Platunov v. Nye Cnty.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:18-cv-00917-GMN-BNW |
| Parties | VASILI PLATUNOV, Plaintiff, v. NYE COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Pending before the Court is Defendants Nye County's and Angela Bello's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion for Younger Abstention, (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff Vasili Platunov ("Plaintiff") filed a Response, (ECF No. 17), and Defendants filed a Reply, (ECF No. 20).
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages and declaratory relief, alleging an unlawful taking of Plaintiff's property rights under a grandfather clause without due process. (See Compl., ECF No. 1). Defendant Nye County is a political subdivision of the State of Nevada; Defendant Bello is a Nye County District Attorney. (Compl. at 2). Plaintiff is a professional dog breeder doing business as Est-Alfa K-9 Security Services, LLC. (Id.).
On or about February 20, 2007, Plaintiff purchased certain real property located at 2790 East Camellia Street, Pahrump, Nevada 89048 (the "Property"), for purposes of commercial kennel use. (Compl. at 2-3); (see ECF No. 1-7). Plaintiff alleges that his commercial kennel use was in compliance with use regulations in effect at the time his use was established. (Compl. at 3-4).
On October 24, 2007, the Nye County Board of Commissioners adopted Bill No. 2007-13, Nye County Ordinance No. 346 (effective Nov. 19, 2007) ("Ordinance 346"), which amended zoning regulations applicable to the Property by adding regulations and amendments regarding animal related uses and definitions. Nye County Code ("NCC") 17.04.220 allows commercial kennel use on real property located in Plaintiff's zoning district with the approval of a conditional use permit ("CUP"). NCC 17.04.100 provides that "[c]ommercial kennels existing prior to the adoption hereof, shall not be required to obtain a conditional use permit," under specified conditions ("Grandfather Clause"). Absent otherwise, only three (3) dogs are permitted per property. See NCC 17.04.100 (defining Kennel, Breeder's); (ECF Nos. 1, 14).
In 2009, Plaintiff submitted a CUP application (CU-10-0013) for a commercial kennel use with up to 30 dogs to be maintained on the Property, which was approved in 2010. (Compl. at 4); (see ECF No. 14-1). In 2015, Plaintiff requested modification of CU-10-0013 to allow a commercial kennel use with up to 150 dogs, which was denied. (See Compl. at 4); (ECF No. 14-3). Plaintiff appealed the modification denial, but his appeal was likewise denied in 2017. (Compl. at 4-5). On April 30, 2018, the Nye County Planning Department, Division of Code Enforcement, issued an Enforcement Order to Plaintiff notifying Plaintiff that his appeal rights have been exhausted and ordering Plaintiff to reduce the number of dogs on the Property in compliance with the CUP ( "Enforcement Order"). (Compl. at 5).
Plaintiff alleges that his existing use of the Property for raising dogs is protected by the Grandfather Clause and that the new limitations placed on property owners are inapplicable to prior-established use. (Compl. at 3). Plaintiff further alleges that notwithstanding this grandfathered protection, agents of the Nye County Planning Commission misled him to believe that a CUP approving Plaintiff's commercial kennel use on the Property was necessary to be in compliance. (Compl. at 4). Plaintiff thus alleges that by granting CU-10-0013, "the [Regional Planning Commission] arbitrarily, and without authority, put conditions on [Plaintiff's] grandfathered CUP" and that Ordinance 346 violated his procedural due process rights. (Compl. at 4, 7).
On May 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed the underlying Complaint against Defendants1 asserting two claims for relief: (1) damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988; and (2) declaratory judgment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint seeks damages and a declaration that Ordinance 346 "is void for failure to observe notice and hearing requirements under State and Federal Law" or, alternatively, that Defendants "shall recognize Plaintiff's grandfather clause rights and shall cease and desist further attempts to enforce compliance with Nye County Ordinance No. 346."2 (Compl. at 7). On September 19, 2018, Defendants filed their Answer. (Answer, ECF No. 12).
On September 25, 2018, Nye County filed suit against Plaintiff in Nevada state court to enforce the Enforcement Order ("Enforcement Action")3—specifically, seeking an injunction enjoining and restraining Plaintiff from a commercial kennel use on the Property and removal of the same. (See ECF No. 14-2); (Mot. to Dismiss ("MTD") at 7, ECF No. 14).
In the instant Motion, Defendants move for dismissal or stay of this action pending the resolution of the Enforcement Action pursuant to Younger abstention. (MTD at 1, ECF No. 14). In response, Plaintiff urges this Court to retain jurisdiction of this action pursuant to the "first-to-file" rule. (Resp. at 5, ECF No. 17).
The Court will first address Plaintiff's First-to-File arguments followed by the issue of Younger abstention.
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In his Response, Plaintiff asks this Court to retain jurisdiction pursuant to the first-to-file rule. (Resp., ECF No. 17). Plaintiff asserts that this first-filed action involves "essentially identical" parties and issues as the later-filed Enforcement Action. (Id. at 6-7). Thus, Plaintiff contends that this Court—as the court with first or earlier possession of the subject matter—must decide the instant action. (Id. at 6).
The Court disagrees. "When two cases involving the same parties and issues are filed in two federal districts, the first-to-file rule permits the second district to exercise its discretion to transfer, stay, or dismiss the second suit in the interests of efficiency and judicial economy." Olin Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 2:10-cv-00623-GMN, 2011 WL 1337407, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 6, 2011) (quoting AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007)) (emphasis added). Here, the two cases were not filed in two federal districts; nor is this Court the second district.
Notably, Plaintiff's Response does not appear to dispute these points. Plaintiff acknowledges that the first-to-file rule applies to competing or parallel litigation filed in separate federal district courts, and that the Enforcement Action was filed in state court. (See Resp. 5:4-13, 7:2-4, 21). Plaintiff also acknowledges that the first-to-file rule permits the second district to exercise discretion, and that the matter was first-filed in this Court. (Id. 6:27-28; 7:18-20, 8:25-26).
Accordingly, as correctly contended in Defendants' Reply, the first-to-file rule is inapplicable here. (Reply at 3, ECF No. 20).
Defendants argue that Younger abstention allows this Court to refrain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings such as the Enforcement Action. (MTD at 8). In Response, Plaintiff does not address the applicability of Younger abstention; rather, the entirety ofPlaintiff's Response is predicated on the first-to-file rule, which, for the reasons set forth above, is inapplicable. (Resp. 5:14-9:8, ECF No. 17).
The abstention doctrine, established in Younger v. Harris, "is an exception to the usual rule that federal courts should exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by statute." 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also Gartrell Const. Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1991). "Younger principles apply to actions at law as well as for injunctive or declaratory relief[.]" Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Absent extraordinary circumstances, Younger abstention applies where the following four elements are met:
(1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.
San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008); Logan v. U.S. Bank N.A., 722 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) ().
Here, the instant circumstances fit within the Younger doctrine: the Enforcement Action is an ongoing state-initiated proceeding that implicates important state interests; Plaintiff is/was not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceedings (nor does he contend otherwise); and this action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state court proceeding. See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd, 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975) ().
The Enforcement Proceeding is an ongoing state proceeding implicating important state interests worthy of abstention under Younger principles. Nye County's complaint in the pending Enforcement Action seeks injunctive relief and the abatement of a nuisance at the Property based on violations of certain provisions of the Nye County Code. (ECF No. 14-2); (see also MTD at 7). "[A]n offense to the State's interest in the nuisance litigation is likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding." See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604. Thus, "the principles of Youn...
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