Pitman v. Lynn Gas & Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1922
• Citation: 241 Mass. 322,135 N.E. 223
• Parties: PITMAN v. LYNN GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

241 Mass. 322

135 N.E. 223

PITMAN

v.LYNN GAS & ELECTRIC CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

May 1, 1922.

Report from Superior Court, Essex County; Nelson P. Brown, Judge.

Action by Dorothy L. Pitman against the Lynn Gas & Electric Company for personal injuries sustained in using a gas flatiron purchased from defendant, a dealer, by a third person, who loaned it to plaintiff. Reported from the superior court, after a verdict for plaintiff. Judgment for defendant.

Frederick E. Shaw and George F. Hogan, both of Lynn, for plaintiff.

Starr Parsons, Arthur G. Wadleigh, and Patrick F. Crowley, all of Lynn, for defendant.

CARROLL, J.

The defendant is engaged in the manufacture and sale of gas and electricity and also in the business of selling gas and electrical appliances. It bought from the manufacturer, the William M. Crane Company, Vulcan gas flatirons, and sold one of them to a purchaser, who gave the plaintiff permission to use it. On August 27, 1917, while the plaintiff was using the appliance, her clothing caught fire from a ‘blue flame’ coming from the side of the flatiron and she was severely burned. There was evidence that the purchaser had observed that the handle of the flatiron would at times get hot, and if used for any great length of time small flames would come from the holes on the side, and that it would smoke. An expert, called by the plaintiff, testified in substance that the flatiron was fundamentally defective, and that the size of the holes would cause flames to come out. There was evidence that the articles were supplied the defendant by the manufacturer in separate boxes; that the defendant inspected each iron to see that there was no fault in its construction. There was also evidence that neither the maker nor the defendant had known prior to the sale by the defendant of flames bursting from the flatiron as claimed by the plaintiff. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judge reported the case to this court.

The plaintiff did not purchase the flatiron from the Lynn Gas & Electric Company. She had no contractual relations with the defendant and it was not the manufacturer of the appliance.

It has been frequently decided and it is the settled law of this commonwealth that neither the seller nor manufacturer is, under ordinary circumstances, liable for mere negligence to a third person with whom he has no contractual relations.

‘The general principal applicable to this class of cases is, that a vendor takes on himself no duty or obligation other than that which results from his contract. For a breach of this, he is liable only to those with whom he contracted. All others are strangers. The law fastens on him no general or public duty arising out of his contract, for a breach of which he can be held liable to those not in privity with him.’ Davidson v. Nichols, 11 Allen, 514, 518.

There are many reasons for this rule, as pointed out in the recent case of Tompkins v. Quaker Oats Co., 239 Mass. 147, 131 N. E. 456; there is the absence of legal duty to a mere stranger, the break in the chain of legal causation, and the multiplicity of suits which would follow if third persons could recover. The rule exempting the seller or manufacturer from liability to strangers for negligence has been frequently applied. See Tompkins v. Quaker Oats Co., supra, where the manufacturer of poultry food was held not liable for its negligence in the preparation of the food, to the plaintiff, who purchased if from a dealer to whom the defendant sold it; Windram Manuf. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N. E. 454, paste or cement purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant's customer; Burnham v. Lincoln, 225 Mass. 408, 114 N. E. 715, explosion of a carboy lent to the plaintiff's employer; Kusick v. Thorndike & Hix, Inc., 224 Mass. 413, 112 N. E. 1025, where a can of lime sold by the defendant to the plaintiff's vendor exploded; Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N. E. 482, employee injured by a bursting emery wheel bought of defendant by plaintiff's employer. And see Thomas v. Lane, 221 Mass. 447, 450, 109 N. E. 363, L. R. A. 1916F, 1077, where a guest of a tenant was injured by reason of the landlord's negligence and it was held that the latter was not liable for the injury. See also Newhall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625.

There is a well-known exception to this rule: When a defendant knowingly sets in motion a dangerous article, or, as commonly expressed, where the article is recognized as inherently dangerous to life or property, the manufacturer or seller may be liable to remote purchasers. Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, 96 Am. Dec. 682;Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64;Thornhill v....