Pizarro v. Wetzel, CIVIL 3:20-CV-00511
| Decision Date | 19 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 3:20-CV-00511 |
| Parties | SHANTA PIZARRO, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. WETZEL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
The plaintiff, Shanta Pizarro, filed this lawsuit against the defendants, asserting violations of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In her complaint, Pizarro alleges that her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during a visit to the State Correctional Institute (“SCI”) in Dallas, Pennsylvania, where her body was “strip” searched and her personal cell phone was searched by correctional staff. Several defendants have been dismissed due to failure to state a claim against them. (Doc. 37). The remaining defendants, Gardzalla, Bradley, and Reese, now move for summary judgment, arguing there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to these claims.
For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.
This case involved the strip search of a prison visitor and the question of whether that highly intrusive physical search was based upon a reasonable suspicion or some unarticulated hunch.
On March 26, 2018, Pizarro arrived at SCI-Dallas for her weekly visit with her boyfriend, Edward Woods, who was incarcerated there. (Doc. 17, ¶¶ 11-12). Such visits take place in a designated visitation room within the prison, and visitors pass through several different security measures before entering. (Doc. 44-4, at 7). Pizarro passed through the usual entry protocols of an ion scan, a metal detector, and a dress code check. (Doc. 17, ¶ 15; Doc. 44-4, at 10). After she did so, Defendants Gardzalla and Bradley approached Pizarro, as they thought she may be smuggling drugs into the prison, told her to accompany them to the Administrative Building next door, and they subsequently escorted her there. (Doc. 17, ¶ 17; Doc. 45, at 23).
Behind a closed door, the two defendants asked Pizarro whether she had ever brought synthetic marijuana or Suboxone into the prison. (Doc. 17, ¶¶ 18, 26). They also asked whether Pizarro had received money from Woods. (Id., ¶ 30). Although Pizarro admitted to receiving money, she denied any criminal activity and explained that she believed the money came from Woods' poker winnings. (Id., ¶¶ 27, 31-32). In his deposition, Defendant Bradley stated that at this point in the interaction with Pizarro, he was “on the fence” and “wasn't sure” if Pizarro was in possession of narcotics. (Doc. 44-2, at 6). Notwithstanding this admitted uncertainty, Defendant Reese was called to conduct a strip search of Pizarro. (Id., at 8).
On this score, it is unclear who actually ordered the strip search. For his part, Bradley stated that he did not have the authority to order a strip search. (Doc. 44-2, at 8). On the other hand, Gardzalla stated that Bradley was the one who requested that Pizarro be searched, and that Gardzalla was acting on Bradley's request when he called for a female officer to assist with a search. (Doc. 45, at 24). Reese stated that she was told by another Lieutenant to meet Gardzalla, and she was only informed that it was a strip search of a visitor when she reported to Gardzalla and Bradley. (Doc. 44-3, at 5). Notably, Reese stated that in her nine years as a correctional officer, Ms. Pizarro was the only visitor she ever strip searched, and that she was aware strip searches of visitors were prohibited by prison policy. (Id., at 6-7).[1]
Despite having the knowledge that the strip search would violate prison policy, Defendant Reese followed the order she was given and escorted Pizarro to a female locker room, where she advised Pizarro that she would be strip searched, although it is unclear if Pizarro actually consented to the search. (Doc. 17, ¶¶ 36, 39; Doc. 44-2, at 8). During the search, Pizarro removed all her clothes, and Defendant Reese subjected her to a visual body cavity search that included examinations of Pizarro's mouth, breast, and genital areas. (Doc. 17, ¶ 41; Doc. 44-3, at 5-6; Doc. 44-4, at 13). Following the search, Pizarro was permitted to use the bathroom under observation, dress herself, and return to the room where she was originally questioned. (Doc. 17, ¶¶ 43-44). She was then questioned further regarding the same topics introduced before the search, to which she gave the same responses. (Id., ¶ 44). Pizarro claims that she did not believe she had the right to leave at any point during the aforementioned search or questioning. (Doc. 17, ¶ 21).
After their questioning, Defendants Gardzalla and Bradley escorted Pizarro to her vehicle. (Id., ¶ 48). They then searched the vehicle and Pizarro's cell phone, taking pictures of various screens. (Id., ¶¶ 48, 50). The searches did not result in any findings of contraband. (Id., ¶ 60). The defendants ultimately denied Pizarro's request to visit Woods. (Id., ¶ 62).
It is against this factual backdrop that the plaintiff brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against six named defendants, alleging a deprivation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 17). Three of these defendants have since been dismissed. (Doc. 37). The three remaining defendants-Gardzalla, Bradley, and Reese-have filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 42). In doing so, they argue that the plaintiff does not have a valid Fourteenth Amendment due process claim in this case since her claims, which relate to a search and seizure and are grounded in the Fourth Amendment, are governed under the more-specific provision rule; that the search of the plaintiff's phone was reasonable under the special needs doctrine; that the strip search was supported by reasonable suspicion; and that all three defendants are entitled to both sovereign and qualified immunity. (Doc. 43). For the following reasons, we will recommend that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial, ” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a par...
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