Plank v. Summers

• Decision Date: 12 January 1954
• Docket Number: No. 60,60
• Citation: 203 Md. 552,102 A.2d 262
• Parties: PLANK et al. v. SUMMERS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 552

203 Md. 552

102 A.2d 262

PLANK et al. v. SUMMERS.

No. 60.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 12, 1954.

Thomas B. Lawrence, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Hal C. B. Clagett and Jerrold V. Powers, Upper Marlboro (Lansdale G. Sasscer, Sasscer, Clagett & Powers and Lansdale G. Sasscer. Jr., Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and HAMMOND, JJ.

COLLINS, Judge.

Here are appeals from the amounts of three judgments awarded the appellants for damages arising out of an automobile collision.

The substantial facts of the case follow. The appellants, all being members of the United States Navy, at 8 P.M. on May 16, 1952, were riding in an automobile driven by one of them, Robert E. Plank, proceeding in a northerly direction on United States Route 301 in Prince George's County, Maryland. Coming in an opposite direction was an automobile driven by one Davis. Following Davis was an automobile driven by the appellee, Samuel J. Summers, and occupied by him and two young women. As the Davis car, proceeding south, and appellants' vehicle, going north, were about to pass, appellee's car struck the Davis car from the rear, knocking it into the back of appellants' car, causing the injuries sustained. The case was tried before the trial judge and a jury, who rendered a verdict for appellant, Plank, in the amount of $800.00; for appellant, Glenn, in the amount of $700.00; and for the appellant, Van Cauwenberg, in the amount of $900.00. The appellants appeal here from the amounts of the judgments entered on those verdicts.

The appellants contend that because the trial was started at 10 A. M. on Friday, May 1st, and was submitted to the jury at 2:18 A. M. on Saturday, May 2nd, the jurors became physically and mentally weary and thereby were not permitted to fairly deliberate the case. Of course, no case should be carried on for such a length of time that the judges, jury and lawyers cannot properly function. However, the widest discretion has been given the trial courts in the conduct of trials and this discretion should not be disturbed unless it is clearly abused. In the instant case no objection seems to have been raised during the course of the trial to its duration by the appellants here or by their attorney or by the jurors.

During the opening statement of the attorney for the plaintiffs, appellants, the following was said: 'Now, one last point is this: These men were treated at the National Naval Hospital because they were members of the Armed Services. These treatments were rendered, the hospital services were given to them by the United States Government by reason of their position, and we believe that these men are entitled to compensation to the full value of those services, had they been rendered----.' At that point an objection was made by the appellee on the ground that services rendered by the United States Government in the form of medicine, medical attention and other services, were without charge of any kind to the appellants and therefore they could not recover them from the appellee. After argument before the court, it was ruled that plaintiffs, appellants, could not recover compensatory damages for services for which they were not required to pay and the court sustained the appellee's objection. Also, during the trial of the case, the following statement was made by appellants' attorney: 'On behalf of the plaintiffs, Plank, Glenn and Van Cauwenberg, I wish to take exception to the Court's ruling that said plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the fair value of the services rendered by the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda in proportion to the prevailing charge by private physicians, surgeons and institutions.' The court then asked whether the plaintiffs paid anything for hospital and medical services while confined for treatment. After the answer, 'No', the court then said: 'All right then, the proffer is tendered, as previously indicated, and that the court has rules as now objected to by Mr. Lawrence', and the court sustained the objection of the appellee. Appellee contends that no sufficient proffer of evidence was made to bring the question as to the value of appellants' hospital and medical services before this Court and relies on Eschbach v. Hurtt, 1877, 47 Md. 61. In that case it was held that it was not sufficient to make an offer of proof where there were no witnesses available to sustain such proof. In the instant case the trial judge considered that a proffer had been made and, from the number of doctors testifying for the appellants as to the injuries sustained, it is evident that they had witnesses to testify as to the value of the hospital and medical services rendered. The following quotation from Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 17, Vol. I, pg. 318, seems appropriate here: 'But a specific offer of evidence is not needed where an entire class of evidence has been in advance formally declared inadmissible by the trial court during preliminary argument or colloquy; for the Court's ruling relates forward to all possible offers of such evidence and renders them needless. Moreover, after such a ruling, the persistence of counsel in making or repeating such offers may be treated as improper attempts to get before the jury the effect of such evidence.' See also Brooke Adm'r v. Quynn, 13 Md. 379, 390; Herrman v. Combs, 119 Md. 41, 43, 85 A. 1044; Stocksdale v. Jones, 133 Md. 176, 182, 104 A. 416. The ruling of the trial judge that the proffered testimony was inadmissible is therefore before this Court on appeal.

The principal question before us is whether the jury should have been allowed to consider and to award the appellants, plaintiffs below, the reasonable value of the hospital and medical services rendered to them without charge or imposition of liability by a United States Navy hospital.

It has been held that, where medical care has been furnished by a charitable institution, no recovery is allowed from the tort feasor. City of Englewood v. Bryant, 1937, 100 Colo. 552, 68 P.2d 913; DiLeo v. Dolinsky, 1942, 129 Conn. 203, 27 A.2d 126. To the contrary, however, see Mobley v. Garcia, 1950, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256, 19 A.L.R.2d 553.

It has been held in a number of cases that a plaintiff cannot recover for medical services gratuitously rendered or for which he is not liable. Among these are: Woeckner v. Erie Electric Motor Co., 1897, 182 Pa. 182, 37 A. 936; Robertson v. Wabash R. Co., 1899, 152 Mo. 382, 53 S.W. 1082; Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Humphries, 1911, 172 Ala. 495, 55 So. 307; Nelson v. Pauli, 1922, 176 Wis. 1, 186 N.W. 217; Malloy v. Southern Cities Distributing Co., La.App., 1932, 142 So. 718; Daniels v. Celeste, 1939, 303 Mass. 148, 21 N.E.2d 1, 128 A.L.R. 682.

However in Beckert v. Doble, 1926, 105 Conn. 88, 134 A. 154, 155, it was held: 'An injured person is entitled to recover for medical or nursing services rendered him, even if gratuitous or paid for by a third party, on the ground that, while such service or payment is a gift for his benefit, it is one of the elements of his injury and he is entitled to the benefit of the gift. Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn. 282, 116 A. 332, 22 A.L.R. 1554; Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 A. 518; Hayes v. Morris & Co., 98 Conn. 603, 607, 119 A. 901; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Holman, 15 Tex.Civ.App. 16, 39 S.W. 130; Crouse v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 102 Wis. 196, 78 N.W. 446, 778.' In Verhelst Const. Co. v. Galles, 1931, 204 Wis. 96, 235 N.W. 556, it was held as dictum that gratuitous nursing services by a parent do not relieve the tort feasor of his liability to pay for them. No mention was made of the previous Wisconsin case of Nelson v. Pauli, supra. In Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 1938, 105 Ind.App. 475, 15 N.E.2d 742, the father was allowed to recover from the tort feasor the value of the mother's gratuitous nursing services in an action for injury to a minor child. In Williams v. Campbell, 1938, 185 So. 683, the Louisiana Court of Appeals made no reference to Malloy v. Southern Cities Distributing Co., supra, and followed what it held to be the majority rule and permitted recovery for the value of services gratuitously rendered. In Clough v. Schwartz, 1946, 94 N.H. 138, 48 A.2d 921, it was held that in determining damages to be recovered by a city fireman for injuries sustained when the fire truck collided with defendant's truck, the plaintiff was properly permitted to introduce in evidence receipted hospital and medical bills regardless of the fact that the bills had been paid by the city fireman's relief association. In Dahlin v. Kron, 1950, 232 Minn. 321, 45 N.W.2d 833, in an action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, it was held that even though physician's services were furnished gratuitously or paid by the hospital, it was error to refuse to admittestimony as to the reasonable value of such medical services. In Mullins v. Bolinger, 1944, 115 Ind.App. 167, 55 N.E.2d 381, 382, 56 N.E.2d 496, where medical services were paid by the city, it was said: 'Where the wrongdoer is liable for damages, he is liable for all damages and it is no concern of such wrongdoer who ultimately gets the money.' Among other cases allowing recovery for the value of nursing or medical services furnished as a gratuity are Brosnan v. Sweetser, 1891, 127 Ind. 1, 26 N.E. 555; Pennsylvania Co. v. Marion, 1885, 104 Ind. 239, 3 N.E. 874; Yeager v. Incorporated Town of Spirit Lake, 1902, 115 Iowa 593, 88 N.W. 1095; Lewark v. Parkinson, 1906, 73 Kan. 553, 85 P. 601, 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 1069; Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 1913, 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 706, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 606. In Dence Bus Lines v. Hargis, 1951, 204 Okl. 339, 229 P.2d 560, where claimant received sick benefits from a source other than the tort feasor, it was held that the amount of recovery was not thereby diminished. It has been held in a...