Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Arnott

• Citation: 189 Ind. 350,126 N.E. 13
• Decision Date: 05 February 1920
• Docket Number: No. 23361.,23361.
• Parties: PITTSBURGH, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. ARNOTT.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

189 Ind. 350

126 N.E. 13

PITTSBURGH, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO.

v.ARNOTT.

No. 23361.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 5, 1920.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lake County; W. C. McMahan, Judge.

Action by Hattie E. Arnott, administratrix of the estate of James W. Arnott, deceased, against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, with instructions to sustain motion for new trial.G. E. Ross, of Logansport, for appellant.

Otto J. Bruce and Geo. E. Hershman, both of Crown Point, for appellee.

LAIRY, J.

Appellee as administratrix of the estate of James W. Arnott, recovered a judgment in the Lake circuit court against appellant for damages resulting from the death of James W. Arnott, occasioned, as alleged, by the negligence of appellant.

The record discloses that James W. Arnott was, on and prior to the 27th day of December, 1915, employed by the government of the United States as a railway mail clerk, and that the work which he was employed to perform required him to make trips between the cities of Columbus, Ohio, and Chicago, Ill., and to assort and route the mails carried by appellant over its line of railway.

It appears that on the evening of December 27, 1918, James W. Arnott left Columbus, Ohio, for Chicago, Ill., in charge of mails in a mail car carried by appellant as a part of one of its trains, and that when the train reached Crown Point, Ind., he was so sick that he was required to leave the car. He was taken to his home, where he died of pneumonia two days later.

The issues were formed and the case tried on two paragraphs of complaint, both of which alleged that the sickness and death of James W. Arnott were caused by the negligent failure of appellant to heat the car in which he was employed to work. As showing the relation between appellant and James W. Arnott which gave rise to a duty on behalf of the former to use care in favor of the latter, the first paragraph alleges, in effect, that there was an arrangement, or contract, between appellant and the United States government whereby appellant undertook to carry the United States mails over its lines of railway in mail cars forming a part of its trains, and to carry the employés of the government engaged on mail cars in assorting and routing the mails while in transit; and that James W. Arnott was on a mail car carried by appellant over its lines of road between Columbus, Ohio, and Chicago, Ill., under and by virtue of said arrangement, while engaged in assorting and routing mails under his employment by the government.

The second paragraph alleges that James W. Arnott was being carried from Columbus, Ohio, to Chicago, Ill., as a passenger for hire. In other respects the two paragraphs of complaint are not materially different.

The court overruled separate motions addressed by appellant to each paragraph of complaint, asking an order requiring appellee to make each paragraph more specific in the several particulars stated in the motions separately directed to each paragraph. This ruling of the court is assigned as error.

The first four specifications of the motion addressed to the first paragraph asked that plaintiff be required to state more specifically the facts showing the nature of the relation existing between defendant and James W. Arnott out of which arose the duty on the part of the former to exercise care in favor of the latter. To this end it was asked that the pleading be required to state the date, the terms and the substance of the arrangement, or agreement, entered into between the government of the United States and the defendant by which the defendant undertook to carry the mails of the United States and transport its employés while in charge thereof, as alleged in the complaint.

[1][2] It must be borne in mind that the action is grounded on a tort, and is not based on contract. The plaintiff did not seek to recover under the terms of the contract mentioned in the complaint; but sought a recovery of damages growing out of a breach of duty which the law imposed upon the defendant. It was not necessary for plaintiff to plead the contract, or to set out its substance further than to show that it conferred on James W. Arnott a right to be in the car in which he was employed to work, and to be transported in that car over the railroad of the defendant. Such allegation is sufficient to show a relation between the defendant and Arnott which would impose on the former the duty to use care for the safety of the latter. Nothing more is required on that branch of the case as a matter of pleading. If the plaintiff had been required to amend her complaint to conform to the motion, she would have been compelled to plead the evidence by which she expected to establish the relation which gave rise to the duty. It is not proper to plead evidence. Anderson v. Townsend (1842) 6 Blackf. 173;Spurgeon v. Smith (1888) 114 Ind. 453, 17 N. E. 105.

[3][4] It is asserted, however, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to allege such facts as would enable the court to determine as a matter of law the exact nature of the relation out of which the duty arose. It is insisted that facts should be alleged from which the court could say, as a matter of law, that Arnott was either a passenger, a licensee, or a trespasser. The facts alleged clearly show that he was not a trespasser, and that he was something more than a mere licensee. He was being carried as a custodian of the mails under a contract to which the defendant was a party, and in the execution of which it had an interest. The facts pleaded show that such a relation existed as imposed on the defendant the duty to exercise care for the safety of Arnott. When such a duty exists, this court recognizes only one standard by which care can be measured, and that is the care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under like conditions and like circumstances. Union Traction Co. v. Berry (1919) 121 N. E. 655, 124 N. E. 737;Raymond v. Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529, 62 Atl. 602, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94, and note; monographic note to St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Woods, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 855.

In the light of the rule thus announced it can make no difference, so far as the rights or the obligations of either party are concerned, whether the facts alleged show the relation to be that of carrier and passenger, or to be some other relation out of which a duty to use due care arises.

Appellant's counsel asserts that the allegations in the first paragraph of complaint do not state facts sufficient to show that the relation of carrier and passenger existed between plaintiff and defendant at the time charged in the complaint, and that the failure to state such facts renders the complaint defective for failure to show a duty on the part of the defendant to use the care due from a carrier to a passenger.

Many pages of appellant's brief are directed to argument in support of the proposition stated, and to the citation of authorities to support it. The argument of counsel is logical, and the authorities cited seem to be well considered. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U. S. 498, 20 Sup. Ct. 385, 44 L. Ed. 560;Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 21, 44 N. E. 796, 38 L. R. A. 93, 58 Am. St. Rep. 348;Pittsburgh, etc., Co. v. Mahoney, 148 Ind. 196, 46 N. E. 917, 47 N. E. 464, 40 L. R. A. 101, 62 Am. St. Rep. 503; Santa Fé, etc., Co. v. Grant Construction Co., 228 U. S. 177, 33 Sup. Ct. 474, 57 L. Ed. 787;Blank v. Ill. Central R. Co., 182 Ill. 332, 55 N. E. 332; Banking Co. v. Lampley, 76 Ala. 357, 52 Am. Rep. 334.

On the authority of these cases, and for the reasons stated in support of the rule therein announced, the court is asked to hold that the facts stated in the first paragraph of complaint do not show that the relation of carrier and passenger existed between appellant and appellee, and to disapprove the former holdings of this court to the contrary. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Voight, 122 Ind. 288, 23 N. E. 774;Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Ketcham, 133 Ind. 346, 33 N. E. 116, 19 L. R. A. 339, 36 Am. St. Rep. 550;Malott, Rec., v. Central Trust Co., 168 Ind. 428, 79 N. E. 369, 11 Ann. Cas. 879.

The court is not required in this case either to affirm or to deny the rule stated in the case last cited. The relation shown by the facts pleaded is such as to impose on appellant, as a matter of law, the duty to exercise care in favor of appellee, and the quantum of care required to fulfill the duty thus imposed is measured by the same standard which applies where the relation existing is that of carrier and passenger. The court holds the first paragraph of complaint sufficient, not because it states facts showing that Arnott was a passenger, but because it states facts from which the court can say, as a matter of law, that a relation existed between him and the appellant which imposed on the latter the duty to use care for his safety. The quantum of care necessary to discharge the duty thus shown is to be determined by the application of the one standard which governs in all cases where such a duty is shown, and that is the care which a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised under like conditions and circumstances and in view of the dangers to be apprehended. Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Berry, 121 N. E. 655.

Whether or not the facts stated in the complaint show such a relation as gave rise to a duty to use care in favor of the plaintiff is purely a question of law for the court. It is not necessary that the court should be able to say that the relation was that of carrier and passenger, master and servant, bailor and bailee, or that it fell within any of the various classes of relations which have been so long recognized. When the facts alleged are of such a character as to give rise to a duty as a matter of law, the duty is to use care commensurate with the danger in view of the conditions and circumstances...