Pitt v. Century II, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1993
• Citation: 631 So.2d 235
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,787 Arnold F. PITT v. CENTURY II, INC. 1920923.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 235

631 So.2d 235

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,787

Arnold F. PITT v. CENTURY II, INC.

1920923.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 22, 1993.

Steven A. Martino, Richard H. Taylor, and Robert J. Hedge of Jackson, Taylor, and Martino, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.

Donald F. Pierce, Helen Johnson Alford, and Forrest S. Latta of Pierce, Carr & Alford, Mobile, for appellee.

SHORES, Justice.

Arnold F. Pitt appeals from a judgment based on a remittitur of the jury's award of damages in this products liability case. The defendant, a crane manufacturer, Century II, Inc., did not appeal. We affirm in part; reverse in part; and render a judgment.

The case arose out of an accident that occurred on July 23, 1990, at the State Docks while Pitt, a State Docks employee, was driving a CN128 crane, a 28-ton model, manufactured by Century II, Inc. Tractor and Equipment Company, a distributor of heavy equipment, had lent the crane to the State Docks while the State Docks awaited delivery of a Century II 50-ton crane it had ordered from Tractor and Equipment. Although Pitt had never driven the CN128, he was an experienced crane operator, having worked at the State Docks since 1980.

Pitt started the engine and allowed the air pressure, which operates the brakes, to build up to the proper level before releasing the parking brake and putting the crane into third gear, high range (the lowest gear in the high range), to travel to a work site. Pitt travelled approximately 100 yards to a railroad track, where he applied the brakes; they worked. He then made a right turn before starting up a 15- to 20-degree incline. As he crested the hill, Pitt stepped on the brake pedal a number of times to slow the crane, but the brakes did not respond. The crane did not have an emergency brake. Pitt shifted into reverse and throttled the engine in an attempt to stop the crane. The wheels caught for a second, but the engine died and the crane began what he called "freewheeling" down the hill. Pitt testified that at that point, "I pure panicked.... [M]y only instinct was just--I grabbed the transmission and put it in reverse trying to make it stop...." When this did not slow the crane, Pitt jumped off the crane. As a result of this jump, Pitt severely fractured his ankle and lower leg.

On January 2, 1991, Tractor and Equipment Company sued Arnold F. Pitt and his employer, the Alabama State Docks. The complaint alleged that Pitt had negligently and wantonly operated the 28-ton crane owned by Tractor and Equipment and that Pitt's negligence and wantonness had caused the crane to be damaged. The complaint also contained a negligent entrustment count against the State Docks. Pitt filed an answer and a counterclaim against Tractor and Equipment. Pitt sought damages for his past and future pain and suffering, his past and future mental anguish, physical disfigurement, and permanent disability. He also filed a third-party claim against Harnischefeger Corporation and P & H Manufacturing Company, believing them to be the manufacturers of the crane. Both Pitt's counterclaim and third-party claim alleged negligence, wantonness, and liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine all based on the absence of an emergency brake on the crane. The State Docks also filed a counterclaim against Tractor and Equipment and a third-party claim against Harnischefeger and P & H Manufacturing, both based on property damage caused by the crane. In both claims, the State Docks alleged negligence, wantonness, and liability under the AEMLD. In its answer the State Docks raised the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity.

The trial court dismissed the State Docks as a defendant, but the State Docks remained as counterclaimant and third-party plaintiff. Pitt and the State Docks then amended their third-party complaints to correctly identify Century II, Inc., as the manufacturer of the crane. State Docks also added a breach of contract action against Tractor and Equipment.

The case proceeded to trial. After presenting its case in chief, Tractor and Equipment voluntarily dismissed its claims against Pitt, and, in return, Pitt and the State Docks dismissed their claims against Tractor and Equipment. The trial proceeded on the claims by Pitt and the State Docks against Century II.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, Century II moved for a directed verdict as to Pitt's negligence, wantonness, and AEMLD claims. The trial court granted the motion as to the wantonness count, and Pitt voluntarily dismissed his negligence count. This left the AEMLD count as Pitt's only remaining count.

The jury returned a $14,800 verdict for the State Docks, and a $300,000 verdict in favor of Pitt for compensatory damages. Century II moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or a remittitur. The trial judge denied Century II's motion for new trial, conditioned upon Pitt's accepting a remittitur of $200,000. ¹ Pitt did not accept the remittitur, and the court ordered a new trial.

Pitt filed his notice of appeal on March 18, 1993. On appeal, Pitt argues 1) that the trial court erred in ordering a remittitur of the compensatory award, and 2) that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on Pitt's wantonness count and thereby refusing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.

The first issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering a $200,000 remittitur of the compensatory award. The jury awarded Pitt $300,000 in compensatory damages. A directed verdict on the wantonness count precluded the jury's consideration of punitive damages. The trial judge's remittitur order read:

"On Defendant's Century II's Motion for Remittitur, the Court finds that the jury verdict of $300,000 was not reasonably proportionate to the injury, but rather was excessive and demonstrated prejudice and bias against the manufacturer, and resulted from the jury's perception of Defendant Century II as a 'deep pockets' defendant.

"The Court is of the opinion that Defendant is entitled to a remittitur of the verdict pursuant to Rule 59(f), A.R.Civ.P. as it is the result of bias, prejudice, and improper motive. [Citations omitted.]

"The Court further makes the following findings, pursuant to Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989).

"Relationship to harm. The harm was not "grievous." Rather, plaintiff suffered a fractured ankle. [Footnote omitted.]

"Reprehensibility of conduct. There was no evidence of any reprehensible conduct. There was no evidence of awareness of any problem with the crane or its braking systems. Moreover, there is no need for a deterrent factor, and no need to 'send a message.'

"There was also no showing of the 'culpability' of defendant's conduct. This case does not represent a pattern or practice of a company acting in known or reckless disregard of the rights of policyholders.

"Profitability of conduct and financial position. There was no evidence produced at trial that any other crane manufacturer incorporates three brake systems. Neither was there evidence as to the profitability to the Defendant of not incorporating three brake systems into the product in question. In short, there was no showing of profitability or increase in financial position to defendant to engage in such conduct.

"Cost of litigation. This was not a complicated case for discovery or trial.

"Criminal sanctions. Defendant was not criminally sanctioned, a mitigating factor.

"Other civil actions. None, a mitigating factor."

These are the factors set out in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 223-24 (Ala.1989), as being appropriate factors for a trial court to consider in determining whether a jury award of punitive damages is excessive or inadequate. These are not the factors to be considered when determining whether a jury verdict solely for compensatory damages is excessive.

In Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986), we began "by recognizing that the right to a trial by jury is a fundamental, constitutionally guaranteed right, Art. I, § 11, Const. of 1901, and, therefore, that a jury verdict may not be set aside unless the verdict is flawed, thereby losing its constitutional protection." Id. at 1378. In Hammond, we stated that "[i]nsofar as damages are concerned, a jury verdict may be flawed in two ways":

"First, it may include or exclude a sum which is clearly recoverable or not as a matter of law, or which is totally unsupported by the evidence, where there is an exact standard or rule of law that makes the damages legally and mathematically ascertainable at a precise figure.... Second, a jury verdict may be flawed because it results, not from the evidence and applicable law, but from bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive. It is this category of cases that most troubles both trial and appellate courts."

493 So.2d at 1378. We then adopted a new procedure that required the trial courts of our state to give reasons for interfering with a jury verdict on the grounds of excessiveness of the damages or for refusing to do so. We required the trial courts "to state for the record the factors considered in either granting or denying a motion for a new trial based upon the alleged excessiveness or inadequacy of a jury verdict." Id. at 1379. This resulted in "Hammond orders," in which trial judges state into the record their reasons for granting or for denying a remittitur.

However, in regard to awards exclusively for compensatory damages, our holdings have narrowed the scope of Hammond so that a Hammond hearing is not mandatory where the award is clearly supported by the record. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Day, 613 So.2d 883, 885 (Ala.1993). We have explained our reasoning as follows:

"We recognized at the time of Hammond that numerous cases involving the 'excessiveness' issue were already 'in the pipeline,' and that these cases would have to be decided on ...