Planas v. Lamoutte, C.A. No. 14-1468-MML
| Decision Date | 22 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 14-1468-MML |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | VIANCA A. ARROYO PLANAS, her husband, VICTOR L. ROSARIO, and their Conjugal Partnership, Plaintiffs, v. HON. ENRIQUE LAMOUTTE, Chief Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico, and; MARIA DE LOS ANGELES GONZALEZ, Clerk of the Court, personally, and; WILMA JAIME, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court, personally, and; YOLANDA BENITEZ, Human Resources/Training Specialist with the Office of the Clerk of the Court, personally and; SIX UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, personally, Defendants. |
The primary plaintiff in this employment-related action, Vianca A. Arroyo-Planas ("Arroyo-Planas," together with her husband Victor L., Rosario ("Rosario"), the "Plaintiffs"), seeks damages as well as declaratory and equitable relief for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment at the Office of the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico (the"Bankruptcy Court").1 The defendants in the case (the "Defendants") include one of the judges of the Bankruptcy Court where Arroyo-Planas had been employed for nearly sixteen years, the Clerk of the Court, the Chief Deputy Clerk, the Human Resources Specialist, and six "unknown defendants."
The matter is before the Court on the Defendants' motion to dismiss Arroyo-Planas's complaint (the "Complaint") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Arroyo-Planas began working at the Bankruptcy Court as a full-time Notice Clerk (Grade CL-21) on September 1, 1997. Complaint ¶13 (Dkt. No.1). By November 30, 2006, Arroyo-Planas was working as a Court Services Clerk (Grade CL-25), a position she still held on the day of her termination. Complaint ¶14. On July 2, 2013, Arroyo-Planas was informed by Chief Deputy Clerk Wilma Jaime and Clerk of the Court Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez that her employment was terminated as of July 5, 2013. Arroyo-Planas was also given a letter, which stated that her Grade CL-25 position was being abolished as "a direct result of a reduction in force due tobudgetary constraints." Complaint ¶¶16-21. Upon inquiry, Arroyo-Planas learned that the Grade CL-25 position of a younger male co-worker was also being terminated, but that the termination of his employment was not effective until September 30, 2013. Complaint ¶22.
According to the Complaint, Arroyo-Planas asked about the reason for the different termination dates and was told that, because she would be eligible to receive retirement benefits on July 15, 2013, her fifty-sixth birthday, the Defendants had acted "expeditiously" to terminate her employment before that date. Complaint ¶23. It should be noted at this point that, although it is correctly stated that Arroyo-Planas became eligible for retirement annuity payments on July 15, 2013, termination of her employment just prior to that date did not affect her eligibility for that benefit. However, the timing of the termination just prior to the eligibility date allowed Arroyo-Planas to collect a year's salary as severance pay, which would not have been available to her, had her employment continued beyond her retirement eligibility date.
On July 9, 2013, Arroyo-Planas sent a letter to the Clerk of Court as an "informal request" to reconsider the termination of her employment. Complaint ¶36. Arroyo-Planas requested to be reinstated to any lower grade position being held by a person with less seniority or, in the alternative, postponement of her employmenttermination until September 30, 2013. Complaint ¶ 37. According to the Complaint, following the termination of her employment, Arroyo-Planas received a letter from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, informing her that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §55952, she qualified for severance pay because her separation from employment was involuntary. Complaint ¶41. According to the Defendants' Answer (Dkt. No. 17), between July 19, 2013 and July 4, 2014, Arroyo-Planas received severance payments totaling $54,183. Answer at ¶6.
On October 4, 2013, after Arroyo-Planas had asked Human Resources Specialist Yolanda Benitez ("Benitez") how she could appeal the termination of her employment, Benitez informed Arroyo-Planas that the Bankruptcy Court did not have a procedure to appeal her termination. Complaint ¶¶43-44. Arroyo-Planas and her husband were also informed that employment by judicial appointment was "at will," and that employees of the federal judiciary service were not covered by the legal provisions of the competitive service. Complaint ¶44. Arroyo-Planas further alleges that she requested, but was not provided with, a copy of the personnel manual. Complaint ¶¶43, 45. According to the Complaint, at some point following her separation, Arroyo-Planas withdrew her retirementcontributions to meet her financial commitments. Complaint ¶ 102.3
On June 12, 2014, Arroyo-Planas filed a four-count complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, asserting claims of deprivation of procedural due process (Count I) and substantive due process (Count II), and violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Count III). In addition, Arroyo-Planas seeks declaratory and equitable relief (Count IV), as well as pecuniary and punitive damages.
Arroyo-Planas contends that she had a protected liberty interest in her continued employment and that she was deprived of her constitutional right to effective notice and pre- and post-deprivation hearings prior to the termination. Complaint ¶¶58-62. Arroyo-Planas also alleges that her male colleague was treated more favorably and that the termination of her employment was intended to impede her qualifications for retirement benefits and resulted in the deprivation of her substantive due process rights. Complaint ¶¶71, 76. According to Arroyo-Planas, she was the subject of intentional discrimination "by unequal treatment due to her gender and her age." Complaint ¶ 82. Arroyo-Planas suggests that the asserted reason for the termination—budgetary constraints resultingin the abolishment of her position—was belied by (1) more favorable treatment of her male colleague (to the extent that his employment continued until September 2013); and (2) the conversion of two temporary positions to permanent positions and/or the extension of promotions to other employees, accompanied by pay raises. Complaint ¶83. In her request for relief, Arroyo-Planas seeks a declaration that, inter alia, she had the expectation of continued employment, a "real, tangible and protectable interest regarding her Retirement Benefits," and that she is entitled to a reinstatement to her position and/or the accumulation of the time needed to qualify for Retirement Benefits and/or the replenishment of her retirement contributions. Complaint ¶¶96-98, 103.
On October 2, 2014, following designation of this Court to preside over the case, the Defendants filed an answer (Dkt. No. 17) to the Complaint, asserting, inter alia, that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Arroyo-Planas's claims because "[j]udiciary employees have no property interest in their employment and thus no due process protection under the Constitution." Answer ¶1.
On December 7, 2014, following a November 5, 2014 telephonic Rule 16 scheduling conference, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. No. 21), to which the Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (Dkt. No. 27). The Defendants elected not to file a reply thereto. The parties have engaged in settlement discussions, which ultimately were unsuccessful.
A. Motion to Dismiss
The dismissal of a complaint is governed by Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court may dismiss a complaint inter alia, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) "is similar to that accorded a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)." Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1144, 115 S.Ct. 2581, 132 L.Ed.2d 831 (1995)(citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)).
It is well established that, "when a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, 'the party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence.'" Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007)(quoting Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d at 522). In determining a motion to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court "give[s] weight to the well-pleaded factual averments in the operative pleading (here, the petitioners' amended complaint) and indulge[s] every reasonable inference in the pleader's favor." Aguilar v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Div. of Dept. of HomelandSecurity, 510 F.3d. 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007); Muñiz-Rivera v. United States, 326 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir.2003). Accordingly, the Court must "construe the complaint liberally, treat all well-pleaded facts as true, and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir.1996). However, a "plaintiff cannot rest a jurisdictional basis merely on 'unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law." Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d at 68 (quoting Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522 (quoting Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993)).
Similarly, in deciding a motion for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts "all well-pleaded facts as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences" in favor of the party...
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