Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Carlson
| Decision Date | 15 February 1900 |
| Citation | 56 N.E. 251,24 Ind.App. 559 |
| Parties | PITTSBURGH, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. CARLSON. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Porter county; H. A. Gillett, Special Judge.
Action by Oscar Carlson against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
N. O. Ross and G. E. Ross, for appellant. Agnew & Kelly, for appellee.
The complaint avers that at the place in question appellant maintains its main track, and also on the north side, and about six feet distant, a side track, which are crossed at right angles by a public highway running north and south. About 9 o'clock on the night of November 19, 1897, appellee, on horseback, was passing north on the highway approaching the crossing. The night was dark, foggy, and rainy, and appellee was unable to see any distance in front or either side of him. When at a distance of 200 feet from the main track he looked and listened, both to the east and west, for the approach of engines and trains, and could not see or hear any. To the west of the crossing, between one-fourth and one-half mile, appellant had a large number of switch lights and lanterns along its track, and, as appellee looked west, he could see no lights except those, nor could he see or hear the approach of any train. That appellee, carefully looking and listening all the time in both directions and in front, attempted to cross the main and side tracks, and having passed over the main track, and in attempting to cross the side track, he discovered for the first time that the side track was occupied by a freight train of cars which appellant had carelessly and negligently left standing for one hour upon the side track, coupled together across the highway, so as to completely bar appellee's further progress. That there was no watchman nor light at the crossing nor upon the freight train, nor was any person in charge of the freight train stationed near the crossing to give appellee, or any other person attempting to cross, notice or warning that the highway was blocked, all of which appellant negligently omitted to do. That while he was so upon the main track, and unable to proceed further and leave the same because of the freight train, appellant carelessly and negligently ran an engine, with caboose attached, over the main track from the west towards the east, noiselessly and at a high and unusual rate of speed, 50 miles per hour, without giving any signal of its approach, and negligently failed to sound the whistle or ring the bell on the engine within two miles of the crossing, neglected to display any headlight, and negligently permitted the switch lights to burn brightly so as to blind appellee, and prevent him from seeing the approaching engine in time to escape from the track. That when he first discovered the approaching train he was on the main track, and had proceeded so far as to be stopped by the freight train. That before he could turn his horse and go back towards the south he became confused by the near approach of the train, and his horse became frightened and unmanageable, and he could not leave the main track, though he used every effort to do so, and before he could escape from the main track the engine ran against him, producing injuries. That in approaching the track, and while on the same, he all the time looked and listened for trains, but could not see any until it was so close to him that he was unable to escape. That he was deceived and misled by the negligent acts of appellant in noiselessly running the engine, in obstructing the highway, in having no headlight, in not having a watchman at the crossing to warn appellee that it was obstructed, in omitting to sound the whistle or ring the bell, in so displaying a large number of switch lights, but for all of which he would not have been misled, and would not have been upon the track and injured. That all of the wrongs and injuries complained of were sustained without any fault or negligence on appellee's part, but wholly by the negligence and wrongful acts of appellant.
Appellant's motion to make the complaint more specific in several different particulars was overruled. Some of these are not discussed. Without repeating the averments of the complaint, we think it shows freedom from fault on appellee's part, and that appellant was negligent, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. It was not necessary that appellee should have stated the distance the engine was from him when he first knew of its approach, nor that he should state the method by which he discovered the approach of the train, as required by appellant's motion and argued by its counsel. Nor was it necessary to state, more fully than can be gathered from the facts pleaded, the length of time he was on the main track before he was struck. The complaint may perhaps contain some averments that are not necessary, but that does not make it bad. It is averred that a number of acts were negligently done, and that appellant negligently omitted to do certain acts. The complaint does not seek redress for an injury received while he was attempting to cross the track, but while attempting to recross the track, after he learned that the highway was blocked by a train on the side track. From the facts averred, it is shown that the acts of appellant put appellee in his place of peril, and that he was injured while trying to extricate himself. When he saw his danger it is not shown that he acted imprudently. Taking the complaint as a whole, we think it states the facts constituting appellee's cause of action in language sufficiently plain and concise and “in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.” There was no error in overruling the motion to make the complaint more specific.
It is true that the omission to give the statutory signals is not sufficient, of itself, to make out a case, but it must also be shown that such omission was the proximate cause of the injury. Railway Co. v. Young, 146 Ind. 374, 45 N. E. 479. In the case at bar it is expressly averred “that said injuries were all the result of the said collision, so wrongfully and negligently caused and brought about by the said wrongful acts and negligence of the defendant aforesaid”; “that all of the said wrongs and injuries were done, committed, and sustained without any fault or negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but wholly by the negligence and wrongful acts of the defendant as aforesaid.” In the former part of the complaint it was averred that certain acts were negligently done, and that certain acts were negligently omitted, and by the above averments it is shown that the injury was caused by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial