Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc., 75 Civ. 3793.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75 Civ. 3793.,75 Civ. 3793.
• Citation: 432 F. Supp. 840
• Parties: John PIRRE, Plaintiff, v. PRINTING DEVELOPMENTS, INC. and Time, Incorporated, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

432 F. Supp. 840

John PIRRE, Plaintiff, v. PRINTING DEVELOPMENTS, INC. and Time, Incorporated, Defendants.

No. 75 Civ. 3793.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

May 6, 1977.

Tobias Weiss, Stamford, Conn., for plaintiff.

Sharfman, Shanman & Poret, P. C., New York City, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WHITMAN KNAPP, District Judge.

Plaintiff, (a resident of Connecticut) a former employee of Printing Developments, Inc. (P.D.I.) (a New York corporation), a wholly owned subsidiary of Time, Inc. (a New York corporation) brought this diversity action for wrongful discharge and for libel and slander. After discovery was complete defendants moved for summary judgment. While that motion was sub judice, plaintiff applied for leave to file an amended complaint. Drawing, as we must, from the affidavits before us every inference in plaintiff's favor, the following emerges:

Plaintiff had since 1947 been employed as an engineering aide by the defendants. He had performed his services with outstanding success and was highly regarded by all of P.D.I.'s employees as well as by the outside contractors with whom he worked. In 1970 there occurred a change in management and Brian M. Chapman became plaintiff's superior. New management — especially Mr. Chapman — started innovating new policies. Plaintiff, having the benefit of years of experience, could see that these new policies would be disastrous. In loyal discharge of his obligations to the corporation, he so advised Mr. Chapman. Disregarding plaintiff's advice, Mr. Chapman proceeded to implement the new policies. As plaintiff had forecast, disaster followed.

Not unpredictably this turn of events caused Mr. Chapman to hate plaintiff, and he determined to get rid of him. Since plaintiff had no contract of employment but was working "at will" Mr. Chapman could have fired him out-of-hand, giving no reason. However, apparently fearing that such action would disgrace himself and the corporation in the eyes of plaintiff's fellow employees and of those outside contractors who had over the years developed respect for plaintiff, Mr. Chapman together with other members of management decided to make a "paper record" to justify the firing. This paper record consisted of a series of memoranda to plaintiff, each containing accusations of disloyalty known to be false, and each containing a hypocritical and self-serving declaration of good will and esteem for plaintiff.

Not content with causing these memoranda to be written, Mr. Chapman saw to it that their contents were widely disseminated among plaintiff's fellow employees and among those of P.D.I.'s contractors as had previously held plaintiff in high esteem. The obvious and intended consequence of this conduct was to cause plaintiff to be held in obloquy and shunned by his former friends, and to cause him untold and predictable emotional stress and pain, and financial loss.

Upon the foregoing facts, plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the corporation¹ for wrongful discharge and for defamation. We conclude that summary judgment dismissing the former claim is appropriate but that issues of fact remain as to the latter.

With respect to his action for wrongful discharge, the plaintiff is met with the insuperable obstacle that his employment was at will and that as a result he could be discharged for any reason or for no reason. Laiken v. American Bank & Trust Co. (1st Dept. 1970) 34 A.D.2d 514, 308 N.Y.S.2d 111; Boucher v. Godfrey (1935) 119 Conn. 622, 178 A. 655.² The contrary decisions which plaintiff cites are inapposite. For example the case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (1974) 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 is clearly sui generis. Even if we were to assume that it would be followed in New York or Connecticut were its peculiar facts to occur in either jurisdiction, it has no application to the situation at bar.

With respect to plaintiff's claim for libel and slander, defendants argue that because he is not suing Mr. Chapman and the other supervisors who defamed him but the corporate employer, his complaint has no legal basis. According to the defendants, either Mr. Chapman and the others were actuated by personal malice and spite or by a desire to protect the interests of the corporation (or by both). If (or to the extent which) the former was the motivation, Mr. Chapman (and the others)³ were off on frolics of their own, and the corporation is not responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Sauter v. New York Tribune (1953) 305 N.Y. 442, 113 N.E.2d 790; Cardona v. Valentin (1970) 160 Conn. 18, 273 A.2d 697. If (or to the extent which) the latter was their motivation, the corporation is fully protected by the qualified privilege for communications in which the participants have an interest described in Stillman v. Ford (1968), 22 N.Y.2d 48, 290 N.Y.S.2d 893, 238 N.E.2d 304. In that case the former president of a foundation claimed that individual officials of the organization defamed him when they criticized his position on certain questions of policy and his performance as executive. The Court of Appeals ruled:

"The parties herein were engaged in a dispute about the policy of an institution in which they all were deeply interested. In defending their respective positions, each faction accused the other of misrepresenting its views in order to win support. Whether or not, in the final analysis, any of these accusations were true or false is hardly relevant. As long as the statements were motivated not by ill will or personal spite but by a sincerely held desire to protect the institution, they are not actionable." 22 N.Y.2d at 53, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 897, 238 N.E.2d at 306.

Accord, Terry v. Hubbell (Sup.Ct. New Haven Co. 1960), 22 Conn.Sup. 248, 167 A.2d 919, 3 Restatement of Torts §§ 593 et seq. Thus, defendants urge, in order to overcome the privilege plaintiff must show that the defendants he is suing acted with malice or exceeded the scope of the privilege. Since plaintiff has selected corporations rather than individuals as defendants and since an individual's malice cannot be imputed to his employer, defendants further urge, plaintiff must prove that there was a corporate purpose to act with malice towards himself. Defendants conclude that because plaintiff has offered no evidence to suggest such a purpose the complaint must be dismissed.

Although we found defendants' argument initially appealing we must reject it. It is...