Pitre Tucker v. Chatfield

• Docket Number: 2023 CA 0343
• Decision Date: 09 November 2023
• Parties: VARILE RAE ANN PITRE TUCKER v. CECELIA CHATFIELD, ET AL
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

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VARILE RAE ANN PITRE TUCKER v. CECELIA CHATFIELD, ET AL

No. 2023 CA 0343

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit

November 9, 2023

Appealed from the 23rd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Ascension State of Louisiana Case No. 124,516 The Honorable Alvin Turner, Jr., Judge Presiding

Jacque B. Pucheu, Jr. Eunice, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Varile Rae Ann Pitre Tucker

Samuel P. Baumgartner Travis L. Simmons Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Homesite Insurance Company

Mark R. Pharr, III Lafayette, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant Cecelia Chatfield

BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.

LANIER, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a dog-bite case granting the motion for summary judgment filed by an insurer and dismissing plaintiffs claims against the insurer with prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 30, 2019, Varile Rae Ann Pitre Tucker filed suit against Cecelia Chatfield and Homesite Insurance Company ("Homesite"), as the homeowners' insurer of the premises where the incident occurred. Therein, Ms. Tucker alleged that on February 8, 2018, Ms. Chatfield was a resident of 11182 River Highlands Drive, Unit 12B, St. Amant Louisiana ("Unit 12B") and had care, custody, and control of the property. She further asserted that Ms Chatfield's grandparents, Douglas and Diana Wade, were the named insureds under the homeowners' policy issued by Homesite.^[1] According to Ms. Tucker's petition, Ms. Chatfield lived in Unit 12B with her minor son and the dog who attacked Ms. Tucker, a Great Dane.^[2] On the date in question, Ms. Tucker, a resident of Unit 5A in the same condominium complex, left her unit to retrieve her mail at the community mailbox. At the same time, Ms. Chatfield's son was walking the dog in the parking lot of the condominium complex. As alleged by Ms. Tucker, the dog pulled the leash out of the boy's hand and began to run free, eventually knocking her to the ground and causing her to suffer injuries and damages.

Ms. Chatfield and Homesite each filed an answer to the petition, generally denying the allegations therein. Thereafter, Homesite filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that there was no coverage under the Homesite policy because Ms. Chatfield was not an "insured" under the policy and that Unit 12B did not meet the definition of an "insured location." Ms. Tucker opposed the motion for summary judgment, pointing to special provisions of the policy concerning the death of a person named in the declarations and the resulting coverage afforded to Ms. Chatfield because she had temporary custody of the property.

The motion was heard on October 11, 2022. Following arguments, the matter was taken under advisement. Subsequently, on November 6, 2022, the trial court issued reasons for judgment finding that Ms. Chatfield did not meet the definition of an insured under the policy because she was neither a named insured nor a resident relative of Diana Wade. On January 10, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment, granting Homesite's motion for summary judgment, dismissing, with prejudice, all claims filed by Ms. Tucker against Homesite, and ordering that Homesite owed no defense or indemnity to Ms. Chatfield for the incident in question.

From the January 10, 2023 judgment, Ms. Tucker appeals, contending that the trial court committed error in:

(1) finding that Diana Wade was the sole owner of Unit 12B;

(2) finding that Diana Wade was the only named insured under the Homesite policy;

(3) failing to address her argument with regard to Section I and Section II Conditions of the policy ("the death provisions"), which extended liability coverage by declaring that an insured includes the person having proper temporary custody of the property until the appointment or qualification of a legal representative; and

(4) failing to find a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Chatfield had temporary custody of the insured premises.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo under the same criteria governing the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Huggins v. Amtrust Insurance Company of Kansas, Inc., 2020-0516 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 319 So.3d 362, 365. A court shall grant summary judgment if the pleadings, memorandum, and admissible supporting documents show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(3). Material facts are those that potentially ensure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant's success, or determine the outcome of a legal dispute. Daniels v. USAgencies Cas. Ins. Co., 2011-1357 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/3/12), 92 So.3d 1049, 1055.

The summary judgment movant maintains the burden of proof. Nevertheless, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court on the motion, his burden is satisfied by pointing out an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual support sufficient to establish he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1). If the adverse party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and, if appropriate, the court shall render summary judgment against him. See La. Code Civ. P arts. 966(D)(1) and 967(B).

Thus, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must first determine whether the supporting documents presented by the mover are sufficient to resolve all material factual issues. If not, summary judgment must be denied in favor of a trial on the merits. Crockerham v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, 2017-1590 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/18), 255 So.3d 604, 608.

It is important to note, however, that when a motion for summary judgment is made and properly supported, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of her pleading. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967(B). Therefore, we must first conduct a de novo review of the evidence submitted with the motion for summary judgment and determine if there were no genuine issues of material fact. Crockerham, 255 So.3d at 608.

Legal Precepts

Summary judgment is appropriate for determining issues relating to insurance coverage. See La. Code Civ. P. art 966(E); Bosse v. Access Home Insurance Company, 2018-0482 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/17/18), 267 So.3d 1142, 1145. Additionally, interpretation of an insurance policy is usually a legal question that can be properly resolved by means of a motion for summary judgment. Sanchez v. Callegan, 99-0137 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 753 So.2d 403, 405. However, summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance policy may not be rendered unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy under which coverage could be afforded. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183.

An insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurer and has the effect of law between the parties. Highlands Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Foley, 96-1018 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 1336, 1340. Thus, an insurance policy should be construed using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code. Mayo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003-1801 (La. 2/25/04), 869 So.2d 96, 99. See also Billiot v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriffs Office, 98-0246 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 735 So.2d 17, 24, writ denied, 99-1376 (La. 7/2/99), 747 So.2d 22. The judiciary's role in interpreting an insurance policy is to determine the common intent of the parties to the contract. Mayo, 869 So.2d at 99. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2045. The initial determination of the parties' intent is found in the insurance policy itself. See La. Civ. Code art. 2046. When a contract can be construed from the four comers of the policy without extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law. Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741, 749-750.

The parties' intent, as reflected by the words of an insurance policy, determines the extent of coverage. Such intent is to be determined in accordance with the plain, ordinary, and popular sense of the language used in the policy, unless the words have acquired a technical meaning. See La. Civ. Code art. 2047; Highlands Underwriters, 691 So.2d at 1340. If the language in an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, the agreement must be enforced as written, and a reasonable interpretation consistent with the obvious meaning and intent of the policy must be given. Highlands Underwriters, 691 So.2d at 1340; Robinson v. Heard, 2001-1697 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 943, 945. Further, the party seeking coverage under an insurance policy (in this case, Ms. Tucker) has the burden of proving the existence of coverage, which includes proving that the defendant (in this case, Ms. Chatfield) is insured by the policy at issue. See Beavers v. Hanover Insurance Company, 2021-0070 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/8/21), 331 So.3d 340, 343.

If the contract cannot be construed based on language contained therein due to an ambiguity, the court may look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent. Maldonado v. Kiewit Louisiana Co., 2013-0756 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/14), 146 So.3d 210, 218. When making the determination as to the parties' intent, any ambiguities within the policy must be construed in favor of the insured to effect not deny, coverage. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2000-0947 (La. 12/19/00), 774...