Plan Helena Inc v. Helena Reg'l Airport Auth. Bd., DA 09-0388.

• Docket Nº: No. DA 09-0388.
• Citation: 355 Mont. 142, 2010 MT 26, 226 P.3d 567
• Case Date: February 09, 2010
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

355 Mont. 142
226 P.3d 567
2010 MT 26

PLAN HELENA, INC., a Montana nonprofit corporation, and Alan Nicholson, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
HELENA REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY BOARD and Lewis and Clark County, Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 09-0388.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Feb. 9, 2010.

226 P.3d 568

OPINION AND ORDERJAMES C. NELSON, Judge.

¶ 1 This is an appeal by Plan Helena, Inc. and Alan Nicholson (collectively, Plan Helena) from two orders of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. In the first, dated March 18, 2009, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Helena Regional Airport Authority Board (HRAA) and Lewis and Clark County (the County). In the second, dated May 13, 2009, the District Court denied Plan Helena's motion to alter or amend the court's March 18 order.

¶ 2 We conclude that this case does not present a case or controversy, but rather calls for an advisory opinion. Accordingly, we vacate the District Court's two orders, dismiss this appeal, and remand for entry of an order dismissing the case as nonjusticiable.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 By way of a brief background, HRAA owns approximately 1,300 acres of land. In October 2008, Plan Helena filed suit against HRAA to enjoin and declare unlawful HRAA's proposed lease of nine acres of this land to Blue Cross Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS). The lease was intended to cover land adjacent to the Helena Regional Airport and to remain in effect for 40 years. Plan Helena contended that the proposed lease violated § 67-11-232, MCA. Ultimately the litigation involved the interpretation of § 67-11-232, MCA, along with § 67-11-211, MCA, and other statutes in the Airport Authorities Act (Title 67, chapter 11, MCA). The District Court framed the precise question before it as “what statutory scheme governs the lease of property owned by [HRAA] to private commercial businesses whose activities are not specifically aeronautically related?”

¶ 4 BCBS was permitted to intervene in November 2008. In December 2008, HRAA commenced a separate proceeding for declaratory judgment, and that suit was later consolidated with Plan Helena's suit. In February 2009, the County was permitted to intervene, and it has remained a party in this case.

¶ 5 Critical to our decision here, BCBS ultimately determined not to go through with the lease and was dismissed from this case in February 2009 shortly before a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court posited that BCBS's decision would render the matter moot; however, the parties desired a ruling on the merits, and the court thus proceeded to issue the orders now before us on appeal, essentially giving an advisory opinion as to the applicability of the above statutes.

226 P.3d 569

DISCUSSION

¶ 6 The judicial power of Montana's courts, like the federal courts, is limited to “justiciable controversies.” See Greater Missoula Area Fedn. v. Child Start, Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 22, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881. Article III of the United States Constitution restricts the judicial power of the federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Likewise, Article VII, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, in relevant part, confers original jurisdiction on district courts in “all civil matters and cases at law and in equity.” Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4(1). This Court has stated that the “cases at law and in equity” language of Article VII, Section 4(1) embodies the same limitations as are imposed on federal courts by the “case or controversy” language of Article III. See Olson v. Dept. of Revenue, 223 Mont. 464, 469-70, 726 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1986); Seubert v. Seubert, 2000 MT 241, ¶ 17, 301 Mont. 382, 13 P.3d 365. Accordingly, federal precedents interpreting the Article III requirements for justiciability are persuasive authority for interpreting the justiciability requirements of Article VII, Section 4(1). See e.g. Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶¶ 6-13, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364.

¶ 7 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the words “cases” and “controversies” embody two complementary but somewhat different limitations:

In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).

¶ 8 “A justiciable controversy is one upon which a court's judgment will effectively operate, as distinguished from a dispute...