Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University
Decision Date | 04 December 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 23,074-CA,23,074-CA |
Citation | 596 So.2d 1324 |
Parties | Earl G. PITRE, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. 596 So.2d 1324, 74 Ed. Law Rep. 425 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Jones, Tete, Nolen, Hanchey, Swift & Spears by Gregory P. Massey, Lake Charles, for appellants.
Hudson, Potts & Bernstein by W. Craig Henry, Monroe, for appellee.
Before SEXTON, LINDSAY and BROWN, JJ.
The plaintiff, Earl G. Pitre, Jr. was injured in a sledding accident on campus while a student at Louisiana Tech University. The plaintiff and his parents, Earl G. Pitre, Sr. and Joan Pitre, filed suit against the defendants, Louisiana Tech University and the State of Louisiana, through the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, for damages and loss of consortium. The defendants, as well as the plaintiffs, filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. However, the trial court sustained the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The plaintiffs have appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment.
In early January, 1988, a snow and ice storm occurred in northeast Louisiana which affected the Louisiana Tech campus in Ruston. On the evening of January 7, 1988, Earl Pitre, Jr., along with numerous other students, engaged in sledding down a hill close to the Thomas Assembly Center on campus. The hill was approximately 85 feet high, measuring from its crest to the bottom. The hill led down to the parking lot of the Thomas Assembly Center. The parking lot measured 143 feet from the grass at the bottom of the hill to a line of large light posts encased in concrete used to illuminate the parking lot. The lights were spaced approximately 150 feet apart.
Students were using homemade sleds, pieces of cardboard and trash can lids for sledding. The students would sled down the hill and into the parking lot which was covered with ice. Mr. Pitre had sledded down the hill several times prior to his accident.
When the accident occurred, Mr. Pitre rode down the hill head first, lying on his back on a large trash can lid, accompanied by several other persons. The group struck one of the light posts in the parking lot and Mr. Pitre injured his spinal column. He is now paralyzed from approximately the mid-chest down.
In their suit, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants were negligent in several respects. The campus housing authority issued a bulletin to all students regarding activities during winter storms. This bulletin stated that sledding was permitted except around the Tech Drive area, due to the vehicle traffic in that location. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants were negligent in failing to prohibit sledding around the Thomas Assembly Center and in failing to warn of the hazards of sledding in that area. They further allege that the defendants were negligent in encouraging sledding in areas known to be hazardous and in failing to erect cushions around the base of the light posts in the parking lot.
On November 28, 1990, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendants contended that the presence of the light posts in the parking lot was easily observable in the exercise of reasonable care and that because the presence of the posts was as obvious to Earl Pitre, Jr., as to the defendants, the defendants had no duty to warn of the existence of this condition.
On December 5, 1990, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants failed to take precautions to prohibit sledding near the Thomas Assembly Center. They also argued that the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff to warn of the danger involved in sledding near the Thomas Assembly Center, an area which was unreasonably dangerous to persons who thought they were engaging in University sanctioned sledding activities. The plaintiffs also argued that the defendants owed a duty to make the area safe for sledding after representing to the students that the area was safe. The plaintiffs contend the defendants should have had cushioning around the base of the light post. Therefore, the plaintiffs contended that because the defendants clearly breached a duty to Earl Pitre, Jr., the plaintiffs were entitled to a partial summary judgment finding liability on the part of the defendants, leaving for trial only the amount of damages and the plaintiff's comparative negligence.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' demands with prejudice. In reasons for judgment, the trial court found that there were no disputed issues of material fact and therefore the question was whether either the plaintiffs or the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The trial court based its finding on an analysis of whether Louisiana Tech owed a duty to Earl Pitre, Jr. which encompassed the risk he encountered. The trial court noted that the plaintiffs contended that the defendants should have put cushions around the light posts in the parking lot. The court then examined whether the uncushioned light post represented an unreasonable risk of harm that the University had a duty to protect against. The trial court found that because the area was well-lit and the light post was easily visible, the defendants had no duty to cushion the light post.
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants had a duty to warn. In this case, the trial court found there was no such duty. The court reasoned that a landowner is not liable where the injured party had knowledge of the potential danger and did not act reasonably to prevent the harm. The court then found that the consequences and likelihood of striking the light post were readily apparent to the plaintiff.
The court also found there was no duty to totally prohibit sledding, reasoning that such a duty would require the defendants to renounce and prohibit every imaginable act which might bring harm to a student and that the defendants could not be held responsible in every case where a student is injured by his own bad judgment.
The trial court found that the defendants were not negligent in the issuance of the bulletin to the students. The court found that this did not create an affirmative duty to warn against every known risk of harm associated with sledding. The court stated that the risks of harm were or should have been apparent to all potential sledders.
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court judgment. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and erred in denying their own motion for partial summary judgment.
In their first two assignments of error, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in failing to construe the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, in this case, the plaintiffs. Rather, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court construed the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants. The plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred in finding that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff, Earl Pitre, Jr. Because these assignments of error are interrelated, they will be considered together.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by LSA-C.C.P. Art. 966 which provides, in pertinent part:
A. The plaintiff or defendant in the principal or incidental action, with or without supporting affidavits, may move for a summary judgment in his favor for all or part of the relief for which he has prayed. The plaintiff's motion may be made at any time after the answer has been filed. The defendant's motion may be made at any time.
B. ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Upon trial of the motion for summary judgment, the burden rests upon the mover to show convincingly that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ledbetter v. Myers, 438 So.2d 700 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983).
Because the mover has the burden of establishing that no material factual issue exists, inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the materials before the court must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Ledbetter v. Myers, supra; Burke v. Occidental Life Insurance Company of California, 427 So.2d 1165 (La.1983).
A summary judgment is not appropriate where the trier of fact must weigh conflicting evidence in order to reach a conclusion upon which reasonable men could differ. Sanders v. City of Blanchard, 438 So.2d 714 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983).
When the evidence submitted on the motion leaves no relevant genuine issue of fact, and when reasonable minds inevitably conclude that the mover is entitled to judgment on the facts before the court, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Fox v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 559 So.2d 850 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), affirmed 576 So.2d 978 (La.1991).
Even if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is improper if the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Williams, 426 So.2d 339 (La.App. 2d Cir.1983).
In this case, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants owed a duty to Earl Pitre, Jr. to warn of the dangers of sledding or to act to prohibit sledding at...
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