Plant v. State

• Decision Date: 19 May 1904
• Citation: 37 So. 159,140 Ala. 52
• Parties: PLANT v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

37 So. 159

140 Ala. 52

PLANT v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 19, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Baldwin County; Wm. S. Anderson, Judge.

Tom Plant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

The appellant in this case, Tom Plant, was indicted and tried for the murder of Will Thomas, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to be hanged. Before entering upon the trial, the defendant moved the court to quash the venire. The grounds of this motion are sufficiently shown in the opinion. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant duly excepted. The evidence showed that the defendant and the deceased, Will Thomas, were convicts, and were worked by the Hand Lumber Company at Dolive; that at the time of the killing they were both confined in the stockade of said lumber company at Dolive, in Baldwin county; that the defendant walked to the place in the mill where the deceased was at work, and they got into a scuffle, and the defendant stabbed the deceased twice in the back of the neck, and that after the deceased fell on his stomach the defendant stabbed him in the back, the last stab being the fatal blow. There was evidence on the part of the state tending to show that on the night before the killing the defendant and the deceased had a dispute about a merchandise check, and the defendant stated in the presence of several witnesses that if the deceased did not give up the merchandise check the next day he (the defendant) would kill him. There was evidence introduced for the defendant tending to show that he struck the deceased in self-defense. During the examination of one J. A. Dudley as a witness for the state he testified that after the defendant had stabbed the deceased he took the defendant to his cell and locked him up. The solicitor then asked the witness the following question: "Did the defendant have anything to say on the way to the cell?" The defendant objected to the question. The court sustained the objection. Thereupon, in answer to several questions by the solicitor for the state, the witness Dudley testified that he did not make any threats against the defendant, nor did he make him any promises, nor did he hold out any inducements to get him to make a statement. Upon this witness further answering that the defendant made a statement to him he was then asked what. The defendant objected to this question. The objection was overruled, and the defendant duly excepted. The witness answered: "I told him that he had killed Will Thomas, and the defendant stated, 'I want to kill another son of a bitch, and then they can hang me.' "

The defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: "(1) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the defendant was justified in taking the life of the deceased if the deceased was coming onto him with a deadly or dangerous weapon in such a manner as to produce in the mind of a reasonable man a sense of danger to life or limb, and the defendant had no means of retreating without exposing the defendant to greater peril; and this danger may not be real; it is sufficient if it so appears to a reasonable mind. (2) If you have a reasonable doubt, gentlemen of the jury, as to whether the defendant acted in self-defense, he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and to an acquittal. (3) The court charges the jury that to establish the plea of self-defense he is only required to show that at the time he was either or to ordinary appearances, in imminent peril of life or limb, or great bodily danger. (4) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that one is justified in taking the life of another if at the time there reasonably appeared to be a present impending, imperious necessity to do so. (5) I charge you gentlemen of the jury, that a man is not required by the law to retreat from his house before he takes the life of his assailant, and the law regards his place of business as his castle, and he is no more under the necessity of retreating from there than he would be from his house, when he is feloniously assailed."

B....