Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee v. City of Pittsburgh

Decision Date06 October 1978
Citation481 Pa. 66,391 A.2d 1318
Parties, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3278 PITTSBURGH JOINT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMMITTEE, Appellant, v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Pete Flaherty, Mayor, and Bruce Campbell, Executive Secretary.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Ernest B. Orsatti, Jubelirer, McKay, Pass & Intrieri, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

D. R. Pellegrini, Asst. City Sol., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Richard Kirschner, Philadelphia, for intervenor.

Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Justice.

The parties to this appeal, the Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee and the City of Pittsburgh, entered into a collective bargaining agreement dated July 25, 1973 which was in full force and effect until December 31, 1975. 1

On August 21, 1973 Frank Parsons, a member of appellant union, was suspended for five days, subject to discharge. On that same day, Mr. Parsons filed a grievance for unjust suspension and, subsequent to his discharge from the Department of Parks and Recreation of the City of Pittsburgh on August 28, 1975, filed a grievance with respect to his discharge. Appellant union, after duly exhausting all steps in the contractual grievance procedure 2 requested that the City submit the dispute to binding arbitration. 3 Upon the City's refusal to arbitrate the dispute, the union filed a complaint in equity seeking a ruling requiring the City to submit the dispute to arbitration. The chancellor sustained the City's preliminary objections on the grounds that the discharge was not an arbitrable issue since it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission of the City of Pittsburgh, and entered a decree dismissing the complaint, which decree was affirmed by the Commonwealth Court. We granted review. The dispositive issue is whether appellee may in this posture assert the defense that the grievance arbitration procedure to which it agreed in 1973 is in conflict with various provisions of the Civil Service Act, 53 P.S. § 23401 Et seq. (1957 & Supp.1978-79), such that the implementation of the procedure is prohibited by section 703 4 of the Public Employee Relations Act of 1970 (Act 195). 43 P.S. § 1101.703 (Supp.1978-79). For the following reasons we conclude that appellee may not in the instant context assert this defense in order to avoid compliance with agreed upon arbitration procedure. 5

The framework for public employee collective bargaining in this Commonwealth is provided by Act 195. The purpose of Act 195 is to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their employees, to provide adequate means for the minimization and resolution of disputes between the public employer and its employees and to facilitate the development of harmonious relationships between the public employer and its employees. Id. § 1101.101. The statutory scheme enacted in this Commonwealth is unusual as compared with other states, 6 in that it affords certain public employees a limited right to strike after exhaustion of negotiation and remediation procedures, Id. § 1101.1001-1003, and in that it provides for mandatory arbitration of "disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement." Id. § 1101.903.

In supporting private sector grievance arbitration, the United States Supreme Court has relied upon evidence of Congressional intent, upon the principle of allocating decision-making power to the more expert tribunal, and upon the assumption that labor peace can best be accomplished through enforced use of dispute resolution machinery established by the parties themselves. 7 The rule is that, except when the contract clearly and expressly excludes the dispute from arbitration, the process set up in collective bargaining negotiations must prevail. 8 Even frivolous grievances are to be sent to arbitration because of arbitration's therapeutic value in providing a safety valve for the ventilation of issues which might spill over in wildcat strikes or job actions. 9 In comparing our labor policy towards arbitration with that of the federal labor policy we have observed "The General Assembly, far from forbidding arbitration of disputes arising out of a collective bargaining agreement, expressly commands it in section 903 of the PERA, which provides, in pertinent part:

'Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory . . . . (T)he final step (of the grievance procedure) shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator . . . .'

This policy is even stronger than that embodied in federal labor policy. See United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Federal policy merely favors the submission of disputes to arbitration, while the PERA requires it."

Bd. of Ed. v. Phila. Federation of Teachers, 464 Pa. 92, 99, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975).

It would therefore be totally inconsistent for this Court to be less supportive of grievance arbitration than the courts in the federal system. Discussing our view of the importance of grievance arbitration under the labor policy articulated in Act 195, we stated:

"It is not difficult to perceive the reasons for the statutory requirement that grievances be submitted to arbitration. If a dispute arises as to the interpretation or application of the agreement there must be a mechanism for resolving the dispute or the agreement is meaningless. Historically, the primary means of resolving such disputes was the strike, and many agreements in the private sector retain this mechanism for at least some types of dispute. However, resolution of all disputes by resort to economic force is costly to the parties, and more importantly, to the public. The General Assembly therefore chose to make the widely used procedure of labor arbitration mandatory under the PERA. This brings the special expertise of labor arbitrators to bear on the often difficult problems of administering the collective bargaining agreement while assuring parties that their agreement will be effective and guaranteeing both the parties and the public that such disputes will not disrupt peaceful labor relations or interrupt public services."

Id. at 100, 346 A.2d at 39 (footnotes omitted).

Where the decision to commit a matter to grievance arbitration arises from the terms of a contract between the parties rather than as a result of statutory mandate, the policy to favor this type of dispute resolution is even stronger. Here the alleged obligation to submit the question to arbitration flows directly from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and not section 903 of Act 195. The Union's argument is premised upon the fact that sections 5 and 6 of the agreement provide the procedure for obtaining redress for the asserted grievance. 10 This Court has recognized that alternative dispute resolutions arrived at voluntarily by the parties to a contract is to be fostered:

"Fundamental in our law of contracts is the axiom that parties may write their own contracts, and that it is the function of the courts to interpret those contracts and to enforce them as made. It is now recognized in this Commonwealth that the enforcement of agreements by the parties to submit future disputes, that may arise under their agreement, to a tribunal other than the courts is not against public policy and is consistent with the concept of the courts' role in dealing with the contractual relationships of individuals. 'Settlements of disputes by arbitration are no longer deemed contrary to public policy. In fact, our statutes encourage arbitration and with our dockets crowded and in some jurisdictions congested arbitration is favored by the courts.'

In Wyoming Radio v. National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, 398 Pa. 183, 186, 157 A.2d 366, 367 (1960), we stated: 'Arbitration is not a makeshift or a subterfuge. It is not an excuse for delay or a fan for the cooling off of tempers. It is a solemn and serious undertaking for the attainment of justice, and when parties engaged in a common enterprise agree to settle by arbitration all differences which may arise between them they are bound by their commitment as much as if they had entered into a stipulation in Court'."

Ambridge Borough Water Authority v. Columbia, 458 Pa. 546, 548-49, 328 A.2d 498 (1974). See also Chester City School Authority v. Aberthaw Construction Co., 460 Pa. 343, 333 A.2d 758 (1975); Flightways Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., 459 Pa. 660, 331 A.2d 184 (1975).

It has also been recognized that these principles are applicable to contracts pertaining to employment. Ambridge Borough Water v. Columbia, supra. In Ambridge, we held that a party to a contract containing an arbitration clause could not avoid this obligation by subsequently asserting its incapacity to enter the contract in the first instance. Id. We believe that decision is instructive here. In both instances, a governmental unit, as employer, entered into an employment contract containing a clause requiring grievance arbitration. At the heart of each case is the fact that a governmental unit employer attempted to avoid arbitration by asserting its own incapacity. In Ambridge we reasoned as follows in deciding that the employer should not be permitted to avoid arbitration:

"Here, there is no question that there was a mutual agreement to arbitrate future disputes. Equally as clear is that there is no challenge to the capacity of the Authority to enter into an agreement providing for arbitration. Furthermore, the parties operated under this agreement...

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