Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago And St. Louis Railway Company v. Marable

• Decision Date: 07 October 1919
• Docket Number: 23,579
• Citation: 126 N.E. 849,189 Ind. 278
• Parties: Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. Marable
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

126 N.E. 849

189 Ind. 278

Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. Marable

No. 23,579

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 7, 1919

Rehearing Denied April 9, 1920. Mandate Modified April 20 1920.

From Clark Circuit Court; James W. Fortune, Judge.

Action by Nathaniel Marable against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. (Transferred from the Appellate Court under § 1399 Burns 1914, Acts 1901 p 565, § 15.)

Reversed.

M. V. Stannard, Jonas G. Howard and John Rynerson, for appellant.

Frank S. Roby, H. W. Phipps and Burdette C. Lutz, for appellee.

OPINION

Lairy, C. J.

Appellee recovered a judgment in the court below based on a claim for additional compensation for services rendered by him as rear brakeman during a period of time in which he was regularly employed by appellant at a fixed compensation as porter to one of its trains running between Louisville, Kentucky, and Logansport, Indiana.

The questions presented on appeal arise on exceptions to the rulings of the court on appellant's demurrer to the complaint, and on appellant's motion for judgment on the answers to interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict.

Under some circumstances a person employed to perform services for a stated remuneration during a specified period may be entitled to recover additional compensation for extra services rendered at the request of his employer, even though the contract of employment makes no provision for such extra compensation. The right to such extra compensation, however, depends on the existence of a contract to that effect, either express or implied. Ordinarily a request for the performance of services gives rise to an implied offer to pay what such services are reasonably worth, and the rendition of such services in response to the request amounts to an acceptance of the offer, thus concluding the implied contract; but this rule does not apply where the services are performed by one who is in the employ of the person making the request. In such a case the request of the employer does not justify the inference of an offer to pay anything in addition to the compensation provided by the contract, for the reason that it is assumed that such services were requested and performed under the contract of employment.

The effect of this doctrine as applied to a case in which an employe seeks to recover from his employer compensation for extra work performed during the period covered by a special contract of employment is to place on the plaintiff the burden of proving that the employer either expressly or impliedly promised to pay extra compensation for the services requested. In a case of this kind it is not sufficient to establish merely that services outside of the ordinary employment were requested by the employer and performed by the employe. The plaintiff must go further and prove that the services requested were of such a character and were rendered under such circumstances as would lead to the conclusion that a servant performing such services would be reasonably justified in the belief that he would be allowed additional compensation therefor, and that an employer making such request would be reasonably expected to know that additional compensation would be expected. In other words, the character of the work requested and the circumstances attending the request and performance must be shown to be of such a nature as to justify the inference that extra compensation was contemplated by both employer and the employe. Middlebrook v. Slocum (1908), 152 Mich. 286, 116 N.W. 422; Mathison v. New York, etc., R. Co. (1902), 72 A.D. 254, 76 N.Y.S. 89.

The question presented is one of fact which should be generally left to a jury for decision; but in cases where only one inference can be reasonably drawn from the nature of the services and the attending circumstances, and where there is no room for reasonable minds to differ, the question should be decided by the court. Town of Monticello v. Condo (1910), 47 Ind.App. 490, 94 N.E. 893; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cheek (1899), 152 Ind. 663, 53 N.E. 641.

In this case the jury, by its general verdict, found that there was either an express agreement or an implied understanding between the plaintiff and defendant that additional compensation was to be allowed for the extra services requested and performed. This fact so found by the general verdict must stand unless the facts directly found by answers to interrogatories are in irreconcilable conflict therewith.

The answers to the interrogatories directly find that appellant did not at any time agree to pay anything in excess of the amount provided in the contract. It thus appears that the general verdict cannot rest on any express agreement to pay extra compensation for the services rendered. It is therefore apparent that, if the verdict is to be sustained under the law, it must rest on an implied agreement or understanding between the parties to the effect that the appellant was to pay, and that appellee was to receive, additional compensation for the extra services rendered.

It appears from the allegations of the complaint that the extra services as brakeman for which appellee claimed additional compensation were rendered in connection with the operation of the...