Pittman v. Pittman

• Decision Date: 24 September 1982
• Citation: 419 So.2d 1376
• Parties: Catherine Parker PITTMAN, as Executrix of the Estate of James Bradford Pittman, Deceased v. Jennifer Bradford PITTMAN, a minor, who sues by and through her next friend, mother and legal guardian, Linda Pittman Johnson, et al. Jennifer Bradford PITTMAN, etc., et al. v. Catherine Parker PITTMAN, as Executrix of the Estate of James Bradford Pittman, Deceased. 81-116, 81-280.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1376

419 So.2d 1376

Catherine Parker PITTMAN, as Executrix of the Estate of James Bradford Pittman, Deceased v. Jennifer Bradford PITTMAN, a minor, who sues by and through her next friend, mother and legal guardian, Linda Pittman Johnson, et al.

Jennifer Bradford PITTMAN, etc., et al. v. Catherine Parker PITTMAN, as Executrix of the Estate of James Bradford Pittman, Deceased.

81-116, 81-280.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 24, 1982.

Frank McRight and Donald J. Stewart of McRight, Rowe & Stewart, Mobile, for appellants.

Taylor D. Wilkins, Jr. of Wilkins, Bankester & Biles, Bay Minette, and Edward L. Hardin, Jr. and Robert J. Hayes, Birmingham, for appellees.

EMBRY, Justice.

The appeal in 81-116 is by Catherine Parker Pittman from a judgment entered in a breach of contract action filed by Linda Pittman Johnson in behalf of her minor children seeking relief on account of the terms of a decree entered in a divorce action between her and her former husband James Bradford Pittman, now deceased.

The appeal in 81-280 is by Linda Pittman Johnson in behalf of her minor children from the judgment dismissing an action by her seeking payment by the executrix of her former husband's last will and testament, from his estate, of postmortem child support together with liquidated damages, provided for by the terms of the modified decree of divorce upon the happening of certain contingencies.

On 30 October 1978, James Bradford Pittman was killed in a plane crash. His will was probated in Baldwin County and letters testamentary issued to his widow, Catherine Parker Pittman, as executrix. Pittman's former wife, Mrs. Johnson, filed two sworn claims against the estate demanding monies she contended were owed her and her two minor children under the terms of decrees entered in the divorce action to which we have alluded. The claims were denied. Mrs. Johnson then filed a three count complaint against Mrs. Pittman, as executrix, in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. On motion of the executrix the action was transferred to the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, the proper forum for same.

The original complaint contained three claims: Count I alleged the decedent breached one provision of the divorce decree requiring that each of the minor children be made the beneficiary of a $25,000 life insurance policy; $50,000 in damages was demanded.

Count II claimed postmortem child support payments under other provisions of that decree; $38,775 was claimed due in that regard.

Count III alleged that Mrs. Johnson was entitled to $1,000 liquidated damages because of a provision incorporated in the decree relating to child support. Counts II and III were dismissed by the trial court on motion of Mrs. Pittman.

Mrs. Johnson amended her complaint to add as a defendant Maryon Pittman Allen, in her capacity as trustee of two trusts created by decedent during his lifetime. Subsequently, Mrs. Johnson amended Count I of her original complaint, making reference to the two insurance policies insuring the life of her former husband, the decedent. The proceeds of those policies have been paid to decedent's sister, Maryon Pittman Allen, as trustee under the trust indentures established for the benefit of Pittman and Mrs. Johnson's minor children.

The case was submitted to the trial court upon stipulations of fact and briefs in support of the respective contentions of the parties. There was no ore tenus trial.

Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment awarding each of the minor daughters the sum of $25,000 together with interest from the date of decedent's death. The court further found that no order to alter, amend, or modify the existing trusts was warranted.

The executrix appeals from that judgment (No. 81-116) and Mrs. Johnson cross-appeals from the judgment dismissing Counts II and III of her original complaint (No. 81-280). For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we address each appeal separately.

Mrs. Pittman's Appeal

A summary of the facts pertinent to this appeal is: Linda Pittman Johnson, and the decedent, James Bradford Pittman, were married in 1963. Two children were born of that marriage: Jennifer Bradford Pittman and Catherine Aubrey Pittman. In September 1969, a decree was entered dissolving the marriage between decedent and Mrs. Johnson. That decree incorporated an agreement of the parties which provided:

"3. Respondent [James Pittman] shall make each minor child of the parties an irrevocable beneficiary of a $25,000.00 life insurance policy on the life of the respondent and respondent shall pay and become liable for such premiums thereof."

After that judgment was entered, James Pittman caused an existing policy insuring his life for the sum of $50,000 to be converted into separate policies for the sum of $25,000 each, issued and naming as the irrevocable beneficiary of each, his sister, Maryon Pittman Allen, as trustee of the two trusts previously mentioned, for the benefit of Jennifer and Catherine Pittman. Later, the divorce decree was modified but left paragraph 3 of the original decree, supra, unchanged. Pittman died with the two $25,000 insurance policies in full force and effect. The proceeds of those policies were paid to the trustee subject to disposition according to the terms of those trusts.

We note, as indicated above, the ore tenus rule does not apply to this case. This being true, we review the evidence de novo. Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792 (Ala.1980).

The dispositive issue in Mrs. Pittman's appeal is whether the indentures of trust established by James Pittman for the benefit of his daughters complied with, or substantially so, the insurance requirements of the original decree of divorce. We opine that the trust indentures did substantially comply with the terms of the decree regarding the required insurance policies.

We find appropriate to this question the maxim that "equity looks through form to substance, and [an] equity court is interested in substantive justice rather than mere technicalities of procedure," United States Finance Co. v. Jones, 288 Ala. 238, 259 So.2d 264 (1972). The decedent, Pittman, on 13 January 1970, established two indentures of trust with his two daughters as beneficiaries, and his sister, Maryon Pittman Allen, as trustee. On 14 January 1970, the next day, Pittman converted the $50,000 insurance policy into two $25,000 policies and designated his sister, Mrs. Allen, as trustee, the beneficiary of each policy, the proceeds of each to be disposed of according to terms of trust instruments executed the day before. The deposition of Frederick E. Miller, as insurance agent, admitted as evidence under stipulation, shows that Pittman's reason for converting the life insurance policy, to make two of one, was to effectuate compliance with the divorce decree. That evidence creates a strong presumption that Pittman established the trusts and divided the insurance policy for the express purpose of complying with the agreement incorporated in the decree. There is no evidence in the record to the contrary anywise rebutting that presumption. Such an interpretation of, and conclusion from, that evidence is both logical as well as reasonable.

Mrs. Johnson contends the trustee holding proceeds of the policies and title thereto, in trust for the benefit of the minor children, defeats the purpose of the insurance provision of the divorce decree by delaying time for payment of such proceeds to the children.

The patent purpose for requiring Pittman to make each of his daughters irrevocable beneficiaries of life insurance policies was to ensure that in the event he suffered an untimely death, as he in fact did, the children would, in any event, be protected to the fullest extent possible with the proceeds of the insurance policies.

Strict compliance with a literal reading of the insurance provision in the decree is not necessary if there is substantial compliance that effectuates the underlying purpose of that provision and the intent evidenced by it. "Substantial compliance" may be defined as "actual compliance in respect to substance essential to every reasonable objective," of a decree giving effect to equitable principles--equity--in the true meaning of that word. Application of Santore, 28 Wash.App. 319, 623 P.2d 702 (1981). Substantial compliance means compliance which substantially, essentially, in the main, for the most part, satisfies the means of accomplishing the objectives sought to be effected by the decree and at the same time does complete equity. See North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 256 S.E.2d 388 (1979). What constitutes substantial compliance is a matter dependent upon the particular facts of each case, none ever quite a clone of any other. See Trussell v. Fish, 202 Ark. 956, 154 S.W.2d 587 (1941).

What greater protection could be provided than a trust administered by a trustee; a fiduciary circumscribed by law severely restricting waste, mismanagement or dissipation, of income and corpus of those trusts as opposed to immediate and full payment to their guardian or custodian?

In the event the proceeds of the policies had been paid to the minor children, one would encounter a variety of troublesome statutorily required procedures, costly and time consuming. The beneficiaries, minors under eighteen years of age, may not be...