Plaskon Electronic Materials v. Allied-Signal
| Decision Date | 12 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:92 CV 7572.,3:92 CV 7572. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | PLASKON ELECTRONIC MATERIALS, INC., Plaintiff, v. ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC., et al., Defendants. |
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Charles Randolph Light, Rohrbacher, Nicholson & Light, Toledo, OH, for Plaskon Electronic Materials, Inc., Rohm and Haas Delaware, Inc., Rohm & Haas Company.
Randall W. Knutti, Christopher R. Schraff, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Columbus, OH, James V. Maher, Allied-Signal, Inc., Law Department, Morristown, NJ, for Allied-Signal, Inc.
Reginald S. Jackson, Jr., Connelly, Soutar & Jackson, Toledo, OH, Robert P. LoBue, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, New York City, for Hillside Capital Incorporated, Hillside Industries Incorporated, Hillside Delaware Incorporated, PLK Liquidating Corp.
John C. Barron, Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, Toledo, OH, Peter C. John, Hedlund, Hanley & John, Chicago, IL, for Trinova Corporation.
Douglas G. Haynam, Fuller & Henry, Toledo, OH, for Libbey Owens Ford Co.
This case is before the Court on the following motions and responses:
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq.
This is an environmental case in which the parties contest liability for the cleanup costs associated with a particular site. The site at issue is located at 2829 Glendale Avenue in Toledo, Ohio, and will be referred to throughout this opinion as "the Site." The Site was used to manufacture plastic and epoxy molding compounds. It was originally owned by the Libbey Owens Ford Glass Company from 1943 to 1953. Manufacturing operations did not begin on the Site until 1947, when construction of the original plant was completed.
In 1953, Libbey Owens Ford Company sold the Site and the attendant operations to Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation. After obtaining the Site in 1953, Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation changed its name to Allied Chemical Corporation. It operated the Site for 26 years and engaged in the production of numerous molding compounds, plasticizers and polyester resins. In 1979, Plaskon Products, Inc. ("PPI") purchased the Site from Allied Chemical. PPI is a subsidiary of Defendant Hillside Industries, Inc. After the sale, Allied Chemical Corporation changed its name to Allied-Signal, Inc.
In 1980, Plaskon Electronic Materials, Inc. ("PEMCO") was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of PPI for the purposes of manufacturing semiconductor-related products and "446" polyester at the Site. At this time, PPI was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hillside Industries, Inc., which, in turn, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hillside Capital, Inc. Like Hillside Industries, Inc., Hillside Capital, Inc. is also a Defendant in this litigation.
PPI leased portions of the Site to PEMCO, which operated the semiconductor. In 1984, PEMCO's stock was sold to Plaskon Holding, Inc., another subsidiary of Hillside Industries, Inc. After the sale, Plaskon Holding, Inc. changed its name to Hillside Delaware, Inc., a Defendant in this litigation. Later in 1984, Plaskon Holdings, Inc. sold the stock in PEMCO to Rohm and Haas Delaware, Inc. Thus, PEMCO became a wholly owned subsidiary of Rohm and Haas Delaware, which is, in turn, a wholly owned subsidiary of Rohm and Haas Company, a large, publicly traded chemical manufacturer with its principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In conjunction with the sale, Plaskon Products, Inc. changed its name to PLK Liquidating, a defendant in this action. It retains corporate existence today as a subsidiary of Hillside Industries, Inc., but has not had any active operations since 1983. The term "PLK" is used throughout the remainder of this Memorandum Opinion to refer to Defendants PLK Liquidating Corporation and its predecessor in interest, PPI.
After the acquisition by Rohm and Haas Delaware, PEMCO continued its chemical manufacturing operations at the Site until 1991, at which time manufacturing operations in Toledo were terminated and transferred to a new plant in Singapore. After closing its manufacturing operations in Toledo and terminating the remaining PEMCO employees, the structures located at the Site were demolished.
As an initial matter, the Court sets forth the relative burdens of the parties once a motion for summary judgment is made. Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Of course, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the unverified pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Defendants Allied-Signal, TRINOVA and LOF move for summary judgment on the counterclaim that PEMCO is jointly and severally liable for response costs associated with the cleanup of contamination caused by the release of hazardous substances at the Site. PEMCO argues that, while it is the current owner of the Site, it is not jointly and severally liable under 107(a) of CERCLA.
Initially, PEMCO notes that it does not object to the contention that it is a current owner of the Site, and therefore, that it is a responsible party under § 107(a)(1) and the doctrine of strict liability. PEMCO, however, opposes any claim that is jointly and severally liable for all of the response costs at the Site.
In its reply brief to PEMCO's opposition to the motion for summary judgment, LOF raises the argument that PEMCO's action cannot be brought under § 107(a) of CERCLA, but instead must be brought under § 113(f) of CERCLA. Subsequently, LOF filed a notice of supplemental authorities supporting its position, PEMCO responded and LOF replied to the response. For the reasons set forth below, this Court is convinced that LOF is correct, and that, regardless of how it is pled, PEMCO's only action is a § 113(f) contribution action.
Section 107(a) of CERCLA states, in pertinent part:
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