Pittman v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-15-3093 |
| Parties | RITA PITTMAN Plaintiff, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this Memorandum, the Court considers whether the defendant timely removed this case to federal court. At the outset of the litigation, the suit contained a federal question but it lacked complete diversity. Removal occurred within thirty days of the existence of complete diversity, but more than thirty days after the suit was served upon the defendant.
On June 29, 2015, Rita Pittman filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest"), Wanda Sprague, and John J. Loh, M.D., alleging discrimination in employment based on race. ECF 2, "Complaint"; ECF 1-2 at 2-3. In particular, plaintiff alleged that Sprague and Loh violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that Quest violated Md. Code , § 20-601 et seq. of the State Government Article ("S.G."). ECF 2 at 3-6.
"Quest is a Delaware Corporation with its principal office in New Jersey" and Sprague and Loh "are domiciled in Maryland . . . ." ECF 1, ¶ 3. Plaintiff is also domiciled in Maryland. ECF 2 at 1. Sprague and Loh were served with the suit on July 13, 2015. Quest was served a month later, on August 13, 2015. ECF 20 at 2.
Plaintiff voluntarily moved to dismiss Sprague and Loh from the State proceeding on or about September 16, 2015.1 ECF 11. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted that motion on the same date. ECF 12. Thereafter, on October 9, 2015, Quest removed the case to this Court, based on diversity jurisdiction. ECF 1, "Notice of Removal," ¶ 4; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and § 1441(b).
On November 9, 2015, plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand (ECF 20, "Motion"), arguing that defendant's removal was untimely. ECF 20.2 Quest opposes the Motion. ECF 22, "Opposition." No reply has been filed, and the time to do so has expired.
The Motion has been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary to resolve it. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I will grant the Motion.
Plaintiff is an African American female employed by Quest as a phlebotomist. ECF 2, ¶¶ 1, 2. In September 2012, she was placed in Loh's medical office, trading as Mace Medical, to provide "phlebotomy services" for Loh's patients. Id. Sprague, who is Caucasian, worked as Office Manager at Mace Medical. Id. ¶ 3. While plaintiff was working in Loh's office, Sprague allegedly "made racially derogatory slurs" and used "racially derogatory language," which plaintiff regarded as "extremely offensive." Id. ¶ 4. For example, Sprague allegedly referred toplaintiff as "'Mammy,'" which is "considered a derogatory term among African Americans. . . ." Id. Sprague also said "'Yes, um'" to plaintiff, "mimicking a southern dialect. . . ." Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff contends that Sprague's "comments were malicious and calculated to be racially offensive to the Plaintiff." Id. ¶ 9.
According to plaintiff, she made several unsuccessful attempts to address Sprague's behavior by speaking directly with Sprague and by complaining to her supervisors at Quest. Id. ¶¶ 5-12. When her efforts failed, "Plaintiff asked to be transferred until Defendant Quest addressed Defendant Sprague's offensive conduct." Id. ¶ 13. Thereafter, plaintiff was transferred "to another office with less hours, resulting in a substantial decrease in salary." Id. ¶ 14.
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights. ECF 2, ¶ 18. Plaintiff avers that she filed her suit more than 180 days after filing the Charge of Discrimination. Id.
Loh and Sprague were served with the suit on July 13, 2015. ECF 20-2; ECF 20-3. Quest was served with the suit a month later, on August 13, 2015. ECF 20-4. At that point, the suit could not be removed based on diversity of citizenship, because plaintiff and two of the defendants are domiciled in Maryland. However, "[o]n August 12, 2015, counsel for Quest contacted counsel for Loh and Sprague seeking consent to remove the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction." ECF 22 at 1, Opposition. But, "[c]ounsel for Loh and Sprague declined to consent to removal." Id.; see also ECF 14, Declaration of Eric Hemmendinger, Esquire, counsel for Quest ("Hemmendinger Declaration"), ¶¶ 3, 4; ECF 20 at 3, Motion ("Defendants Sprague and Loh elected to keep this action in state court . . . .").
On or about July 31, 2015, Loh and Sprague filed a motion to dismiss or to transfer the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. ECF 4. Similarly, on August 21, 2015, Quest also moved to dismiss or to transfer the case from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. ECF 8. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City held a hearing on the motions on September 16, 2015. ECF 22 at 2. According to Quest, "[a]t the hearing, Plaintiff hand-served counsel for Quest" with her voluntary dismissal of Sprague and Loh. ECF 22 at 2. In particular, ECF 11 contains plaintiff's motion to dismiss the suit as to Sprague and Loh. By Order dated September 16, 2015, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss Sprague and Loh, with prejudice. ECF 12.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and "may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). "A court is to presume, therefore, that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and until jurisdiction has been shown to be proper." United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
The "burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on . . . the party asserting jurisdiction." Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2010); accord McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, "[i]f a plaintiff files suit in state court and the defendant seeks to adjudicate the matter in federal court through removal, it is the defendant who carries the burden of alleging in his notice of removal and, if challenged, demonstrating the court's jurisdiction over the matter." Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008).
A federal court "should construe removal statutes narrowly, [with] any doubts . . . resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction." Barbour v. Int'l, Union, 640 F.3d 599, 617 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (). The Fourth Circuit has said: "Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, we must strictly construe removal jurisdiction." Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)).
Under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction" may be "removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending."
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants federal district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." When a case arises under this provision, it is removable without regard to the citizenship of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a)-(b). However, removal requires the consent of all defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States." With exceptions not applicable here, diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 "requires complete diversity among parties, meaning that the citizenship of every plaintiff must be different from the citizenship of everydefendant." Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 103 (4th Cir. 2011).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), any civil action brought in a state court "of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant" to the federal court in the district "where such action is pending." Notably, "[e]ach defendant shall have 30 days after receipt by or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or summons . . . to file the notice of removal." Id. § 1446(b)(2)(B). Of import here, § 1446(b)(2)(A) provides: "When a civil action is removed solely under Section 1441(a), all defendants . . . must join in or consent to the removal of the action." And, "[i]f defendants are served at different times, and a later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal even though that earlier served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal." Id. § 1446(b)(2)(C). This is known as the Last-Served Defendant Rule. See JVCA, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 ().4
Of relevance here, "if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." Id. § 1446(b)(3). As described by Wright & Miller, "federal courts have given the reference [in § 1446(b)] to 'other paper' an expansive construction and have included a wide array of documents within its scope." 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT...
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