, Elise Piquet, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, the town of Chester (town) and its planning and zoning commission, and remanded the case with direction to dismiss the action. The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing the present declaratory judgment action. The defendants, in response, claim that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “The plaintiff is the owner of property at 28 South Wig Hill Road in Chester. The plaintiff resided with her husband, Christopher J. Shaboe Doll, at their residence on the property for fourteen years prior to his death on October 13, 2004. The plaintiff ... and her husband wanted to be buried side by side in Chester, and, accordingly, on October 24, 2004, the plaintiff interred her husband's remains in the backyard of her property under the supervision of a licensed funeral director. On June 8, 2005, [the town's] zoning compliance officer ¹ issued a cease and desist order with regard to the burial, for violation of the Chester zoning regulations [cease and desist order].² On August 12, 2005, the plaintiff [appealed] from the cease and desist order [to] the Chester zoning board of appeals [board], seeking a variance. On or about September 16, 2005, the zoning compliance officer specifically informed the plaintiff [by letter] that the burial was not permitted as a principal use or a special principal use in the residential district where the plaintiff's property was located, [in accordance with] § 40A of the Chester zoning regulations [September letter].³ [In the September letter, the] zoning compliance officer, however, withdrew the cease and desist order for the purpose of allowing the plaintiff time to remedy the violation. On October 15, 2005, the plaintiff notified the [board] that she was withdrawing her objection to the cease and desist order, without prejudice.

“On October 26, 2007, the plaintiff commenced an action in the trial court, requesting a judgment declaring that she has the right to use her property for the interment of her [husband's remains] and, upon her death, for [the] interment [of her remains] as well. On April 28, 2008, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 30, 2008, the court granted the motion ... and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.” Piquet v. Chester, 124 Conn.App. 518, 520–21, 5 A.3d 947 (2010). The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment. After oral argument, the Appellate Court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's action. Thereafter, the Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not appealing to the board. The Appellate Court thus reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with the direction to dismiss the plaintiff's action. Id., at 524, 5 A.3d 947.

We certified the plaintiff's appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action because the plaintiff [had] failed to exhaust her administrative remedies?” ⁴Piquet v. Chester, 299 Conn. 917, 10 A.3d 1051 (2010).

On appeal, the plaintiff makes three claims as to why the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her declaratory judgment action. First, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that she should have appealed to the board prior to filing the present action because there was no decision of the zoning compliance officer from which she could appeal. The plaintiff alternatively claims that, even if there was an appealable decision, any appeal to the board would have been futile, and, thus, she was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies. In that regard, the plaintiff also argues that the board cannot grant her requested relief. Finally, the plaintiff claims that she is challenging the validity of the zoning regulations, and, therefore, a declaratory judgment action is proper.⁵ In response, the defendants claim that (1) the cease and desist order and the September letter issued by the zoning compliance officer to the plaintiff represented decisions from which the plaintiff properly could appeal, (2) the plaintiff's futility argument reflects a misunderstanding of the futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine, and (3) the plaintiff is actually challenging the interpretation, not the validity, of a zoning ordinance, and, thus, a declaratory action is not proper.

We address these claims under a plenary standard of review. See, e.g., Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 383, 3 A.3d 892 (2010) ( “[w]e have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary” [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

I

In the present case, the Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies by appealing to the board and that only after taking that appeal and obtaining an adverse decision could she properly file the present declaratory judgment action. See Piquet v. Chester, supra, 124 Conn.App. at 524, 5 A.3d 947. The Appellate Court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she withdrew her variance application and did not otherwise appeal from the cease and desist order or the zoning compliance officer's September letter, and, therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over her action. See id., at 522–24, 5 A.3d 947.

“It is a settled principle of administrative law that if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter.... [B]ecausethe exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the ... [action].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, 263 Conn. 558, 563, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). Thus, “exhaustion of remedies serves dual functions: it protects the courts from becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency's role in administering its statutory responsibilities.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 564–65, 821 A.2d 725.

On appeal, the plaintiff first, and principally, argues that there was no decision by the town's zoning compliance officer from which she could appeal to the board. In support of this argument, the plaintiff relies on the fact that the zoning compliance officer's September letter expressly withdrew the previous cease and desist order, which, according to the plaintiff, was the only order or decision in this case from which the plaintiff could have appealed to the board. See footnotes 2 and 3 of this opinion. Thus, the plaintiff argues, there was no “decision,” within the meaning of General Statutes § 8–7⁶ and § 140G.1 of the Chester zoning regulations, ⁷ from which the plaintiff could appeal, and, therefore, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her action on the ground that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. We conclude, for the reasons that follow, that the September letter constituted a decision from which the plaintiff could appeal to the board.

There is no prior decision by this court defining what constitutes an appealable decision of a zoning compliance officer.⁸ Recently, however, the Appellate Court was presented with a similar question in Holt v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 114 Conn.App. 13, 968 A.2d 946 (2009). ⁹

In Holt, the plaintiff, Carol F. Holt, had purchased a lot in an area zoned for residential use. Id., at 16, 968 A.2d 946. The previous owner of the lot had obtained a letter from the local zoning enforcement officer informing the previous owner of the maximum allowable size for a single-family residence on the lot, and the previous owner had transferred this letter to Holt. Id., at 15–16, 968 A.2d 946. In apparent reliance on this letter, Holt filed with the zoning enforcement officer building plans for the lot and requests for a building permit and a certificate of zoning compliance. Id., at 16, 968 A.2d 946. Around this time, the defendant abutting landowner contacted the zoning enforcement officer and asked the officer to reconsider his previous letter regarding Holt's lot. Id., at 16–17, 968 A.2d 946. Holt withdrew her requests for a building permit and a certificate of zoning compliance, and published a copy of the zoning enforcement officer's letter in a local newspaper. Id., at 17, 968 A.2d 946. Shortly thereafter, the...