Platt v. Huegel

• Decision Date: 18 November 1930
• Docket Number: No. 28950.,28950.
• Citation: 32 S.W.2d 605
• Parties: CHET A. PLATT, Administrator <I>Pendente Lite</I> of Estate of JOSEPH A. HUEGEL; LOUIS J. HUEGEL, CHARLES P. HUEGEL, LAWRENCE B. HUEGEL, HENRY O. HUEGEL, EUGENE W. HUEGEL, JOSEPHINE HUEGEL KIRKPATRICK and MARY ELINOR HUEGEL, by Her Next Friend LAWRENCE B. HUEGEL, v. MARY M. HUEGEL, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

32 S.W.2d 605

CHET A. PLATT, Administrator Pendente Lite of Estate of JOSEPH A. HUEGEL; LOUIS J. HUEGEL, CHARLES P. HUEGEL, LAWRENCE B. HUEGEL, HENRY O. HUEGEL, EUGENE W. HUEGEL, JOSEPHINE HUEGEL KIRKPATRICK and MARY ELINOR HUEGEL, by Her Next Friend LAWRENCE B. HUEGEL, v. MARY M. HUEGEL, Appellant.

No. 28950.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division One.

November 18, 1930.

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court. — Hon. Ransom H. Breuer, Special Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Ira H. Lohman and Barnett & Hays for appellant.

(1) When a husband causes the legal title to his property or property purchased with his means to be vested in his wife, the law indulges the presumption that he intended it as a settlement or gift, and no trust for himself will be presumed. Clark v. Clark (Mo.), 4 S.W. (2d) 807; Stevens v. Stevens, 309 Mo. 130; Wavrin v. Wavrin, 220 S.W. 931; East v. Davis, 204 S.W. 402; Bender v. Bender, 281 Mo. 473; Viers v. Viers, 175 Mo. 444; Ilgenfritz v. Ilgenfritz, 116 Mo. 429; Price v. Kane, 112 Mo. 412; Curd v. Brown, 148 Mo. 82; Gilliland v. Gilliland, 96 Mo. 522; Pensenneau v. Pensenneau, 22 Mo. 27; State ex rel. Roll v. Ellison, 233 S.W. 1065. (2) In order to obtain a decree declaring real or personal property to be held in trust when the conveyance is absolute in its terms, vague and uncertain evidence and loose or equivocal declarations are insufficient. The trust and the terms thereof must be established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. Harding v. Trust Co., 276 Mo. 136; Northrip v. Burge, 255 Mo. 641; Wiehtrechter v. Miller, 276 Mo. 322; Pitts v. Weakley, 155 Mo. 109; Carroll v. Woods, 132 Mo. App. 501; Darling v. Potts, 118 Mo. 506; Crawford v. Jones, 163 Mo. 577; Brinkman v. Sunker, 174 Mo. 709; Viers v. Viers, 175 Mo. 444; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 57 Mo. 73; Philpot v. Penn, 91 Mo. 38; King v. Islay, 116 Mo. 155; Rogers v. Rogers, 87 Mo. 257. (a) It must be shown that the settler had a clear intention to create a trust. Johnson v. Quarles, 46 Mo. 423; Knapp v. Knapp Pub. Co., 127 Mo. 53; Childs v. Wesleyan Cemetery Assn., 4 Mo. App. 74. (b) Mere loose statements are not sufficient. Garrett v. Garrett, 171 Mo. 155; Mulock v. Mulock, 156 Mo. 431; Curd v. Brown, 148 Mo. 82; Modrell v. Riddle, 82 Mo. 31; Rings v. Richardson, 53 Mo. 385. (c) If the evidence is susceptible of explanation on any theory other than the existence of a trust, no trust will be declared by the court. Potter v. Potter, 180 Ky. 370, 202 S.W. 872. (d) The evidence must show an explicit declaration of the trust or circumstances which show beyond a reasonable doubt that a trust was intended to be created. Sanford v. Van Pelt (Mo.), 282 S.W. 1022; Korompolis v. Tompras (Mo.), 251 S.W. 80; Stevens v. Fitzpatrick, 218 Mo. 708; McKee v. Allen, 204 Mo. 655; Haguewood v. Britain, 273 Mo. 89; Bobb v. Wolff, 148 Mo. 335; Mulock v. Mulock, 159 Mo. 431; Pitts v. Weakley, 155 Mo. 109; Ringo v. Richardson, 53 Mo. 385. (e) The element of certainty in the declaration is especially necessary where the proof of the declaration of trust rests in parol. 39 Cyc. 84; Lanigan v. Miles (Wash.), 172 Pac. 894; Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56. (3) The only necessary party plaintiff was the administrator who took title to the personal estate of Joseph A. Huegel. Brown v. Turner, 113 Mo. 27. He stood in the shoes of deceased and could not recover unless Joseph A. Huegel could have maintained the action except for his death. State Bank v. Lillibridge (Mo.), 293 S.E. 116. (4) Although the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that Joseph A. Huegel intended the stock transfer as a gift to his wife, yet it also shows that he was prompted to act when he did because the hotel had to procure a new loan to satisfy pressing creditors, and Mr. Huegel was acquainted with the fact that permanent competent management of the hotel was a great if not a controlling factor among money lenders, and that his age made continuous management under him impossible. A transfer in trust for himself, which could be set aside at his death, would not tend toward continuity of management. Therefore, the irresistible inference, in the absence of strong evidence of bad faith, is that Mr. Huegel intended an absolute conveyance to his wife. The law always presumes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a man acted honestly and fairly. Brigham v. Fruit Growers Assn. (Mo.), 220 S.W. 916; Glover v. Am. Casualty, etc., Co., 130 Mo. 173; Robertson v. Johnston, 210 Mo. App. 590; Nelson v. Jones, 245 Mo. 591; Sheffield v. Balmer, 52 Mo. 474; Long v. McDow, 87 Mo. 197; State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512; Henry v. Buddecke, 81 Mo. App. 360. (5) But if the evidence had disclosed that Joseph A. Huegel, though he transferred the stock to his wife so that it would appear that she was the owner and that the chance of continuity of competent management was satisfactory, yet intended that he should remain the beneficial owner of the stock and intended to regain the title after a loan had been secured, thus defeating the expectation of the lender, he would not come into equity with clean hands, and could not have a decree or declare a trust that would aid him to accomplish his deceitful and fraudulent purpose. Stillwell v. Bell, 248 Mo. 61; Derry v. Fielder, 216 Mo. 176; Butte Inv. Co. v. Bell (Mo.), 201 S.W. 880; Gilmore v. Thomas, 252 Mo. 147; Mountain Grove Creamery v. Willow Springs Creamery (Mo. App.), 202 S.W. 1054. (a) If plaintiff does not come into equity with clean hands, the court will deny all relief of its own motion. Gilmore v. Thomas, 252 Mo. 147; Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 485. (b) The finding of the trial court that the purpose for which the transfer was made had failed is contrary to all of the evidence. (6) The only testimony that Mr. Huegel did not intend to part with the beneficial interest in the stock was the testimony that Mr. Huegel said, in the absence of his wife, that he had put the stock in his wife's name, but they had an understanding that if he should die the property would revert back to the children. Louis Huegel's testimony that Mr. Huegel said, "I have papers to show it will revert to me;" Lawrence Huegel's testimony, that Mr. Huegel said, "This hotel is in her name for a certain purpose, but that's all fixed so that's just a temporary proposition." There was evidence that Mr. Huegel told Liv Morse several times after January, 1925, that Mr. Huegel owned the stock. In addition to this Howard Cook testified that when Mr. and Mrs. Huegel came to his bank to rent a lock box in Mrs. Huegel's name and to place the stock certificate therein, one or the other said "that was for a particular temporary reason." All were made after the date of the assignment on the stock certificate. These self-serving declarations made in the absence of defendant were not competent evidence of the intention of Mr. Huegel to retain the beneficial interest in the stock. Johnson v. Burks, 103 Mo. App. 221; Gaugh v. Gaugh (Mo.), 11 S.W. (2d) 746; Clark v. Clark (Mo.), 4 S.W. (2d) 809; Roberts v. Roberts (Mo.), 291 S.W. 485; Fishback v. Prock, 311 Mo. 494; Schwartz v. Trust Co. (Mo. App.), 277 S.W. 253; Coles v. Belford, 289 Mo. 97; Pursifull v. Pursifull (Mo.), 257 S.W. 117; McCune v. Daniels (Mo. App.), 225 S.W. 1020; McFarland v. Bishop, 282 Mo. 534; Townsend v. Schaden (Mo.), 275 Mo. 227; O'Day v. Annex Realty Co. (Mo.), 191 S.W. 41; In re Greenwood's Estate, 201 Mo. App. 39; Farmer's Bank v. Barbee, 198 Mo. 465; Dunnigan v. Green, 165 Mo. 98; Criddle's Admr. v. Criddle, 21 Mo. 522; Watson v. Bissell, 27 Mo. 220; Armstrong v. Johnson, 93 Mo. App. 492; Miller v. Quick, 158 Mo. 495. (7) The fact that the chancellor (who saw the witnesses) declared a trust, is not persuasive in this court. He either based the finding upon the self-serving declarations of Mr. Huegel, or he based it upon inferences which he drew from the direct testimony. The legitimacy of an inference has nothing to do with the honesty or reliability of the witnesses, and therefore the trial court's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses placed that court in no better position than this court is in to decide what inferences should be drawn. Watson v. Markham (Tex. Civ. App.), 77 S.W. 660; McMahon v. Stratford (Conn.), 76 Atl. 983; 2 R.C.L. 208, sec. 173.

Irwin & Bushman, Dumm & Cook and H.P. Lauf for respondents.

(1) In an equity suit the cause is triable de novo on appeal, thus constituting appellate court the trier of facts as well as of equitable principles. Schwartzman v. Fire Ins. Co., 2 S.W. (2d) 595. (2) In an equity case the court on appeal will consider competent proof offered and exclude and reject incompetent proof objected to and received. Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 271; Roberts v. Roberts, 291 S.W. 487. (3) The presumption will be overcome if the evidence shows that a trust relationship was intended, as evidenced by the acts of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Clark v. Clark, 18 S.W. (2d) 80; Thierry v. Thierry, 249 S.W. 952; Sanford v. Van Pelt, 282 S.W. 1031; Price v. Cain, 112 Mo. 415; Hall v. Hall, 107 Mo. 110; Darrier v. Darrier, 58 Mo. 227; Gillespie v. Gillespie, 289 S.W. 582. (a) The presumption can be overcome by parole evidence. Curd v. Brown, 148 Mo. 92. (b) And any antecedent or contemporaneous acts or facts may be received either to rebut or support the presumption and any acts or facts so immediately after the transaction as fairly to be considered a part of the transaction may be received for the same purpose. 1 Perry on Trusts (7 Ed.) sec. 147; Viers v. Viers, 175 Mo. 444. (c) The fact that practically all the husband's estate is involved has a strong tendency to rebut the presumption of a gift. 1 Perry on Trusts (7 Ed.) sec. 147; Hall v. Hall, 107 Mo. 110; Poole v. Phillips, 167 Ill. 432. (d) Fraud in any form in obtaining title will itself rebut the presumption. Darrier v. Darrier, 58 Mo. 227. (c) The fact that the donor did not...