Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago And St. Louis Railway Company v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 26 April 1910
• Docket Number: 21,494
• Parties: Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. Mitchell
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

91 N.E. 735

175 Ind. 196

Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. Mitchell

No. 21,494

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 26, 1910

Rehearing Denied February 14, 1911, Reported at: 175 Ind. 196 at 211.

From Henry Circuit Court; Ed Jackson, Judge.

Action by Daniel J. Mitchell against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

John L Rupe, L. P. Newby and F. J. Newby, for appellant.

Eugene H. Bundy and N. Guy Jones, for appellee.

OPINION

Myers, J.

Appellee brought an action against appellant, alleging that on November 1, 1906, appellant, controlling and operating a line of railroad from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Cincinnati, Ohio, and other lines of railroad within and without the State of Indiana, was a common carrier for hire, engaged in interstate commerce, and held itself out as such common carrier of freight and passengers from Dunreith, Indiana, to New Smyrna in the State of Florida, on which day appellee delivered to appellant at its station at Dunreith, Indiana, a carload of apples, to be by it carried and transported to New Smyrna, and as a consideration for the carriage of the apples to their destination, appellee paid to appellant in advance the full charges demanded by it. Appellee averred that, by reason of unreasonable delays in transportation, the apples became spoiled in transit and were worthless, and he demanded judgment for $ 1,400. Appellant answered by general denial, and by a special paragraph, setting up as a defense that appellant's line extended only to Cincinnati, Ohio, and no nearer New Smyrna, Florida, and that it made the shipment under a written contract or bill of lading, set out, alleged to have been entered into fairly and understandingly by appellee, governing the shipment and the conditions under which the property was received for shipment, by which the property was to be carried to Cincinnati over appellant's line, and there delivered to a connecting carrier; that it carried the property without delay, and delivered it in good order to the connecting carrier.

The contract recites the receipt of the apples consigned to appellee at New Smyrna, Florida, and some of its provisions are that its terms and conditions shall run to the benefit of any carrier, and that no carrier

"shall be liable for any loss thereof, or damage thereto, by causes beyond its control, * * * or by * * * changes in weather, heat, frost, wet or decay. * * * No carrier shall be liable for loss or damage not occurring on its own road or its portion of the through route. * * * The amount of any loss or damage for which any carrier becomes liable shall be computed at the value of the property at the place of shipment under this bill of lading."

To this answer appellee replied by general denial, and specially that the written contract was executed without consideration. The cause was tried by a jury, and a general verdict returned for $ 1,200, with answers to interrogatories. Over motions for judgment on the answers to interrogatories and for a new trial, judgment was rendered on the general verdict.

The first error urged here is the overruling of the motion for a judgment in favor of appellant upon the answers to the interrogatories.

These answers show that the shipment was made under the written contract; that appellant's own line extended to Cincinnati only, where it delivered the apples in good order to a connecting carrier; that the damage accrued after their delivery to the connecting carrier, and that there was no consideration for the written contract or bill of lading.

Appellant's argument is based on the theory that as the written contract by its terms limits its liability to loss occurring on its own line, it is discharged under the facts found. Closely allied to this contention is the further insistence that the opening statement of counsel for appellee to the jury--that the act of congress known as the Carmack amendment to section twenty of the interstate commerce act (34 Stat. p. 595, U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909 p. 1166) rendered the bill of lading void as a defense--was erroneous and prejudicial. The question was presented by motion to the court to have the statement withdrawn from the jury. The question was presented again at the close of the evidence by a motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, and upon the motion for a new trial, on the grounds that there was error in giving instruction and that the verdict was contrary to law, the theory being that the interstate commerce act has no application, except in cases arising under that act, brought in the federal courts, and that no other courts have jurisdiction to enforce its provisions.

We are thus confronted with the question of jurisdiction. The complaint, it will be noted, counts upon a common-law liability, and also contains the averments required by the act of April 15, 1905 (Acts 1905 p. 58, §§ 1-3, §§ 3918-3920 Burns 1908.

Upon the face of the complaint no statute is invoked except the act of 1905, and the allegations thereof give the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The federal statute is invoked only incidentally, as a reply to the defense sought to be interposed by the bill of lading.

We are not able to discover that the precise question has received the attention of the Supreme Court of the United States, but strong analogies may be found in the pronouncements of that court. The acts of congress in force, relating to subjects over which congress has power to legislate for the states, are expressly declared by the statute to be the law of the states. § 236 Burns 1908, § 236 R. S. 1881.

Interstate commerce is within the exclusive regulation of congress, but it is regulation within and for the benefit of the states and their citizens. "The laws of the United States are laws of the several states and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the state laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several states, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, a paramount sovereignty. Every citizen of a state is a subject of two distinct sovereignties, having concurrent jurisdiction in the state; concurrent as to place and persons, though distinct as to subject-matter. * * * So rights, whether legal or equitable, acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States courts, or in the state courts, competent to decide rights of the like character and class; subject, however, to this qualification, that where a right arises under a law of the United States, congress may, if it see fit, give to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. * * * This jurisdiction is sometimes exclusive by express enactment and sometimes by implication. If an act of congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of congress, by a proper action in a state court. The fact that a state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws is no reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the state as it is to recognize the state laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the state; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent." Claflin v. Houseman (1876), 93 U.S. 130, 136, 23 L.Ed. 833. The case of Pratt v. Paris, etc., Coke Co. (1897), 168 U.S. 255, 18 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed. 458, is instructive and to the point. In that case plaintiff in error sued the defendants in error in a state court, in assumpsit-- a common-law action--on the common counts for the price of a patented machine. Defendants answered that the patent was void, that it was an infringement on prior patents, that plaintiff had no right to use it, and that the consideration had failed. The question arose on the trial, when the court admitted evidence tending to show that the patents were invalid as infringements. Plaintiff in error contended that the court thereby assumed jurisdiction of a patent case. The Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Brown, said: "The state court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter as set forth in the declaration, and it could not be ousted of such jurisdiction by the fact that, incidentally to one of these defenses, the defendant claimed the invalidity of a certain patent. To hold that it has no right to introduce evidence upon this subject is to do it a wrong and deny it a remedy. Section 711 [§ 711 R. S. U.S. 1874, 1 U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901 p. 577] does not deprive the state courts of the power to determine questions arising under the patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of 'cases' arising under those laws. There is a clear distinction between a case and a question arising under the patent laws. The former arises when the plaintiff in his opening pleading--be it a bill, complaint or declaration--sets up a right under the patent laws as ground for a recovery." In order that exclusive jurisdiction shall be in the federal courts, a federal case must arise from the cause of action stated. Riverside Mills v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (1909), 168 F. 987; Osborn v. U. S. Bank (1824), 22 U.S. 738, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L.Ed. 204.

It is urged that jurisdiction is in the federal court, by virtue of section nine of the interstate commerce act, which reads in part as follows: ...