Pittman v. Pittman, 98-293.
| Citation | 999 P.2d 638 |
| Decision Date | 10 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-293.,98-293. |
| Parties | Leona Marie PITTMAN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Theodore William PITTMAN, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Representing Appellant: Corinne A. Miller, Casper, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Richard H. Peek, Casper, Wyoming.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.
The primary issue here arises from Appellant Leona Pittman's (the wife) dissatisfaction with what she perceives as an inequitable division of property and debt by the trial court in granting her a divorce from Appellee Theodore Pittman (the husband). The wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the husband property worth three times what it awarded to her. Because the Pittmans acquired the property primarily with the husband's premarital assets and the proceeds from a personal injury he suffered, we hold there was no abuse of discretion in the property and debt divisions. The wife also raises issues regarding the trial court's rulings on motions and an abrupt termination of the trial. Although the trial court erred by halting the trial during the cross-examination of a witness, we hold the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment in all respects.
The wife presents these issues for our review:
The Pittmans' marriage began on February 20, 1985. Although they each had children from previous marriages, they did not have any together. Within a few years, each party filed individually for bankruptcy and received a discharge of debts. The bankruptcy not only left the parties debt free, but it also left them with little personal property and no real property.
In 1989, the husband was seriously injured in an accident. The resultant lawsuit included the husband's injury claims and the wife's claim for loss of consortium. The Pittmans ultimately accepted a settlement which gave them net proceeds of $143,560.44. They used the settlement money and some other assets to buy real properties that they upgraded and rented or sold on contracts for deed.
The wife filed a complaint for divorce on January 20, 1998. The parties reached a stipulation by which they agreed to sell one of their Casper properties. The proceeds were to be used to pay off marital debts with any remainder to be split between the parties. The stipulation further provided that the husband would pay the wife $600 per month for temporary maintenance. In a second stipulation, the parties agreed that neither of them would sell any other property, incur new debts, or remove funds from bank accounts beyond what was necessary for normal living expenses.
Each party soon accused the other of violating the stipulations, and they requested contempt citations. The trial court reserved ruling on the motions for contempt until after the trial. On July 17, 1998, the trial court convened a half-day bench trial as requested by the parties. Although the wife had at least one nonparty witness present, the only witnesses actually called were the parties. The trial court adjourned during the cross-examination of the husband when the allotted time expired. The record does not show that either party objected to the adjournment. Both parties submitted written closing arguments. The trial court issued a decision letter the following week, awarding the husband most of the property. This appeal followed.
Decisions regarding the division of marital property are within the trial court's sound discretion, and we will not disturb them on appeal unless there was an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 980 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo.1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when the property disposition shocks the conscience of this Court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people cannot abide it. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, affording that party every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the record. Id.
The wife's primary claim is that the trial court erred by awarding the vast majority of their property to the husband. The heart of her claim is that, because both parties filed for bankruptcy during the marriage and were left without significant assets, any property subsequently acquired must have been acquired equally by both. The Court's paradigm for such a case is France v. France, 902 P.2d 701 (Wyo.1995). There we affirmed a property division in which the wife received the overwhelming majority of the property. 902 P.2d at 706. We agreed with the trial court that, because most of the couple's property was brought into the marriage by the wife or inherited by her, she was the appropriate party to receive it upon their divorce. Id.
In the case at hand, the husband testified that some of the funds used to buy real property came from the sale of his premarital assets, the collection of a debt he had thought was uncollectible, and a refund of federal taxes paid before the marriage. Most of the money came from the settlement of the personal injury suit. Although the suit included the wife's claim for loss of consortium, the settlement agreement did not divide the amount between the Pittmans or among their various claims. The assignment of a value to the wife's loss of consortium claim would, therefore, require speculation, in which we will not engage. The testimony further showed that, although the wife was fifty-two years of age and healthy enough to work, the husband was sixty-eight and had suffered serious injuries which limited his physical activity.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the husband and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. As in France, the trial court could have reasonably found that most of the property was brought into the marriage by one party or acquired during the marriage through that party. It is, therefore, reasonable that the party through whom the property was acquired should receive a larger share.
Along with the division of the assets, the wife also disputes the division of the debts. Specifically, she claims the husband should bear sole responsibility for a debt to the University Medical Center. The couple incurred that debt for treatment of injuries to the wife near the end of the marriage. The wife contends she received her injuries at the husband's hands in the last of many episodes of domestic violence. The husband testified that the wife injured herself in a fall while she was intoxicated. Again, we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the husband. In doing so, we cannot say the trial court acted unreasonably when it apparently believed the husband's version of the events. We do not detect an abuse of the trial court's discretion in the division of the debt.
In the next issue, the wife claims the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to appear and show cause. Through that motion, the wife sought a contempt ruling against the husband for failing to make the stipulated support payments to her during the pendency of the action. The trial court scheduled the hearings for that motion and other pretrial motions concurrently with the trial. The trial court did not rule on the motions at trial, but it later informed the parties that it denied all the motions.
In a case similar to this one, we confirmed that judicial discretion is a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wallop v. Wallop
...wife or inherited by her, she was the appropriate party to receive it upon their divorce. France, at 706. In accord see Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638, 640 (Wyo.2000), where we held that when most of the property was brought into the marriage by one party or acquired during the marriage t......
-
Kruse v. Kruse
...which can be drawn from the record. Id.Zaloudek v. Zaloudek, 2009 WY 140, ¶ 8, 220 P.3d 498, 501 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638, 640 (Wyo.2000)). For some time, we held that an error of law under the circumstances also constituted an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Sch......
-
Kummerfeld v. Kummerfeld, S–13–0028.
...wife or inherited by her, she was the appropriate party to receive it upon their divorce. France, at 706.In accord see Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638, 640 (Wyo.2000), where we held that when most of the property was brought into the marriage by one party or acquired during the marriage th......
-
Zaloudek v. Zaloudek
...to the prevailing party, affording that party every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the record. Id. Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638, 640 (Wyo. 2000). [¶ 9] When dividing marital property, the district court considers the factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNe......
-
§ 8.01 Personal Injury Claims
...Kozich, 397 Pa. Super. 463, 580 A.2d 390 (1990). Vermont: Guiel v. Guiel, 165 Vt. 584, 682 A.2d 957 (1996). Wyoming: Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638 (Wyo. 2000). [56] A Louisiana court has disagreed with this analysis. In Young v. Young, 549 So.2d 437 (La. App. 1989), the court concluded t......
-
Distributing Personal Injury Settlements and Workers� Compensation Awards in Divorce
...[70] Gronland v. Gronland, 527 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1995) (PI); Bladow v. Bladow, 665 N.W.2d 724, (N.D. 2003) (PI). [71] Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638 (Wyo. 2000) (PI); WS § 20-2-114(a) provides in part: “The court may decree to either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other ......