Platt v. Woodland

• Decision Date: 12 June 1926
• Docket Number: 26,755
• Citation: 121 Kan. 291,246 P. 1017
• Parties: BEVERLY C. PLATT et al., Appellants, v. IDA F. WOODLAND and STANLEY WOODLAND et al., Appellees
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

246 P. 1017

121 Kan. 291

BEVERLY C. PLATT et al., Appellants, v. IDA F. WOODLAND and STANLEY WOODLAND et al., Appellees

No. 26,755

Supreme Court of Kansas

June 12, 1926

Decided January, 1926.

Appeal from Johnson district court; JABEZ O. RANKIN, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. CONTRACTS--Agreement for Exchange of Deeds--Evidence. The proceedings considered, and held, a general finding for defendant determined in her favor a disputed question of fact relating to the nature of a family agreement for exchange of deeds. Held further, the finding was sustained by the evidence.

2. ESTATES--Executory Devise--Conveyance. A contingent executory devise may be conveyed by quitclaim deed.

3. VENDOR AND PURCHASER--Interest Conveyed--Quitclaim Deed. The parties to a quitclaim deed were cotenants by inheritance of a half interest in the land. The grantee was devisee of a determinable fee, and the grantors were devisees of a contingent executory devise, of the other half. Held, the quitclaim deed conveyed all the interest of the grantors intent to pass a lesser interest not expressly appearing or being necessarily implied from the terms of the grant.

Charles C. Hoge, of Olathe, and Caleb S. Monroe, of Kansas City, Mo., for the appellants.

S. D. Scott, S. T. Seaton, both of Olathe, E. S. McAnany, Maurice L. Alden and Thomas M. Van Cleve, all of Kansas City, for the appellees.

OPINION

BURCH, J.:

The action was one against Ida F. Woodland, who will be referred to as the defendant, for possession of land, for partition, and for rents and profits. The answer admitted possession of defendant, exclusion of plaintiffs from possession, and receipt and appropriation of rents and profits. The answer further denied title in plaintiffs, asserted title in defendant, and prayed that her title be quieted. Defendant recovered, and plaintiffs appeal.

Defendant was the wife of Stanley Woodland, who was joined as a defendant, but had no interest in the land except such as the marital relation conferred. Defendant's maiden name was Ida Frazier. In 1896 she married John Helm Platt. No children were born of the marriage. John Helm Platt died in December, 1914, leaving a will devising the land in controversy to his widow, who was his only heir. In 1918 she married Woodland.

John Helm Platt was the son of Mortimer R. Platt. In his lifetime Mortimer R. Platt owned land in Johnson county, and land elsewhere situated with which we are not concerned. He died on May 2, 1911, leaving a will which was executed on March 30, 1911, and was admitted to probate on May 11, 1911. The testator left five sons. The will gave to each son 160 acres of land in severalty. Four of the sons were given estates in fee simple. John Helm Platt was given 80 acres in fee, and a qualified fee in 80 acres. A tract of 160 acres was given to four sons as cotenants, and a tract of 60 acres was given to the five sons as cotenants. Although John Helm Platt had been married fifteen years when the will was executed, he had no children, as his father well knew, and the provision of the will relating to the land given him in severalty reads as follows:

"I give and devise to my son, John Helm Platt, the east half of the northwest quarter of said section thirty-three (33), containing eighty (80) acres. I also give and devise to my said son, John Helm Platt, the north half of the southeast quarter of said section thirty-three (33), containing eighty (80) acres, subject to the express condition that if the said John Helm Platt at his death shall leave surviving him no children or descendants, I give and devise said north half of said section thirty-three (33) to such of his brothers as may survive him, in equal shares."

The plaintiffs in the case are persons and representatives of persons qualified to take under the will on the death of John Helm Platt in the event he should leave no surviving children or descendants.

The testator's wife, Beverly Helm Platt, was living when the will was made and when the testator died. She was not mentioned in the will, did not consent to it, and did not elect to take under it. She died on May 7, 1911, five days after her husband's death occurred. She left no will. Her husband's five sons were her children, and her only heirs.

A few days after their mother's death, the sons rearranged the title to the lands devised to them as cotenants, by exchange of warranty deeds, one of which recited that the interest conveyed was as devisees under the will of Mortimer R. Platt, deceased, and as heirs of Beverly Helm Platt, deceased. Subsequently, the sons conferred together respecting the situation created by their mother's nonadherence to their father's will. By agreement between them, deeds were exchanged, and John Helm Platt received a deed from his brothers dated December 20, 1911, the material portions of which read as follows:

"The said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar paid and a conveyance of real estate to each of said grantors made by said John Helm Platt, the receipt whereof is hereby duly acknowledged, have sold and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, release, and forever quitclaim unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns forever, all of the following-described tract, pieces, and parcels of land situated in the county of Johnson and state of Kansas, to wit:

"All of the east half (1/2) of the northwest quarter (1/4) and the north half (1/2) of the southeast quarter (1/4) of section thirty-three (33) in township twelve (12) and range twenty-five (25), together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining; to have and to hold the said granted premises unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns forever."

After the death of John Helm Platt in December, 1914, his widow continued in unmolested possession of the land until this action was commenced. The premises on which plaintiffs predicated recovery are stated in their brief as follows:

"The undivided half interest in the land in question which passed under the will of Mortimer R. Platt, Sr., vested in John Helm Platt as a base or terminable fee, with a contingent executory devise over to such of his brothers as should survive him, in equal shares.

"The contingent executory devise created by the will is not affected by the deeds exchanged during the lifetime of John Helm Platt.

"The deeds exchanged during the life of John Helm Platt, being deeds of partition, were inoperative to vest in the respective grantees any new title, but merely set off in severalty the interest which had descended to them as cotenants."

At the trial plaintiffs raised an issue of fact respecting the nature of the agreement under which the deed to John Helm Platt and the deeds referred to in that instrument were given. Plaintiffs' evidence was that the parties intended merely to partition the interest they had taken by descent from their mother. Defendant testified the sons all said the will was not worth the paper on which it was written, and they determined to divide and deed the property, disregarding both estates so far as affected by the will. The district court resolved the conflict in the evidence by a general finding in favor of defendant. Besides that, in a memorandum opinion filed in connection with decision of the case, the trial judge stated the brothers intended to settle the whole matter among themselves, and to convey to each other every interest they had in the land. The finding and the judgment of the district court were predicated on that view. The general finding embraced every material fact and inference of fact favorable to defendant, was sustained by evidence, and is conclusive on this court.

The pretension of the will to dispose of the entire estate failed. The devisees were obliged in any event to derive title to a portion by descent. Nobody was concerned except themselves, and they were at liberty to disregard the will if they chose to do so. Plaintiffs brought into the case the subject of family agreement respecting exchange of deeds, and the court determined the nature of the agreement. It was not necessary there should be controversy or compromise to sustain the agreement. The mutual renunciation of title by purchase and division of property on the basis of title by descent, constituted consideration, and when the arrangement was consummated by exchange of deeds, all parties were bound.

The finding of the court respecting intention of the parties is not essential to validity of the judgment. Plaintiffs are bound by the quitclaim deed to John Helm Platt.

The will gave John Helm Platt a fee determinable on a stated condition, and a contingent executory devise to his brothers. An executory devise is a limitation by will of a future estate or interest in land. This description is not complete but is correct as far as it goes. A remainder is also a future estate or interest. The doctrine of seizin made it necessary that a remainder be supported by a particular estate of freehold. Devises were good without livery, and when the statute of wills permitted land to be disposed of by will (32 Henry VIII, c. 1 [1540]), future estates in land could be created without intervention of the particular estate. The result is, all future devises which are not remainders are executory devises. (Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, §§ 53, 54.) Since remainders were dependent on the particular estate, they were destroyed if the particular estate were destroyed, leaving a gap in the seizin. The case of Pells v. Brown, 2 Cro. Jac. 590 (1620), held executory devises were not destructible on account of casualties to the...