Pitts v. City Of Cuba
| Decision Date | 07 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:10CV00274 ERW |
| Parties | SHARON PITTS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CUBA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Frank Magel, Shane Spratt, and South Central Drug Task Force's Motion to Dismiss [doc. #35]; Defendants Crawford County Sheriff's Department, Randy Martin, and Jay Coleman's Motion to Dismiss [doc. #43]; Motion of Defendants Robert Rickerd and Owensville Police Department to Dismiss [doc. #45]; Plaintiffs' Motion to Squash [doc. #48]; Defendants Missouri State Highway Patrol, Rhonda Shanika1, and Nicholas Mathews' Motion to Dismiss [doc. #51]; Defendants Frank Magel, Shane Spratt, and South Central Drug Task Force's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [doc. #54]; Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash [doc. #56]; Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash [doc. #58]; Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [doc. #63]; and Motion of Defendants Steelville Police Department and Adam Reed to Dismiss [doc. #74].
On February 16, 2010, Sharon Pitts, Lisa King, Marilyn Copling, and Daniel Pitts, acting pro se, filed a complaint against 30 individuals and public entities. Specifically, Plaintiffs sued the following public entities: City of Cuba; Crawford County Sheriff Department; Cuba Police Department; Lake Area Narcotics Group; Missouri State Highway Patrol; Owensville Police Department; South Central Drug Task Force; and Steelville Police Department. Plaintiffs also sued the following individuals: Tim Bailey (Retired City Marshall, City of Cuba); Ralph Bayless (elected city official, City of Cuba); Jay Coleman (Officer, Crawford County Sheriff Department); Kevin Copling (Alderman, City of Cuba); Paul Crow (Officer, Cuba Police Department); Richard Dildine (Chief of Police, Cuba Police Department); Maruice Grant (elected city official, City of Cuba); Harold Halbert (elected city official, City of Cuba); Faye Howard (elected city official, City of Cuba); Kenny Killeen (Mayor, City of Cuba); Frank Magel (Officer, South Central Drug Task Force); Randy Martin (Officer, Crawford County Sheriff Department); Nicholas W. Mathews (Officer, Missouri State Highway Patrol); Les Murdock (elected city official, City of Cuba); Scott Parish (Officer, Missouri State Highway Patrol); Adam Reed (Officer, Steelville Police Department); Robert Rickerd (Officer, Owensville Police Department); Kent Robinson (City Attorney, City of Cuba); Rhonda Shanika (Missouri State Highway Patrol); Doug Shelton (Officer, Cuba Police Department); Shane Spratt (Officer, South Central Drug Task Force); and Jason Wilkerson (Officer, Cuba Police Department). The Complaint sets forth 35 counts of alleged violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 14141; 1st, 4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution;and Article I, Sections 2, 8, 9, 10, 15, and 32 of the Missouri Constitution. The Complaint is 52 pages long, containing 439 individual paragraphs.
On March 26, 2010, Defendants Frank Magel ("Defendant Magel"), Shane Spratt ("Defendant Spratt"), and South Central Drug Task Force ("Defendant SCDTF") filed a Motion to Dismiss [doc. #35]. In their Motion, they argue that Plaintiffs' claims against them should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the Complaint does not give adequate notice of the allegations against them. On April 12, 2010, Defendants Crawford County Sheriff's Department ("Defendant CCSD"), Randy Martin ("Defendant Martin"), and Jay Coleman ("Defendant Coleman") also filed a Motion to Dismiss [doc. #43]. In their Motion, they also argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Additionally, they argue that Plaintiffs did not state sufficient facts to establish a conspiracy, and that Defendant CCSD is not an entity capable of being sued. On April 16, 2010, Defendants Robert Rickerd ("Defendant Rickerd") and Owensville Police Department ("Defendant OPD") also filed a Motion to Dismiss [doc. #45]. In their Motion, they argue that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant Rickerd and against Defendant OPD. On April 23, 2010, Plaintiffs filed what this Court will construe to be a response to each of the three Motions discussed above [doc. #48].2 Defendants Magel, Spratt, and SCDTF filed a Reply [doc. #50] to Plaintiffs' responsive brief, and Plaintiffs then filed what will be construed as a Sur-Reply [doc. #52]. Subsequently, Defendants Magel, Spratt and SCDTF filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [doc. #54].
Additionally, on May 5, 2010, Defendants Rhonda Shanika ("Defendant Shanika"), Nicholas Mathews ("Defendant Mathews"), and Missouri State Highway Patrol ("Defendant MSHP") filed a Motion to Dismiss [doc. #51]. They argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert the claims made against them, and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Shanika and Mathews. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Quash [doc. #58], which this Court will construe to be a Response, on May 18, 2010, and Defendants Shanika, Mathews, and MSHP filed a Reply [doc. #61] on May 26, 2010.
Finally, on June 17, 2010, Defendants Adam Reed ("Defendant Reed") and Steelville Police Department ("Defendant SPD") filed a Motion to Dismiss [doc. #74]. They argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring certain claims against them, and that Defendant SPD is not a legal entity capable of being sued. Plaintiffs filed their Response [doc. #77] to this Motion on July 8, 2010. Also pending in this case is Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [doc. #63]. Defendants Magel, Spratt and SCDTF filed a Response [doc. #66], in which they state their opposition to this Motion.
The Court notes that the arguments made by the various Defendants in their motions to dismiss are rather inconsistent from motion to motion, even when the same Counts are allegedagainst them. For the most part, this Court will only address those arguments actually raised in the applicable Defendant's motion.
The notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In order to meet this standard and to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This requirement of facial plausibility means that the factual content of the plaintiffs allegations must "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., 599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). Furthermore, courts must assess the plausibility of a given claim with reference to the plaintiff's allegations as a whole, not in terms of the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Group, 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). This inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal alterations and citations omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 () (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Nevertheless, although the "plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a sheer possibility, " it is not a "probability requirement." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). As such, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely, " id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal quotations omitted), provided that the complaint contains sufficient facts to "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted).
The sole argument made by Defendants Magel, Spratt and SCDTF in support of their Motion to Dismiss is:
Plaintiffs have made vague and sweeping allegations against each of the Defendants but fail to make a connection between the specific allegations and each individual Defendant. The allegations made in the Complaint make it virtually impossible for the Defendants to formulate proper defenses. The Complaint does not give the individual Defendants notice of the allegations against them.
(Motion, doc. #35, p.2 ¶ 3). Thus, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs' pro se Complaint complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), and gives Defendants Magel, Spratt, and SCDTF notice of the claims against them.
First, the Court will consider the...
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