Pittman v. Pomeroy
| Decision Date | 01 November 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 20786-CA,20786-CA |
| Citation | 552 So.2d 983 |
| Parties | Claudia Fowler PITTMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maria Rathburn POMEROY and Paul Allen Pomeroy, Defendants-Appellants. 552 So.2d 983 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
McLeod, Swearingen, Verlander, Dollar, Price & Noah by Robert P. McLeod, Paul J. Verlander, Monroe, for defendants-appellants.
Walter C. Dunn, Jr., Monroe, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HALL, FRED W. JONES, Jr., and SEXTON, JJ.
Defendants-appellants Marie and Paul Pomeroy appeal the judgment of the district court ordering specific performance of an option to buy immovable property verbally exercised by plaintiff-appellee Claudia Pittman. In the alternative, appellants ask this court to award damages which they argue they sustained as a result of having to pay taxes, insure, and service the debt of the subject property. These damages arose during that period following the termination of the residential lease between the parties, which lease contained the option in question. Appellee argues the lack of merit to any of appellants' assignments of error and has answered the appeal, seeking a modification of the district court judgment insofar as it failed to award money damages which appellee sought in the district court. For reasons which will be discussed more fully below, we amend and, as amended, affirm.
FACTS
In early January 1985, Ms. Pittman borrowed $25,000 from Monroe Mutual Plan to assist her son in the purchase of a home, mortgaging her own home to secure the loan. Ms. Pittman was to have repaid the amount 90 days after executing the loan. When she was unable to do so, Monroe Mutual threatened to foreclose on her property. Ms. Pittman confided her dilemma to Mrs. Pomeroy, a longtime friend who makes her living as a realtor.
After some discussion between Ms. Pittman and Mrs. Pomeroy, Mr. and Mrs. Pomeroy agreed to attempt to borrow $35,000 from their bank to help Ms. Pittman out of her difficulties. In order to facilitate the loan, Ms. Pittman sold her home to the Pomeroys, following which she executed a one-year residential lease of the home with an option to purchase it back for $35,000.
At the time of the sale in June 1985, the Monroe Mutual loan was paid off, expenses incidental to the sale and loan were deducted, and the remainder was given to the Pomeroys, by agreement of the parties. That evening the Pomeroys gave Ms. Pittman $1,326.06 so that Mrs. Pittman could pay off a sizable telephone bill.
Ms. Pittman continued to live in the house, making monthly lease payments to the Pomeroys. The evidence reflects that lease payments were always or frequently late and that the lease payment for at least one month was never made. Throughout the lease, Ms. Pittman continuously represented to the Pomeroys that she intended to repurchase the home. These statements were usually made in the context of Ms. Pittman's expression of hope that a financial deal of some sort was about to materialize. Apparently, the deal never materialized.
Late in April 1986, Ms. Pittman, Mrs. Pomeroy, and a mutual friend, Ms. Nell Heard, had dinner one evening. Testimony regarding what was discussed in relation to the lease is in conflict. On the one hand, both Ms. Pittman and Ms. Heard testified that Mrs. Pomeroy indicated that Ms. Pittman did not have to exercise the option in writing or within the delay provided in the lease instrument.
Mrs. Pomeroy testified that when the ladies went out to dinner there was no discussion whatsoever about the exercising of the option. She specifically denied ever having told Ms. Pittman that she need not exercise the option in writing or in a timely manner, but testified that she told Ms. Pittman that the Pomeroys intended to abide by the written agreements.
Some time after the dinner engagement, Ms. Pittman attempted, on at least two occasions, to secure financing to repurchase the home. On one occasion, while she was with one of the loan officers, Mrs. Pomeroy was requested to go to the loan office to discuss the matter, and she did so. Ultimately, Ms. Pittman was turned down for the loan.
On the last day or next to last day of the lease term, 1 Ms. Pittman telephoned Mrs. Pomeroy late in the evening. Mrs. Pomeroy was not at home, however, and Mr. Pomeroy took a message. When Mrs. Pomeroy returned from work, her husband advised her of the message, but she indicated she did not intend to return the call. Ms. Pittman called once again and advised Mrs. Pomeroy that she was in possession of a cashier's check for $35,000. Mrs. Pomeroy responded that it was too late to exercise the option. Notwithstanding, Ms. Pittman requested that the Pomeroys meet her at the bank the next morning. The next morning Mr. and Mrs. Pomeroy went to the bank to meet Ms. Pittman, but Ms. Pittman was not there.
The following week the Pomeroys, through their attorney, gave Ms. Pittman notice to vacate the subject premises. Ms. Pittman filed a lawsuit for specific performance within days of this notice. The Pomeroys filed an answer and reconventional demand denying plaintiff's allegations generally and specifically and seeking damages for plaintiff's failure to vacate the premises under the residential lease.
Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of Ms. Pittman ordering specific performance and rejecting all of the Pomeroys' demands. The Pomeroys have appealed this adverse ruling, seeking a reversal of the district court judgment or, in the alternative, damages under the residential lease or in quantum meruit. Ms. Pittman has filed an answer seeking a modification of the judgment below.
PURCHASE OPTION
This appeal calls upon us to resolve a conflict between two well-established principles of law. On the one hand, argued strenuously by the Pomeroys, is the statutory and jurisprudential rule that any contract concerning immovable property must be in writing and no modification of such a contract will be enforced unless it is also in writing. Ms. Pittman, on the other hand, argues that the Pomeroys should be estopped from defending on the basis of her failure to exercise the purchase option in writing because she justifiably relied on the representations by Ms. Pomeroy that no written exercise of the option would be necessary. In short, she argues that she failed to exercise the option in writing through the fault of the defendants where defendants' interest was contrary to its fulfillment.
It has long been a tenet of Louisiana law that contracts regarding the transfer or encumbrance of immovable property must be in writing. LSA-C.C. arts. 1839, 2440. This applies both to agreements and options to purchase or sell real estate, Louisiana State Board of Education v. Lindsay, 227 La. 553, 79 So.2d 879 (1954); Reaux v. Iberia Parish Police Jury, 454 So.2d 227 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 120 (La.1984); and the exercise of options to buy real estate, Barchus v. Johnson, 151 La. 985, 92 So. 566 (1922); Louisiana State Board of Education v. Lindsay, supra. The very purpose of the writing requirement for contracts regarding immovable property is to prevent misunderstanding over verbal terms. Rebman v. Reed, 335 So.2d 37 (La.App. 4th Cir.1976), writ denied, 338 So.2d 699 (La.1976). The instant case illustrates the importance of that underlying policy.
The Pomeroys place great reliance on Ms. Pittman's failure to exercise the option in writing. Ms. Pittman does not deny that she did not exercise the option in that manner; however, she and her main witness testified that Mrs. Pomeroy reassured her that a written exercise was not necessary. Although Mrs. Pomeroy disputed that she ever made such a statement, the district court implicitly accepted Ms. Pittman's version. As a reviewing court, we must give great weight to the factual conclusions of the trier of fact and, where there is a conflict in testimony, reasonable inferences of fact and reasonable evaluations of credibility should not be disturbed on review, even though we may feel that our own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978), on remand 370 So.2d 1262 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1979), writ denied, 374 So.2d 660 (La.1979); Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973); Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La.1985).
Were we to dispose of this issue solely on the basis of the lack of a written exercise of the purchase option, the outcome would be predictable. What makes this case different is an unusual combination of factors which convinces us that Ms. Pittman's reliance on Mrs. Pomeroy's assurances was reasonable.
Both ladies testified that they had been friends for a number of years, something which obviously led Ms. Pittman to believe that Mrs. Pomeroy's expressed lack of interest in a written exercise of the option was sincere. The real estate which is at issue here was the home in which Ms. Pittman had lived for decades and where Mrs. Pomeroy frequently visited her. Ms. Pittman was always late with the rent on the subject property and the Pomeroys apparently never sought to exercise their rights under the lease agreement in this regard.
More important, however, are the following facts: Mrs. Pomeroy is a realtor and is obviously well versed in matters regarding real estate, including that all agreements affecting real estate must be in writing; the original set of documents, which consisted of a sale and simultaneous lease with an option to purchase, was put together by Mrs. Pomeroy's attorney; and Ms. Pittman, a nurse, was not represented by counsel either in the negotiation stage or at closing. The attorney who represented Mrs. Pomeroy at that time testified that he recommended to Ms. Pittman that she seek counsel for advice or interpretation of the pertinent documents, but Ms. Pittman denies that such advice was offered.
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