Pirozak v. Knight

• Decision Date: 18 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:19-cv-499
• Parties: VENDELA PIROZAK, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN KNIGHT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

VENDELA PIROZAK, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN KNIGHT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-cv-499

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

March 18, 2020

JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers

OPINION AND ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Assistant Prosecutor Jack Felgenhauer's ("Felgenhauer") Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Deputy Morgan Knight's ("Knight") Motion to Partially Dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff Vendela Pirozak ("Plaintiff") responded and Felgenhauer and Knight replied. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I.

Plaintiff commenced this action on February 14, 2019, by filing a Complaint alleging that Knight and Felgenhauer (collectively "Defendants") violated her rights under the United States' Constitution and Ohio state law. As this matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the allegations in the Complaint are taken as true and are as follows:

On January 17, 2017, Plaintiff's mother Kenturah Krankovich ("Krankovich") was driving to her and Plaintiff's home in Jewett, Ohio. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF N o. 1.) Plaintiff, who lived with Krankovich, was a passenger in the vehicle. (See id. ¶ 5.) Prior to reaching their home, a marked Harrison County Deputy Sheriff vehicle began to follow them. (Id. ¶ 4.) As Krankovich turned into her driveway, the Deputy Sheriff¹ pulled over the vehicle for suspicion of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. (Id.¶¶ 8-9.) The Deputy Sheriff radioed for assistance and asked Krankovich to step out of the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 9.) Krankovich complied and the Deputy Sheriff asked Krankovich to undergo field sobriety tests. (Id.) Krankovich performed three separate field tests. (Id.) During these field tests another Deputy Sheriff arrived and commented "well, she clearly isn't impaired." (Id.)

Plaintiff watched Krankovich complete the field sobriety tests. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also videoed her mother's interaction with the deputy sheriffs on Plaintiff's cellphone, including Krankovich's eventual arrest for suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while impaired. (Id. ¶ 11.)

Days after Krankovich's arrest, Knight called Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 17.) Knight asked whether Plaintiff had recorded Krankovich's completion of the field sobriety tests. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff answered affirmatively and Knight requested that Plaintiff give her cellphone to the Sheriff's Department. (Id.) Plaintiff declined to do so and told Knight: "I am retaining my phone and I won't give it to you. . . . [O]nce I make a copy of the video, I will give that to you. Or have my mother's lawyer give it to you." (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.)

On February 14, 2017, Plaintiff was at the Harrison County Courthouse in Cadiz, Ohio, for a hearing on an unrelated misdemeanor charge. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff waited outside the presiding judge's courtroom prior to the calling of her case. (Id ¶ 24.) At this courthouse, in order to enter a courtroom, individuals must pass through security, including a metal detector. (Id. ¶ 26.) Just before Plaintiff's case was called, Plaintiff saw Felgenhauer, a prosecutor, speaking on his cellphone. (Id. ¶ 25.) Felgenhauer called Plaintiff's case. (Id.) Before she could pass through the courtroom metal detector, Knight approached Plaintiff and asked that Plaintiff give him hercellphone. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.) Plaintiff refused, stating "you can't have it. I will make it available to you later, after my hearing and I make a copy for you." (Id. ¶ 28.)

Knight then "forcibly and unprovoked grabbed [] [P]laintiff's arm [and] twisted it . . . behind her back[,] which knocked the Plaintiff off balance and to the ground." (Id. ¶ 29.) Next, while plaintiff lay on the floor at the entrance to the metal detector, Knight grabbed Plaintiff's hand in which she was holding her cellphone. (Id.) While holding Plaintiff down on the ground, Knight twisted Plaintiff's wrist, forcing her hand to open. (Id. ¶ 31.)

During these events, Felgenhauer stood next to Plaintiff and watched as Knight knocked Plaintiff to the ground and took her cellphone. Plaintiff asserts:

The [p]rosecutor looked upon the events with a certain silent tacit approval, never trying to prevent or say something in response to the actual physical actions taken against the person of the Plaintiff, by Defendant Knight . . . It can be readily inferred, Defendant Assistant Prosecutor clearly had arranged for this confrontation to occur and had literally created the moment and circumstance, by calling the case of the Plaintiff, which alerted the Deputy to come just when the Plaintiff stepped over to the security area in front of the courtroom door.

(Id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff was deeply embarrassed and shocked and began to cry. (Id. ¶ 34.) Next:

[Plaintiff] was dragged into the little small courtroom, on the floor by her arms, by the local officer and most likely the prosecutor himself. The iPhone itself was taken forcibly from her, stripped of her and its owner and was gone. Then, she was forcibly dragged through the courtroom door, where the security device was located and [into the] courtroom itself which isn't very large but it was public. She wasn't comforted or asked if she needed attention or any [] medical assistance. Nor was she treated with dignity and respect by the Assistant Prosecutor whatsoever at this moment; instead, she was dragged into the courtroom, [through] the entrance and literally into the small inner space of the courtroom itself.

(Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff claims she "saw the Officer [] rip the phone out of her hands and [] run away, with [it] just as she was being dragged into the courtroom by the assistant prosecutor himself." (Id. ¶ 35.)

Plaintiff asserts that she was so distraught by these encounters that the presiding judge delayed calling her case, and then eventually continued the hearing to another day. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 42.) Plaintiff and Krankovich then went to the Harrison County Sheriff's Office to retrieve her phone. (Id. ¶ 43.) Krankovich requested to see a warrant for the cellphone and was told the Sheriff's Office would obtain one "if necessary." (Id.) A Deputy Sheriff let Plaintiff see her phone for a short while to retrieve some numbers from it.² (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on February 14, 2019. Plaintiff asserts claims against Knight for: (1) violation of her right not to have personal property taken without legal compensation and without due process, her right to privacy, her right to bodily integrity, her right to proper legal process, her right to counsel, her right to trial, and her right not to be assaulted under the Fourteenth Amendment (id. ¶ 62.); (2) assault and battery under state law (id. ¶ 60); (3) violation of her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment (id. ¶ 59); and (4) false imprisonment and use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment (id. ¶ 61).³

Plaintiff asserts claims against Felgenhauer for: (1) violation of her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment (id. ¶ 59); and (2) use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment (id. ¶ 61). Plaintiff asserts all of the above claims in the Defendants' official and personal capacities. (Id. at 1.)

Plaintiff also asserts the following claims against Knight and Felgenhauer on behalf of Krankovich: (1) violation of due process; (2) violation of right to counsel; and (3) violation of rightto trial, all under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 19.)

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for "the intentional and wanton serious mental and emotional harm, anxiety and intense suffering[,] humiliation[,] and embarrassment . . . " (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. (Id. at 21-22.)

On June 3, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them in their official capacities, arguing the claims are barred by sovereign immunity. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 7-8.) Felgenhauer moves to dismiss all claims filed against him in his personal capacity arguing he has absolute immunity. (Id. at 4-7.) Felgenhauer also moves to dismiss the claim of the failure to intervene, under Rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 15-16.)

Knight moves to dismiss the claims against him for violations of the rights: not to undergo a taking, to privacy, to bodily integrity, to counsel, to legal process, not to undergo an assault, and to trial, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Id. at 8-16.) Knight also claims Plaintiff did not file a claim for assault and battery in violation of state law, and even if Plaintiff did or intends to do so, the claim is time barred. (Defs.' Reply at 3.) Knight does not, however, move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against him for violation of her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment or for violation of her right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 7-8.)

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss the claims Plaintiff asserts on behalf of Krankovich for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 16-18.)

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 authorizes dismissal of a lawsuit for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To meet this standard, thecomplaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the...