Pittman v. Grewal

• Decision Date: 17 February 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-06696 (FLW)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
• Parties: LARNADO PITTMAN, Plaintiff, v. GURBIR S. GREWAL, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, CAROLE A. JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Commissioner, and within the scope of her authority and Office of the Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Office of Child Support Services, and NATASHA JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Director and Assistant Commissioner, and within the scope of her authority and office of the Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Office of Child Support Services, Defendants.

LARNADO PITTMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
GURBIR S. GREWAL, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, CAROLE A. JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Commissioner, and within the scope of her authority and Office of the Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Office of Child Support Services, and NATASHA JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Director and Assistant Commissioner, and within the scope of her authority and office of the Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Office of Child Support Services, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-06696 (FLW)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

February 17, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Hon. Freda L. Wolfson, U.S. Chief District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Larnado Pittman (“Plaintiff” or “Pittman”) brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Gurbir S. Grewal, the former Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, ^[1] Commissioner of the Department of Human Services Carole A. Johnson (“Commissioner Carole Johnson”), and Assistant Commissioner of the Department of Human Services Natasha Johnson (“Commissioner Natasha Johnson”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions. Plaintiff maintains that two state statutes, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67, violate his rights to equal

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protection and due process by authorizing courts to award support for post-secondary educational expenses against divorced parents but not against those who are still married. Plaintiff brings his federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the state-law claims are based on alleged violations of Articles I and VIII of the New Jersey Constitution.

Before the Court are two separate motions to dismiss (the “Motions”) filed by former Acting Attorney General Andrew J. Bruck, see ECF No. 40, ^[2] and Commissioner Natasha Johnson and Commissioner Carole Johnson, see ECF No. 39. Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the Motions.^[3] For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims under the U.S. Constitution are dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law claims. As set forth in the Order accompanying this Opinion, Plaintiff may refile his state-law claims in state court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594 (2018).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For the purposes of these Motions, the Court takes as true all allegations in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 28, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).

Under New Jersey law, “a child support obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless, ” inter alia, “a written

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request seeking the continuation of child support services is submitted to the court by a custodial parent prior to the child reaching the age of 19 . . . and such request is approved by the court.” N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(a)(3). The statute further provides that “[i]n response to a notice of proposed termination of child support[, ] . . . a custodial parent may submit a written request . . . seeking the continuation of child support services beyond the date the child reaches 19 years of age” when, inter alia, “the child is a student in a post-secondary education program and is enrolled for the number of hours or courses the school considers to be full-time attendance during some part of the academic year.” N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(b)(1)(b). “In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, ” courts generally must consider, among other factors, the “[n]eeds of the child, ” the “[s]tandard of living and economic circumstances of each parent, ” the “[e]arning ability of each parent, ” and the “[n]eed and capacity of the child for education, including higher education.” N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

On April 22, 2020, the Superior Court of New Jersey entered an order against Plaintiff, a noncustodial parent, continuing Plaintiff's child support obligations to his daughter until May 5, 2023. See SAC p. 3 ¶ 1; SAC Ex. A. At that time, Plaintiff's daughter was approaching 19 years old, and her mother had requested a continuation of Plaintiff's support obligations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(b)(1)(b). See SAC Ex. A. The Superior Court awarded the continuation based on the child's full-time enrollment in a post-secondary education program. See id.

Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint on June 1, 2020, alleging that the statutes pursuant to which the Superior Court issued its continuation award violate the U.S. and New Jersey Constitutions. ECF Nos. 1, 8. On September 9, 2020, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the original complaint, arguing, in part, that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In addition, the named Plaintiffs, who at the time consisted of Pittman, Giovanni

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LoPresti, and Nino Calabrese (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a cross-motion, consenting to the removal of Governor Philip Murphy as a named defendant in this action; requesting that former Attorney General Grewal be designated as an Interested Party, rather than a named defendant; and further requesting that Commissioner Natasha Johnson, in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, be added as a defendant. See ECF No. 20 (“Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion”) ¶¶ 2-8. In a Letter Order dated April 13, 2020, see ECF No. 27, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs' cross-motion as moot. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiffs had not established standing to pursue their claims. Nonetheless, the Court provided Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their Complaint and advised them that, should they wish to add or remove parties to this action, they must do so in their amended pleading.

On May 5, 2021, Pittman filed the SAC, ^[4] alleging that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67 and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied. See SAC p. 28 ¶ 1. In Counts Two and Four, Plaintiff contends the statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by requiring divorced parents to finance their children's post-secondary education past the age of majority when no such requirement applies to parents with “intact” marriages. See, e.g., id. pp. 2-3, 20-22, 28-35. In Counts One and Three, Plaintiff asserts that the statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying noncustodial parents their “fundamental right to control the education of their children.” Id. pp. 16-20, 23-28. In Counts Two and Three, Plaintiff alleges that the statutes violate Articles I and VIII of the New Jersey Constitution, largely on the same grounds as his federal claims. Id. pp. 20-28.

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And in Count Five, Plaintiff alleges that because the statutes are unconstitutional, they are void pursuant to Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

On July 22, 2021, Defendants timely filed their motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 39, 40. Plaintiff filed his “Cross Motion” in response to Defendants' Motions on July 21, 2021, ECF No. 41, and Defendants filed Reply briefs on August 6 and 9, 2021. ECF Nos. 42, 43. Plaintiff then filed his “Reply Opposition” on August 10, 2021. ECF No. 44.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must dismiss a claim if there is no subject matter jurisdiction. Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can raise a facial attack or a factual attack, which determines the standard of review. Const. Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017). On a facial attack, courts “only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, ” since the motion contests the sufficiency of the pleadings. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted); Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016).

On a factual attack, courts may “consider evidence outside the pleadings, ” such as affidavits, since the motion contests the underlying basis for jurisdiction. Gould Elecs. Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (citing Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1997)); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

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trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”); CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] factual attack concerns the actual failure of [plaintiff's] claims to comport with the jurisdictional prerequisites.”) (quotations and citation omitted). In such circumstances, the court “is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case, ” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891, but “must be careful [ ] not to allow its consideration of jurisdiction to spill over into a determination of the merits of the case, and thus must tread lightly.” Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 F.Supp.2d 813, 815 (D.N.J. 2008) (quotations and citation omitted). The proponent of jurisdiction bears the burden to prove that it exists...