Pitts v. Balt. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 28 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action RDB-22-1404 |
| Parties | DIERTRA A. PITTS, Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Diertra Pitts (“Pitts”) brings this employment discrimination action against Defendant Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”), alleging retaliation (Count One) and hostile work environment (Count Two) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Three), and retaliation in violation of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”), Md. Code Ann., State Gov't, § 20-601 et seq. (Count Four). (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 62-119.) Pitts is a former Detective Sergeant at BPD who claims she was forced to retire after enduring years of ongoing retaliation resulting from her refusing to unethically change “guilty” findings on BPD Equal Employment Opportunity complaints and filing internal and external employment complaints. (Compl ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 14, 52; EEOC Charge 1, ECF No 5-5.) In the operative complaint, she alleges that she was the victim of retaliation, forced to endure a hostile work environment, and deprived of her property, liberty, and due process rights based on the conduct of others at BPD. (Id. ¶¶ 62-119.)
Now pending is BPD's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 5.) In support of this motion, BPD contends that Pitts' instant complaint was untimely filed, that her EEOC Charge giving rise to the complaint was untimely filed, that her complaint exceeded the scope of her EEOC Charge, that she did not allege facts sufficient to state claim entitling her to relief under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or MFEPA, that her MFEPA claims are time barred, and that BPD is immune from MFEPA claims in federal court. (Def's Mem. Supp. Mot Dismiss, ECF No. 52 at 9-23; Def's Repl. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10 at 2-16.) The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons set forth below, BPD's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED as to Counts One, Three, and Four, and DENIED as to Count Two.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff is an African American woman formerly employed by Defendant BPD. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 14.) She was hired by BPD on March 20, 1987, and reached the rank of Detective Sergeant. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 20.) From 2010 until 2020, she worked in BPD's Equal Employment Opportunity Department (“EEO”).[1](Id. ¶ 20.)
While working in that department, Plaintiff investigated complaints made against BPD members. (Id.) On two occasions sometime before January 23, 2014, Plaintiff was “ordered” to change “Guilty” EEO complaint findings against Major Dombrowski and Deputy Major Rutherford to reflect “Not Guilty”, but refused to do so. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.) After she refused to change the guilty findings, Plaintiff claims that she “began to be the target” of retaliation from “Chief Hill, Director Laura Giantris, and Lieutenant Jason Yerg . . .,” and eventually filed an EEOC Charge on January 23, 2014, which was subsequently dismissed in March 2015. (Id. ¶ 24-25.)
In 2015, BPD Detective Chawntay Willie (“Willie”) experienced two medical emergencies which required transportation to the emergency room. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 26.) On the first occasion, Detective Alexi Correa (“Correa”) accompanied Willie with her personal belongings, which included her personal weapon. (Id.) Correa returned Willie's belongings, including her firearm, after returning from the emergency room without being disciplined. (Id.) On the second occasion, Plaintiff accompanied Willie. (Id. ¶ 27.) Before leaving for the emergency room, Lieutenant Callaghan (“Callaghan”) inquired as to Willie's firearm and instructed Plaintiff to secure it in a gun box. (Id.) Plaintiff did not do so because it was Willie's personal weapon. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) Callaghan subsequently came to the hospital and secured the weapon from Willie's husband. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 31-32.)
Following the second incident, Callaghan charged Pitts with insubordination and failing to follow a direct order. (Id.) Pitts alleges that she was disparately treated for the same behavior as her colleague, Correa. Nevertheless, a BPD Trial Board later found Pitts guilty on both charges although Callaghan recanted his previous statements and testified that he did not give her a direct order. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims she later learned that Major Chris Jones asked to be removed from the Trial Board because “the Board had been ordered to find her guilty which he could not in good conscience do.” (Id. ¶ 33.) After hearing this, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (“MCCR”) on May 13, 2015. (Id. ¶ 34.)[2]
Over the next two years, Plaintiff was involuntarily detailed to different departments within BPD and twice faced disciplinary charges. (Id. ¶¶ 36-40.) First, in “early 2017” she was charged with a failure to send a text notification to Lieutenant Hall regarding a crime that occurred overnight, but the charges were dismissed because this failure was found to be Lieutenant Hall's responsibility. (Id. ¶ 40.) Subsequently, during Spring 2017, Plaintiff was charged with having files from a previous assignment locked in her EEO office. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 41.) Plaintiff later alleges that she was advised that her punishment would be involuntary transfer, however she was never transferred. (Id. ¶ 42.)
Following these incidents, Plaintiff alleges she continued to endure hostile conduct. Specifically, sometime during in June 2017, Plaintiff overheard a conversation during which two Sergeants discussed “Lt. Mahoney coming to the midnight shift to ‘target Plaintiff.'” (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff filed another EEOC Charge in response to hearing this conversation, but nevertheless was required to work with Mahoney for the following six months. (Id. ¶ 44.) During this period, she was issued poor performance reviews without documented support, accused of violating policy when others weren't disciplined for similar conduct, and asked threatening questions by her colleagues. (Id. ¶¶ 44-46.) Particularly, Sergeant Frieman allegedly asked her whether she feared being killed in the same manner as a former BPD officer who was found dead before testifying in a case involving the Gun Trace Task Force. (Id. ¶ 46.) Accordingly, during November 2018, Plaintiff decided to take medical leave because of the “extreme emotional distress” she suffered during the previous years. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 46.) Pitts alleges that her mental health was so severely affected that she was entitled to twenty-four months of leave because her condition was considered a Line of Duty injury. (Id. ¶¶ 4748.)
Plaintiff attempted to return to BPD in December 2019, but was told by Major James Rhoden (“Rhoden”) that it was too late and that she would be medically suspended. (Id. ¶ 50.) Rhoden then issued a notification letter informing Pitts that she must retire within ninety days. (Id. ¶ 51.) According to the Complaint, after years of pushback from BPD, Pitts “felt forced to complete her retirement paperwork in March 2020.” (Id. ¶ 52.) She travelled to BPD to return her equipment on June 19, 2020, but was told that she had been terminated in May 2020. (Id. ¶ 53.) However, BPD promptly remedied the error after being informed that Pitts timely submitted her retirement documents. (Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 55.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff filed another EEOC Charge against BPD on February 4, 2021, alleging “years of retaliation and harassment that she was forced to endure at the hands of BPD leadership.” (Id. ¶ 57.) In her EEOC Charge, she stated that “[a]s a result of filing a Charge of Discrimination (5312017-01739), and filing an internal complaint of harassment, [she had been] subjected to ongoing retaliation.” (EEOC Charge 1.)[3] She additionally alleged that “[a]lthough [she] wanted to return to [her] job [she] was forced into retirement by Major Rhoden.” (EEOC Charge 1.)
According to Pitts, “[o]n March 9, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued Plaintiff a Right-to-Sue Letter[4] through the EEOC electronic portal.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff further notes that “[o]n March 31, 2022, after noting that Plaintiff had not viewed the Right-to-Sue, the EEOC mailed Plaintiff her Right-to-Sue Letter which Plaintiff received on April 11, 2022.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint with this Court on June 6, 2022, ninety-one days after the EEOC issued Plaintiff's Right-to-Sue Letter. (ECF No. 1.) In response to the Complaint, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 5.)
To survive a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must, however, set forth “enough factual matter (taken as...
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