Platt v. Prince

• Decision Date: 07 July 1933
• Docket Number: No. 585.,585.
• Citation: 167 A. 540
• Parties: PLATT v. PRINCE, General Treasurer.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

167 A. 540

PLATT

v. PRINCE, General Treasurer.

No. 585.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 7, 1933.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Hugh B. Baker, Presiding Justice.

Petition by Ronald J. R. Piatt for writ of mandamus to be directed to Antonio Prince, General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island. From a judgment denying the petition, petitioner appeals.

Appeal denied and dismissed, and judgment affirmed.

Rosenfeld & Hagan and C. Bird Keach, all of Providence, for petitioner.

John P. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., and William W. Moss, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

HAHN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court denying the petition of Ronald J. R. Piatt for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, by whom he had been discharged, to reinstate him in his position.

The petitioner, an honorably-discharged, partially-disabled veteran of the World War, who for over thirteen years had served as bookkeeper and accountant in the office of the general treasurer, was discharged on May 1, 1933. As no question was raised as to his ability to perform the duties of his position and no claim made of inefficiency or improper conduct in the performance thereof, petitioner contends that respondent had no legal right to discharge him and that he is entitled to retain his position by virtue of Public Laws 1924, chapter 557, which reads as follows: "Section 1. In every public department and upon all public works of this state, any honorably discharged soldier, sailor or marine who served in the army or navy of the United States during the civil war, Spanish-American war, Phillipine insurrection, China relief expedition or world, war, and who, having been disabled in service, and at the time of his application for employment is a qualified elector of this state, shall be preferred for appointment and employment. Age, loss of limb or other physical impairment, which does not in fact incapacitate, shall not disqualify such veteran, if he possesses the other requisite qualifications. Whenever any department, board or commission in this state shall have a vacant position available, said department, board or commission, shall notify the veteran's bureau, that a vacancy exists."

The respondent contends that he has the right to discharge any employee of his office and to appoint in his place another person who, in his opinion, after investigation, gives promise of more loyally and efficiently filling the position, and that the fact that the former employee is a veteran does not restrict or limit respondent's right to appoint and discharge.

The petition was denied by the trial court on the ground that, as the statute is silent on the question of discharge and as the respondent discharged petitioner for reasons which, in his judgment, were for the good of the office, there is no basis for the court to intervene and usurp such discretionary power by a writ of mandamus.

The Rhode Island rule—enunciated in Corbett v. Naylor, 25 R. I. 520, 57 A. 303, and Cruise & Smiley Constr. Co. v. Town Council, 42 R. I. 408, 108 A. 419—is that mandamus is not a proper remedy for controlling the exercise of discretionary power vested in an official. The sole question for our consideration, therefore, is whether, upon the evidence in this case, the court below erred in finding that the respondent had the power to discharge the petitioner.

In many cases courts have considered the power of an appointing officer to discharge a veteran employee claiming the right to retain his position through a "veterans preference statute" similar to our own. In Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. at page 293, 20 S. Ct. 574, 575, 44 L. Ed. 774, a leading case on this subject, the court says: "The appointment to an official position in the government, even if it be simply a clerical position, is not a mere ministerial act, but one involving the exercise of judgment. * * * In the absence of specific provision to the contrary, the power of...