Pitts v. Pilkerton, 3-87-0554.
Decision Date | 16 November 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 3-87-0554.,3-87-0554. |
Citation | 714 F. Supp. 285 |
Parties | Gary PITTS and Judy Pitts, d/b/a Pitts Sign Company v. Kenneth PILKERTON, J. Michael Woods, and Town of Smyrna, Tenn. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Frank M. Fly and Brad W. Hornsby of Burger, Fly & McFarlin, for plaintiffs.
W. Gregory Miller of Cornelius J. Collins and James C. Cope of Murfree, Cope J. Moore, for defendants.
The plaintiffs bring this action as a civil rights suit for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. The plaintiffs, who own a business engaged in the portable sign business, seek to enjoin enforcement of a sign ordinance of the Town of Smyrna, Tennessee hereinafter Smyrna ordinance. The plaintiffs allege that the ordinance violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.
The defendant Town of Smyrna, Tennessee,1 submits a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 8(b)(2) of the Local Rules of this Court. The defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law alleging that the Smyrna ordinance does not violate the First Amendment nor deprive plaintiffs of their property interest without due process of law, or impair their right to contract. The plaintiffs argue that material and genuine issues of fact exist, precluding an award of summary judgment.
Plaintiffs, Gary and Judy Pitts, are in the business of selling and renting portable signs in the town of Smyrna, Tennessee. Smyrna, Tennessee, is a community located in Rutherford County, southeast of Nashville, Tennessee, which has undergone substantial growth in recent years. The plaintiffs have numerous portable signs in use in Smyrna.
The plaintiffs hold that the portable signs are a cost effective means for communication for small organizations and businesses. Plaintiffs argue that portable signs are used by merchants for commercial expression, by individuals to convey ideas, and by political, civic, and religious organizations to announce campaigns or events.
The defendant believes that the portable signs present not only dangers to highway travelers and pedestrians with visual obstructions and distractions, but also cause a visual blight and eyesore along roadsides. After a two year study by the Town of Smyrna Planning Commission, along with various citizen groups and committees, the Planning Commission drafted a comprehensive sign ordinance to the Board of Commissioners. The Smyrna ordinance was passed on May 12, 1987. The ordinance creates a regulatory scheme which inter alia restricts the use of portable signs to address traffic safety and aesthetic problems. Section 11.010 of the Smyrna ordinance pertains to portable signs. Section 1.010 defines the term "portable sign":
A portable sign shall mean to include any advertising sign device that is located on the ground, easily moveable, not permanently attached thereto and which is usually a two-sided sign and including any single or double surface painted or postered panel type sign or any variation thereof, which is temporary in nature, usually mounted on wheels, easily moveable, not permanently attached to the premises or any building, wall, fence, pole or any other structure situated upon any real property.
Smyrna, Tenn. Ordinance to Regulate Signs, § 1.010 (May 12, 1987).
As to these portable signs, Section 11.010 further provides:
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United States Supreme Court explained the District Court's function in ruling upon a motion for summary judgment:
It is likewise true that " Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp. v. Storm King Corp., 303 F.2d 425, 427 (6th Cir.1962) (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals stated recently:
Summary judgment may only be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. All facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be read in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 986 100 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed.2d 415 (1979).
Duchon v. Cajon Co., 791 F.2d 43, 46 (6th Cir.1986). Under these holdings, three questions are to be considered upon a motion for summary judgment: (1) does the plaintiff present sufficient facts to establish all the elements of his claim; (2) are those facts sufficient to support a judgment; and (3) are there any material factual issues with respect to those facts.
The plaintiffs complain that the Symrna Ordinance substantively and procedurally abridges the exercise of freedom of speech, commercial expression and religion. The defendant seeks summary judgment on the grounds that the Smyrna Ordinance is consistent with the First Amendment as a content neutral regulation that advances the town's government interests in aesthetics, traffic safety, and general public welfare.
The defendant is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law for this claim. The Court DENIES defendants' summary judgment motion pertaining to plaintiffs' First Amendment claim.
Material and genuine issues of fact on this claim include, but are not limited to: whether or not the portable signs are used for commercial expression exclusively or involve political, civic, and religious expression; whether or not the Smyrna Ordinance advances substantial governmental interests in aesthetics, traffic safety, and general public welfare; whether or not the Smyrna Ordinance constitutes a total ban on the use of portable signs and whether or not the town used the least restrictive means to accomplish its objectives. By construing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, granting a summary judgment motion here would be inappropriate.
Plaintiffs complain that the Smyrna Ordinance deprives them of property interest without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim since defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law even when construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
The Court holds that the reasoning of Sign Supplies of Texas v. McConn, 517 F.Supp. 778 (S.D.Texas 1980) and Inhabitants of Boothbay v. Nat'l Advertising Co., 347 A.2d 419, 81 A.L.R.3d 474 (Me. 1975), applies to this case.
The Court holds that the Smyrna Ordinance does not constitute a taking of property interest without just compensation even if the ordinance bans rather than substantially curtails the use of portable signs. In McConn, the plaintiffs complained that an ordinance which prohibited new off-premise signs and set permit and fee requirements for portable signs consisted of a "taking" of their property without just compensation. McConn, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial