Platt v. Kan. State Univ.
| Decision Date | 02 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | 110,179. |
| Citation | 337 P.3d 73 (Table) |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Rachel PLATT, Appellant, v. KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY, Appellee. |
Mark Beam–Ward, of Beam–Ward, Kruse, Wilson & Fletes, LLC, of Overland Park, for appellant.
Maureen A. Redeker, of Kansas State University, of Manhattan, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., STANDRIDGE and STEGALL, JJ.
Rachel Platt appeals from the district court's decision to summarily dismiss her claim of retaliatory discharge against Kansas State University (University). Finding her claim was governed exclusively by the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA), K.S.A. 77–601 et seq., the district court held dismissal was required because Platt's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the KJRA deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, we conclude the district court erred in finding Platt's claim was governed by the KJRA and, in turn, finding that she was required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. Alternatively, we conclude that even if her claim had been governed by the KJRA, Platt was relieved from its requirement to exhaust because there was no administrative remedy available to her.
The following facts are taken from the petition filed by Platt and are assumed to be true for purposes of reviewing the district court's ruling on Platt's motion to dismiss. See Cohen v. Battaglia, 296 Kan. 542, 545–46, 293 P.3d 752 (2013) ().
Platt was hired as a probationary employee by the University on September 21, 2011. Shortly after beginning her employment, she began to suffer from headaches and migraines, head and nasal congestion, nausea, sneezing, and burning eyes. Platt complained about the air quality in her office to her supervisor. Platt's supervisor told her that Crystal Hamer, the person who occupied the office before Platt, had also complained of similar air quality and health problems. After determining that there were problems with the ventilation system in Platt's office, the University attempted to improve the air quality by cleaning the grates on the ventilator system. Platt brought an air purifier to her office in an attempt to improve the air quality conditions herself. The University discussed the possibility of having an industrial hygienist evaluate the air quality conditions in Platt's office.
Platt's status as a probationary employee was scheduled to expire on or around March 21, 2012. Although Platt claimed she performed her job duties in a satisfactory manner during her employment, the University terminated Platt on March 7, 2012, citing excessive absences as the reason for her termination. Platt's termination occurred on the same day she met with Dr. El–Sotouey, an industrial hygienist.
On March 20, 2013, Platt filed a lawsuit in district court asserting she was wrongfully terminated from her employment in retaliation for having a potential claim under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act (KWCA), K.S.A. 44–501 et seq. In support of her assertion, Platt alleged she suffered a work-related injury (headaches, congestion, nausea, sneezing, and burning eyes due to poor air quality and ventilation) giving rise to a viable workers compensation claim, she told her supervisor about the injury, and then she was discharged (for absences directly resulting from the work-related injury) before she had an opportunity to pursue the KWCA claim. She further asserted the University wrongfully used absences directly caused by her work-related illnesses as the basis for her termination.
In lieu of an answer, the University filed a motion to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim (governmental immunity) and lack of subject matter jurisdiction (failure to exhaust administrative remedies). The district court granted the motion to dismiss based solely on Platt's failure to exhaust administrative remedies; the court did not address the University's argument regarding dismissal based on governmental immunity. Platt filed a motion to reconsider, arguing in part that the district court made erroneous assumptions of fact beyond the scope of the pleadings in dismissing the case. In conjunction with this argument, Platt attached to the motion several exhibits she claimed the district court should review if it was going to consider matters beyond the scope of the pleadings in dismissing her claim. The University filed a motion to strike these exhibits, claiming a motion to reconsider is not a proper vehicle to advance new allegations, arguments, and evidence that were previously available to Platt. The district court ultimately denied the motion to reconsider because it did not present any new argument. The court also declined to consider the exhibits submitted by Platt in conjunction with her motion based on Platt's failure to explain why they could not have been submitted with an earlier pleading.
Platt appeals from the district court's decision to dismiss, arguing she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because her claim of retaliation sounds in tort and therefore falls outside the purview of the KJRA. Platt also argues the district court erroneously made inferences in the University's favor when deciding the motion to dismiss and declined to consider the evidence Platt submitted with her motion to reconsider.
Whether a district court erred by granting a motion to dismiss is a question of law subject to unlimited review. The appellate court will view the well-pleaded facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and assume as true those facts and any inferences reasonably drawn from them. If those facts and inferences state any claim upon which relief can be granted, then dismissal is improper. Battaglia, 296 Kan. at 545–46.
In the motion to dismiss it filed with the district court, the University asserted that Platt's petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because she was procedurally barred from filing suit based on her failure to strictly comply with the exhaustion requirements of K.S.A.2013 Supp. 77–612. In response, Platt argued she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because her claim of retaliatory discharge was pled as a common-law tort based on wrongful conduct and was not based on “agency action” as is required to come within the purview of the KJRA. See K.S.A.2013 Supp. 77–603(a) ().
The tort of retaliatory discharge was first recognized by a Kansas court in Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan.App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981). Seven years later, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled in Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645 (1988), disapproved on other grounds by Gonzalez–Centeno v. North Central Kansas Regional Juvenile Detention Facility, 278 Kan. 427, 101 P.3d 1170 (2004), that an employer could not terminate an employee on the basis of absences due to a work-related injury. In a case very similar to the one here, the court expanded on its ruling in Coleman to provide protection to employees who the employer has reason to believe might file a workers compensation claim. Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 516–17, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994) (), disapproved on other grounds by In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 187 P.3d 594 (2008).
Although it does not dispute that Kansas recognizes the common-law tort claim of retaliatory discharge, the University contends that such a claim is governed by the exclusive remedy provision of the KJRA when the claim challenges an administrative decision to terminate the employment of a state agency employee. In support of its contention, the University cites to numerous cases where Kansas appellate courts have found the KJRA to be the exclusive remedy for claims of wrongful discharge. See Heiland v. Dunnick, 270 Kan. 663, 668–69, 19 P.3d 103 (2001) (); Gaskill v. Ft. Hays State Univ., 31 Kan.App.2d 544, 70 P.3d 693 (2003) (); Douglass v. Kansas State University, 22 Kan.App.2d 171, 915 P.2d 782 (), rev. denied 259 Kan. 927 (1996).
But the University's reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Heiland, the plaintiff was laid off by the Kansas Savings and Loan Department, which was ultimately replaced by the Office of the State Bank Commissioner (SBC). Steven C. Heiland filed suit against SBC claiming he was entitled to, but was denied, a preferential position on a reemployment list as required under K.S.A. 75–2948. Finding Heiland's claims involved the SBC's failure to perform a duty imposed by statute to benefit state employees in Heiland's position, the court found the KJRA applicable. In the other two cases cited by the University, the claims for wrongful discharge involved the agency's failure to perform a duty imposed by contract. See Gaskill, 31 Kan.App.2d at 546 (); Douglass, 22 Kan.App.2d at 173 (same).
Unlike the cases cited above, Platt's claim for retaliatory discharge does not involve the University's performance of, or failure to perform, an agency duty, function, or activity imposed by statute, regulation, rule, or even contract. Instead, Platt seeks damages caused by a wrongful and tortious act alleged to have been committed by a state agency. Given her claim, we...
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