Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of Westport v. Synanon Foundation, Inc.

Decision Date05 January 1966
Citation216 A.2d 442,153 Conn. 305
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesPLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF WESTPORT v. SYNANON FOUNDATION, INC., et al.

Edwin K. Dimes, Westport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Jack Waltuch, Norwalk, with whom, on the brief, were Donald J. Irwin, South Norwalk, and Nicholas A. Cioffi, Norwalk, for appellees (defendants).

Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, HOUSE and COTTER, JJ.

COTTER, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a denial by the court of an injunction against the defendants. The issue is singular and unique in its facts. The appeal raises the question whether the court erred in failing to find that the defendant Synanon Foundation, Inc., was in violation of § 1(B)(1) of chapter 3 of the Westport zoning regulations (1958, as amended), which limits the occupancy of dwellings in the town's AAA residential zone to 'one family per lot.' It should be emphasized that the nature of Synanon's program, which may be meritorious, is not involved as an issue in this case, and our decision is directed solely to the interpretation and enforcement of the zoning ordinance already described.

A lengthy recital of the facts is unnecessary. Synanon Foundation, Inc., a charitable foundation incorporated under the laws of California, leased a very large house at 249 Greens Farms Road, which is in a restricted residential area designated by the Westport ordinance as an AAA zone. The plaintiff claimed that Synanon was violating the one family per lot zoning restriction and brought this action to enjoin it and seven individuals from further violation of the ordinance. The issues were tried to the court, which found that the plaintiff failed to prove a violation of the one family per lot restriction. The present appeal was then taken by the plaintiff. The claim as to the seven individual defendants has not been pressed, and we therefore consider only the claim as to Synanon, hereinafter referred to as the defendant.

From the trial court's finding of subordinate facts, together with such corrections as are warranted, the concluson is inescapable that the premises were residentially occupied by a large number of persons who, with minor exceptions, were unrelated to one another. There was testimony by town officials that in the course of their inspections, which covered thirty-eight separate dates during the period from February 27, 1963, to March 18, 1964, they found that a number of persons, ranging in total from eleven to thirty-four, were ostensibly living on the premises at various times and for differing periods. These inspections, which were made with the full cooperation of those found on the premises, disclosed twenty-four beds, including one double bed, on the second floor and additional sleeping quarters, as well as a fully equipped barber shop, on the third floor. The rest of the evidence either supports or is consistent with the conclusion that a large number of unrelated persons were residing at the dwelling leased by and under the control of the defendant.

The inclusion of regulated residential districts within the general zoning ordinance, such as we have in this case, has been reviewed and upheld by the courts on many occasions. See, e. g., Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 110 Conn. 130, 138, 147 A. 513, 54 A.L.R. 361, cert. denied, 281 U.S. 732, 50 S.Ct. 247, 74 L.Ed. 1148. The further limitation that a residence may not be used by more than one family is not uncommon in zoning jurisprudence. Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303; note, 95 A.L.R.2d 716, 719.

The only remaining question is whether the phrase 'one family,' which is left undefined in the Westport zoning ordinance, is broad enough to encompass the group of persons residing at the premises leased by the defendant. The trial court concluded that the use of this property as found was not excluded by the zoning ordinance. The applicable provision of the ordinance, which is a permissive rather than a prohibitory ordinance, allows '[o]ne detached dwelling for occupancy by one family per lot.' Westport Zoning Regs., c. 3, § 1(B)(1) (1958, as amended). Obviously the use of this dwelling was not by one family, under any definition, since the trial court found that it was occupied over a long period of time by an ever-changing aggregate of individuals. Such a group of individuals, who were sleeping, cooking, eating, working, and carrying on other activities at these premises, cannot be interpreted to come within the meaning of the word 'family,' either according to common usage or under the dictionary definitions, and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary, in the absence of a controlling definition in the ordinance, cannot be sustained. City of Schenectady v. Alumni Assn. of Union Chapter, Delta Chi Fraternity, Inc., 5 A.D.2d 14, 15, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754; Cassidy v. Triebel, 337 Ill.App. 117, 127, 85 N.E.2d 461; 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 143. Indeed, if these occupants were held to constitute 'one family,' it is difficult to imagine any group or organization which would not be considered one family, and the phrase 'occupancy by one family per lot' would be rendered superfluous, in conflict with the well-established rule that, whenever feasible, the language of an ordinance will be construed so that no clause is held superfluous, void, or insignificant. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Scheuy, 148 Conn. 721, 723, 167 A.2d 862; Fox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 70, 73, 147 A.2d 472.

The language of the ordinance must be given a construction which is reasonable under all the circumstances. Hutchison v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 381, 385, 100 A.2d 839. The word 'family' is one of indefinite conception which gives rise to varying definitions. When a court is called...

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21 cases
  • Armstrong v. Baltimore
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 23 July 2009
    ...because they "could leave at any time" and the average length of stay was only six months); cf. Planning and Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Found., Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442, 443 (1966) (applying a zoning ordinance that did not define the term "family" and holding that "an ever-changing a......
  • City of Grapevine v. Muns
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 23 December 2021
    ...takings claim and claims challenging the STR Ordinance's constitutionality.27 See, e.g., Plan. & Zoning Comm'n of the Town of Westport v. Synanon Found., Inc. , 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442, 443 (1966) (concluding that "ever-changing" group of individuals who slept, cooked, ate, worked, and ......
  • Earney v. Clay
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 7 November 1974
    ...of 'family' must relate to and be consistent with the context in which the word is found. Planning & Zoning Com'n v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442, 444(3) (1966). In a more general sense, especially when referring to deceased persons rather than to living persons, it......
  • Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Stratford
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 13 August 1991
    ...family is not uncommon in zoning jurisprudence" and has been upheld implicitly by this court. Planning & Zoning Commission v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 308, 216 A.2d 442 (1966). Their attack upon the validity of § 1.18 is confined for the most part 4 to its restriction of the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Frank S. Alexander, the Housing of America's Families: Control, Exclusion, and Privilege
    • United States
    • Emory University School of Law Emory Law Journal No. 54-3, 2005
    • Invalid date
    ...living, sleeping, cooking or eating on premises as a single housekeeping unit"). Contra Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Found., Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 308-09, 216 A.2d 442, 443 (1966) (eleven to thirty-four unrelated persons belonging to a charitable institution were in violation of an or......

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