Pisello v. Town of Brookhaven

• Decision Date: 10 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. CV 95-2960 (ADS).,CV 95-2960 (ADS).
• Citation: 933 F. Supp. 202
• Parties: Peter PISELLO and Rainbow Property Management Corp., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, John Lamura, Individually and as Supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven; Edward Hennessey, Both Individually and as a Member of the Town Board of Brookhaven; and Andrew Dark, Both Individually and as Chief Building Inspector for the Town of Brookhaven, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

933 F. Supp. 202

Peter PISELLO and Rainbow Property Management Corp., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, John Lamura, Individually and as Supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven; Edward Hennessey, Both Individually and as a Member of the Town Board of Brookhaven; and Andrew Dark, Both Individually and as Chief Building Inspector for the Town of Brookhaven, Defendants.

No. CV 95-2960 (ADS).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

July 10, 1996.

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E. Christopher Murray, Hempstead, New York, for plaintiffs.

Richard Charles Hamburger, P.C., Melville, New York, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge:

This lawsuit arises from the claims of the plaintiffs, Peter Pisello and Rainbow Property Management Corp. ("Rainbow," collectively "Pisello" or the "plaintiff") that the defendants, the Town of Brookhaven (the "Town"), John LaMura ("LaMura"), Edward Hennessey ("Hennessey"), and Andrew Dark ("Dark," collectively the "defendants") violated their constitutional and common law rights. The gravamen of the plaintiff's allegations is that the defendants discriminated against him because of his role in locating minorities in public housing in the Shirley/Mastic area of Suffolk County, New York.

In his Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleges causes of action for constitutional violations of the equal protection clause, procedural and substantive due process, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985, and a common law claim for defamation. The defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(c). The plaintiff opposes the defendants' motion and cross moves to serve a Second Amended Complaint to include a cause of action for violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617.

I. Background

The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint. Rainbow Property Management Corp. is a New York corporation which rents offices located at 1402 Montauk Highway in Mastic, New York. Peter Pisello is a resident of Mastic, New York and is an officer, director, and the sole Rainbow shareholder. Rainbow is engaged in the "management and leasing of rental properties in the Shirley/Mastic area located within the Town of Brookhaven." The lion's share of Rainbow's business involves locating African American and Hispanic individuals who receive government assistance in rental housing.

The defendant Town of Brookhaven, a municipality organized under the laws of the State of New York, is located in Suffolk County. The defendant John LaMura, at all times relevant to this litigation was the Supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven. Edward Hennessey was a member of the Town Council and Andrew Dark was the Town's Chief Building Inspector.

As stated above, the plaintiff is engaged in the leasing and management of rental properties in the Shirley/Mastic area of the Town of Brookhaven. According to the Amended Complaint, his success resulted in a "strong backlash from the existing, predominately Caucasian, members of the Shirley/Mastic community, and for a number of years certain local businesses and individuals ... have openly expressed contempt for the plaintiff because of his business." Part of this "backlash" includes being "blackballed" from the local chamber of commerce, the president of which, Pat Peluso, owns a competing real estate brokerage firm. Moreover, the plaintiff has been the subject of numerous physical threats and harassment by members of the community which culminated in the fire bombing of his offices.

After the premises were destroyed, the owner, Thomas Brennan ("Brennan") sought to rebuild at the same location. Although Brennan filed the necessary applications, Dark, as the Town's Chief Building Inspector "arbitrarily refused to act" on the applications. The plaintiff pleads upon information and belief that Dark's refusal to process the applications was the result of community policy "adopted and implemented" by the Town Supervisor John LaMura and Councilman Edward Hennessey to curtail the influx of minorities in the Shirley/Mastic area.

Nevertheless, in December 1994, the building located at 1402 Montauk Highway was reconstructed and the plaintiff was able to resume his business. When this occurred, according to the plaintiff, members of the community sought the aid of defendants LaMura and Hennessey. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that Peluso solicited the aid of Councilman Hennessey, whom he had supported in his bids for elected office, to assist in "forcing the plaintiff out of business." As a result of this meeting, the defendants conspired against the plaintiff by bringing a civil suit against his landlord for failure to obtain the requisite permits for the leased property. It is alleged that based on that civil suit, the defendants subsequently closed the plaintiff's place of business without notice or a hearing, even though the leased property did not pose a threat to public health or safety.

According to Pisello, the defendants further violated his constitutional rights by singling out the minority occupied properties he manages for inspections and by threatening the owners of those properties because they continued to work with the plaintiff. The details of these threats are not identified. On at least one occasion however two properties occupied by African Americans located 125 Patchogue Avenue and 127 Patchogue Avenue in Mastic were singled out for inspection and searched by Town officials including the defendant Hennessey. Although the defendants issued a press release on June 9, 1995 stating that these searches were based on complaints filed with respect to these properties, Pisello alleges that no such complaints were ever made.

According to the plaintiff, the press release contained the following statement by defendant Hennessey:

Rainbow's actions in constructing a building and ignoring the Town's permit procedures in the process raises serious questions standards sic in their business practices. That is why Rainbow Property Management sic are a blight to our communities and a threat to the health and safety of the tenants who are placed there.... This action by Rainbow Properties and its principals demonstrate that they conducted their business affairs in complete disregard for the standards of law that are in place, not only to protect social services tenants, but to maintain the integrity of those communities who have endure sic slumlord business practices.

In addition to Hennessey's statement, the same press release contains the following statement by defendant LaMura:

Rainbow Properties sic Management is the largest property management company for landlords dealing with Social Services clients in the Mastic/Shirley area. For them to represent themselves as experts in this area to their clients while disregarding the Town Code in their own construction project suggests a certain level of contempt for the law.

According to the Amended Complaint, these statements are false and were made with "malice," "knowledge of their falsity," "reckless disregard for the truth" and "improper motive." Specifically, Pisello alleges that LaMura and Hennessey knew that he was not the owner of the premises located at 1402 Montauk Highway and that he had no connection to that building's construction. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Hennessey used his influence to have all social service applications made by minority tenants of the properties managed by Rainbow or other minority applicants using the plaintiff's services forwarded to his office in order to "delay their processing."

As a result of the defendants' activities, the plaintiff was forced to relocate his business and property owners cancelled their listings and contracts for fear of reprisals with the Town. Pisello seeks $660,000 in compensatory damages, $2,000,000 in punitive damages and attorneys' fees and costs.

Based on these facts, the plaintiff alleges constitutional violations of the equal protection clause, substantive and procedural due process, infringement of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 and a common law claim for defamation. The defendants now move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the entire Amended Complaint. Pisello opposes the defendants motion, arguing that he has adequately alleged his claims and cross moves for leave to serve a Second Amended Complaint to add a cause of action pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617.

II. Discussion

A. The standard for judgment on the pleadings

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where material facts are undisputed and a judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the contents of the pleadings. Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.1988). In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept as true all of the non-movant's well pleaded factual allegations, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-movant. Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 1994); DeSantis v. United States, 783 F.Supp. 165, 168 (S.D.N.Y.1992). Unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief, the court can not grant a defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.) (when deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, the court applies the same standard as that applicable to a 12(b)(6) motion), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 73, 130 L.Ed.2d 28 (1994); George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1977).

In its discretion and upon notice to the parties, a court may consider materials outside the pleadings. If it does so and notice is given to the parties, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is...