Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 26 April 1910
• Docket Number: No. 21,494.,21,494.
• Citation: 91 N.E. 735,175 Ind. 196
• Parties: PITTSBURG, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. MITCHELL.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

175 Ind. 196

91 N.E. 735

PITTSBURG, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO.

v.MITCHELL.

No. 21,494.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 26, 1910.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; E. A. Ely, Judge.

Action by Daniel J. Mitchell against the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.John L. Rupe, L. P. Newby, and F. J. Newby, for appellant. Eugene H. Bundy and N. Guy Jones, for appellee.

MYERS, J.

Appellee brought an action against appellant, alleging that on the 1st day of November, 1906, appellant, controlling and operating a line of railroad in the state of Indiana from Indianapolis, Ind., to Cincinnati, Ohio, and other lines of railroad within and without the state of Indiana, was a common carrier for hire, engaged in interstate commerce and held itself out as such common carrier of freight and passengers from Dunreith, Ind., to New Smyrna, in the state of Florida, on which day he delivered to appellant at its station of Dunreith, Ind., a car load of apples to be by it carried and transported to New Smyrna, and, as a consideration for the carriage of the apples to their destination, appellee paid to appellant in advance the full freight and charges demanded by appellant. Appellee avers that, by reason of unreasonable delays in transportation, the apples became spoiled in transit and worthless, and demanding judgment for $1,400. Appellant answered by general denial and by a special paragraph setting up as a defense that appellant's own line only extended to Cincinnati, Ohio, and no nearer New Smyrna, Fla., and that it made the shipment under a written contract or bill of lading, set out, alleged to have been entered into fairly and understandingly by appellee, as governing the shipment, and the conditions under which the property was received for shipment, by which the property was to be carried to Cincinnati over its own line and there delivered to a connecting carrier, that it carried the property without delay, and delivered it in good order to the connecting carrier. The contract recites the receipt of the apples consigned to appellee at New Smyrna, Fla., and some of its conditions are that its terms and conditions shall run to the benefit of any carrier, and that no carrier “shall be liable for any loss thereof, or damage thereto by causes beyond its control, *** or by *** changes in weather, heat, frost, wet or decay. *** No carrier shall be liable for loss or damage not occurring on its own road or its portion of the through route *** the amount of any loss or damage for which any carrier becomes liable shall be computed at the value of the property at the place of shipment under this bill of lading.” To this answer appellee replied by general denial, and by special plea that the written contract was executed without consideration. The cause was tried by a jury, and a general verdict returned for $1,200, with answers to interrogatories. Over motion for judgment on the interrogatories and answers and for a new trial judgment was rendered.

The first error urged here is overruling the motion for a judgment in favor of appellant upon the answers to the interrogatories. These answers show that the shipment was made under the written contract; that appellant's own line extended to Cincinnati only, where it delivered the apples in good order to a connecting carrier; that the damage to appellee accrued after their delivery to the connecting carrier; and that there was no consideration for the written contract or bill of lading. Appellant's argument travels upon the theory that, as the written contract by its terms limits its liability to loss occurring on its own line, it is discharged under the facts found. Closely allied to this contention is the further insistence that in the opening statement of counsel for appellee to the jury that the act of Congress known as the Hepburn Amendment (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1163]) to section 20 of the interstate commerce act (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154]) rendered the bill of lading void as a defense was error and prejudicial. The question was presented by motion to the court to have the statement withdrawn from the jury. The question was presented again at the close of the evidence by motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, and upon the motion for a new trial under the assignment of error in giving instructions, and that the verdict was contrary to law, upon the theory that the interstate commerce act has no application, except in cases arising under that act, or brought in the federal courts, and that no other courts have jurisdiction to enforce its provisions. We are thus confronted with the question of jurisdiction. The complaint it will be noted counts upon a common-law liability, and also contains the averments required by the act of April 15, 1905 (Act 1905, c. 47; Burns' Ann. St. 1908, §§ 3918, 3919, 3920). Upon its face no statute is invoked except the act of 1905. Upon its face there is jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The federal statute is only invoked incidentally, as a bar to the defense sought to be interposed by the bill of lading. We are not able to discover that the precise question has received the attention of the Supreme Court of the United States, but strong analogies may be found in the pronouncements of that court. The acts of Congress in force relating to subjects over which Congress has power to legislate for the state are expressly declared by the statute to be the law of the state. Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 236. Interstate commerce is within the exclusive regulation of Congress, but it is regulation within and for the benefit of the states and their citizens. “The laws of the United States are laws of the several states, and just as much binding on the citizens and the courts thereof as the state laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several states, but is a concurrent, and within its jurisdiction a paramount, sovereignty. Every citizen of a state is a subject of two distinct sovereignties, having concurrent jurisdiction in the state concurrent as to place and persons, though distinct as to subject-matter. *** So rights, whether legal or equitable, acquired under the laws of the states, may be prosecuted in the United States courts, or in the state courts competent to decide rights of the like character and class, subject, however, to this qualification: That, where a right arises under a law of the United States, Congress may if it sees fit give to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. *** This jurisdiction is sometimes exclusive by express enactment, and sometimes by implication. If an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise, by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a state court. The fact that a state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford relief, because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the state as it is to recognize the state laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the state; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different, and partly concurrent.” Claflin v. Houseman (1876) 93 U. S. 130, 136, 23 L. Ed. 833.Pratt v. Paris, etc., Co. (1897) 168 U. S. 255, 18 Sup. Ct. 62, 42 L. Ed. 458, is instructive and to the point.

The plaintiff in error sued the defendants in error in a state court in assumpsit on the common counts for the price of a patented machine, a common-law action. The defendant answered that the patent was void, and an infringement on prior patents, and they had no right to use it, and the consideration had failed. The question arose on the trial when, upon the court admitting evidence tending to show that the patents were invalid as infringements, plaintiffs in error contended that the court thereby assumed jurisdiction of a patent case. The Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Brown, said: “The state court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter as set forth in the declaration, and that it could not be ousted of such jurisdiction by the fact that incidentally to one of these defenses the defendant claimed the invalidity of the patent. To hold that it has no right to introduce evidence upon this subject is to do a wrong, and deny it a remedy. Section 711 does not deprive the state courts of the power to determine questions arising under the patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of ‘cases' arising under those laws. There is a clear distinction between a case and a question arising under the patent laws. The former arises when the plaintiff in his opening pleading, be it a bill, complaint, or declaration, sets up a right under the patent laws, as a ground for a recovery.” In order that jurisdiction shall lodge in the federal courts exclusively, it must be a federal case arising under the cause of action stated from the questions involved. Riverside Mills v. Atlantic &, etc., Co. (C. C.) 168 Fed. 987;Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 824, 6 L. Ed. 204.

It is urged that jurisdiction is in the federal courts by virtue of section 9 of the interstate commerce act, reading, in part, as follows: “Sec. 9. That any person, or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provision of this act may either make complaint to the commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such carrier may be liable under...