PITCHFORD V. State Of Miss.
| Decision Date | 24 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2006-DP-00441-SCT,2006-DP-00441-SCT |
| Parties | TERRY PITCHFORD v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
¶1 Terry Pitchford and an accomplice killed a store-owner in Grenada County during the course of an armed robbery. Pitchford was indicted, tried, and convicted of capital murder, and the jury found that he should be executed by lethal injection. He appeals, raising for our review seventeen issues. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
¶2. On the morning of November 7, 2004, Walter Davis and his son entered the Crossroads Grocery, where they discovered the body of the owner, Reuben Britt. They immediately called 911, and Grenada County Sheriff's Department Investigator Greg Conley responded.
¶3. During his initial investigation at the scene, Investigator Conley observed that some of Britt's wounds appeared to have been made by a projectile, and others by pellets, suggesting to Investigator Conley that two different weapons were involved. Missing from the store were a cash register, some cash, and a.38 caliber revolver loaded with "rat shot." Also during his initial investigation, Investigator Conley received information suggesting that a vehicle owned by Terry Pitchford matched the description of the car used by Britt's assailants, and that Pitchford had been part of a previous attempt to rob the Crossroads Grocery.
¶4. At Pitchford's home, Conley found a car matching the description of the one involved in the homicide at the Crossroad's grocery. After a search of the vehicle produced the missing.38 caliber revolver, Pitchford was taken into custody.
¶5. On November 7 and 8, 2004, Investigator Conley and Investigator Robert Jennings of the local district attorney's office interviewed Pitchford. During those interviews, Pitchford confessed that he and Eric Bullin had gone to the store with the intention of robbing it. Pitchford stated that Bullin had shot Britt three times with a.22 caliber pistol, and that he (Pitchford) had fired shots into the floor. Pitchford also confessed that he had attempted to rob the same store a week and a half prior to the murder on November 7.
Pitchford also confessed his role in the murders to fellow inmates Dantron Mitchell and James Hatchcock.
¶6. On January 11, 2005, the Grenada County Grand Jury indicted Pitchford for capital murder. After he was appointed counsel, he was arraigned on February 9, 2005, and jury selection commenced on February 6, 2006. Of the 350 registered voters of Grenada County who were summoned to a special venire, 126 returned jury questionnaires and appeared upon their summonses. Of these, forty were African-American, eighty-four were Caucasion, one was Hispanic, and one did not provide race information.
¶7. The trial judge (without objection from either party) excused certain jurors for statutory cause and other reasons unrelated to the case. At that point, the venire stood at ninety-six, of which thirty-five were African-American, and sixty-one were white. Following voir dire by the attorneys, the trial judge (without objection from either party) struck fifty-two prospective jurors for cause and three others for reasons not disclosed in the record, leaving thirty-six white persons and five African-Americans in the venire.
¶8. The attorneys were allowed to exercise strikes only on the twelve lowest-numbered members of the venire. Each time a strike was exercised, the next lowest-numbered juror joined the twelve potential jurors subject to peremptory strikes. The State exercised seven peremptory strikes, and Pitchford exercised twelve. The persons who replaced the nineteen strikes, plus the original twelve, resulted in thirty-one potential jurors subject to peremptory strikes by the attorneys.
¶9. Of the thirty-one potential jurors subject to peremptory strikes, Pitchford struck twelve whites and no African-Americans. Thus, there were nineteen potential jurors-fourteen ofwhom were whites and five of whom were African-Americans-subject to the State's peremptory strikes. Although the State was allowed twelve peremptory strikes, it exercised only seven-three whites and four African-Americans.
¶10. Following jury selection, the case proceeded to trial, and on February 8, 2006, the jury found Pitchford guilty of capital murder. On February 9, the case proceeded to the penalty phase, at which the jury imposed a sentence of death by lethal injection. Pitchford filed a motion for a new trial on February 17, 2006, which was denied. He timely filed his notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Additionally, we have stated that "what may be harmless error in a case with less at stake becomes reversible error when the penalty is death."2 Bearing in mind our standard of review, we shall now proceed to analyze Pitchford's assignments of error in the order in which he presented them.
I. WHETHER THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF PITCHFORD'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE OF DEATH.
¶12. In his first assignment of error, Pitchford makes three arguments, which we shall address in turn.
A. Whether The State Discriminated On The Basis Of Race In Its Peremptory Strikes In Violation of Batson v. Kentucky.
¶13. Citing Batson v. Kentucky3 Pitchford asserts the State exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.4 In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the State of Kentucky was prohibited from racially discriminating through its exercise of peremptory strikes.5 Building on Batson, the Supreme Court later stated that the Constitution forbids striking even a single juror for a discriminatory purpose.6 For purposes of analyzing a claim of discrimination in jury selection, Batson and its progeny have established a three-step inquiry for courts to follow.
¶14. First, the party objecting to the peremptory strike of a potential juror must make a prima facie showing that race was the criterion for the strike. Second, upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for excluding that particular juror. Finally, after a race-neutral explanation has been offered by the prosecution, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there hasbeen purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory strike, i.e., that the reason given was a pretext for discrimination.7
Prima facie showing
¶15. As stated, a trial court faced with a Batson challenge must determine whether the defense8 has made a prima facie showing that race was the criterion for the prosecution's strike. This Court has held that the required prima facie showing can be made by demonstrating that the percentage of the State's peremptory strikes exercised on members of the protected class was significantly higher than the percentage of members of the protected class in the venire.9
¶16. Pitchford points out in his brief that the State used only seven of its peremptory strikes, four of which removed African-Americans from the venire. As a result, only one African-American remained on the jury of fourteen (twelve jurors and two alternates). This, Pitchford argues, is incompatible with the fact that, in 2006, African-Americans made up approximately forty percent of Grenada County's population. In that regard, the following exchange occurred at trial:
In his motion for a new trial, Pitchford stated the following:
The state was allowed to use all of its peremptory challenges to remove all but one African-American from the jury resulting in a jury composed of less than 10% African-American citizens selected from a county with nearly a 45% African-American population.
Although Pitchford's counsel made these assertions, he presented the trial judge no evidence of the racial makeup of Grenada County. And regardless of the racial makeup of Grenada County, we are persuaded that the record supports the trial court's finding of a prima facie showing of discrimination.
¶17. The racial makeup of the venire subject to the State's peremptory strikes10 was fourteen whites (seventy-four percent), and five blacks (twenty-six percent). Thus, statistically speaking, 11 if all other factors were equal, the State's peremptory strikes should approximate these percentages, resulting in the state striking either one or two African- Americans.12 However, the State used fifty-seven percent of its peremptory strikes on African-Americans. Stated another way, the State used fifty-seven percent of its peremptory strikes (four out of seven) to remove African-Americans from a venire comprised of twentysix percent African American and seventy-four percent white. While the difference in these...
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