Plaza Recreational Center v. Sioux City

• Decision Date: 14 November 1961
• Docket Number: No. 50355,50355
• Parties: PLAZA RECREATIONAL CENTER, a corporation, Appellee, v. SIOUX CITY, Iowa, a municipal corporation, and T. H. Walensky, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 758

111 N.W.2d 758

253 Iowa 246

PLAZA RECREATIONAL CENTER, a corporation, Appellee, v. SIOUX CITY, Iowa, a municipal corporation, and T. H. Walensky, Appellants.

No. 50355.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 14, 1961.

Neil R. McCluhan, City Attorney, Sioux City, for appellants.

Whicher & Davis, Sioux City, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

Being displeased with a provision of Sioux City Zoning Ordinance No. R-3589, section 2, paragraph a, subsection 4, which states that only 'bowling alleys and structures accommodating recreational activities which do not permit the consumption of beer or intoxicating liquor on the premises' may be operated in the district, plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action, contending such restriction goes beyond the city's power and is illegal, unconstitutional and void.

The case was tried to the court which found that there was no substantial relationship between the consumption of beer in this bowling alley and the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, that the conditional phrase 'which do not permit the consumption of beer or intoxicating liquor on the premises' was null and void, of no legal force and effect, and enjoined its enforcement. We do not agree.

The city assigns as error the trial court's holding that there was a sufficient showing by plaintiff that the zoning ordinance was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious and discriminatory, that the council exceeded its authority and discretion in adopting the ordinance in question, and that it was not a proper exercise of its police power. Thus the relevant facts become important.

We learn from the record that in 1928 Sioux City enacted its first zoning ordinance, that it has been amended many times, but it has been apparent over the years that districts were recognized and set up according to present and potential uses, and that general zoning was in effect. They included residential, multiple dwelling, commercial, light and heavy industrial districts. In February, 1956, the city council established a new business or commercial district in the city designated D-1 Shopping District, by Ordinance No. R-3589. It provided in Section 4A-2 for seven zoning districts, including the D-1 Shopping District involved herein. Section 4A-6.01, 'added' after Section 4A-6, Ordinance Q-13000, provided:

'A. Use Regulations. In the 'D-1' District no buildings or premises shall be used for dwellings * * * and no buildings shall be hereafter erected or structurally altered save as provided in this Ordinance, except for one or more of the following uses:

'1. * * *

'4. Bowling alleys and structures accommodating recreational activities which do not permit the consumption of beer or intoxicating liquor on the premies. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

Retail stores and shops, including department stores and restaurants were subject to the same limiting clause.

The record further discloses at the time of the trial that this area, known as the Plaza Shopping Center, was the only D-1 district in the city, and that in addition to plaintiff's bowling alley a grocery store and a hardware store had been erected and were in operation. Other authorized businesses were in the process of being established. While a Class C beer license was issued to the grocery store, it permits sales for consumption off the premises only.

There are six other bowling alleys in Sioux City proper, and all have Class 'B' beer licenses permitting consumption on the premises. All are in less restrictive zones, one in the heavy industrial zone, one in a commercial zone, and the other four in light industrial zones.

The Plaza Shopping Center had been taken from an exclusive Class A residential district, and all the area surrounding it is in the A residential zone, with homes valued from $9,000 to $14,000 above those in districts where other bowling alleys are located.

Mr. Selander, the city planner, testified that the purpose of the D-1 Shopping District was to serve residential areas and provide to those residents community services and goods without seriously detracting from the general character of the neighborhood. He testified he took into consideration, in setting up the District, the fact that it was for the purpose of forming safeguards to protect the general health and welfare of the residents nearby and to protect values in the surrounding areas; that it was meant to decrease the usual objectionable features of commercial or light industrial areas where different types of uses were considered less offensive. Testimony of a property owner nearby, a former mayor of Sioux City and a real state appraiser, tended to show those facts were taken into consideration by the authorities when they established this restricted zone permitting limited uses in the area, and that careful consideration was given to the effect the uses permitted in this district would have upon residences located within the vicinity.

Plaintiff was aware of the provisions of this ordinance when he purchased his lot in 1958, erected his structure and commenced operations. He does not claim his is a hardship case. Recently when certain bowling teams or groups complained of the restriction on his alley and threatened to take their business elsewhere, he raised objections to the involved proviso which he now says interferes with the full use of his authorized business on this premise.

The nub of the controversy, as stated by the learned trial court, is whether the city council, in the enactment of an ordinance creating a commercial shopping center, can authorize the operation of bowling alleys and other like establishments but so limit them as to prohibit the use or consumption of beer or liquors upon the premises where such businesses may be conducted, and whether the city council, in doing so, exceeded its authority and discretion.

Actually the issue is whether plaintiff carried his burden to show arbitrary and unreasonable council action and whether the city council so discriminated against him that it exceeded its power and authority under the statute and the federal and state constitutions.

We have often and fully considered the statutes and general propositions involved. What we have here is principally a question of their proper application.

I. Zoning in Iowa municipalities finds its authority under Chapter 414, Code of Iowa 1958, I.C.A., and we have often sustained those statutes as a valid exercise of the police power. Brackett v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 67 N.W.2d 542; Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113, 51 A.L.R.2d 251; Boardman v. Davis, 231 Iowa 1227, 3 N.W.2d 608; McMahon v. City of Dubuque, Iowa, 8 Cir., 255 F.2d 154; Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354.

Legislative authority to pass such ordinances is found in Section 366.1, Code 1958, I.C.A., and in Sections 414.1, 414.2, and 414.3, Code 1958, I.C.A., and we find the announced purpose and extent of that authority in the field of zoning. Section 414.1 provides: 'For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, any city or town is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict * * * the location and use of buildings * * * for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.' Section 414.2 provides that the council may divide the city into districts 'and within such districts it may regulate and restrict * * * use of buildings, structures, or land.' All regulations and restrictions must be uniform for each class throughout each district, 'but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts.' Section 414.3 provides the basis of regulations, and restates the purpose 'to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; * * * to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, * * * and other public requirements.' It further provided that 'reasonable consideration' shall be given 'to the character of the area of the district and the peculiar suitability of such area for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city or town.'

Plaintiff concedes that under such extensive grant of authority the city could have legally excluded bowling alleys from the new zone D-1, but contends since it did permit them, it could not interfere with the usual and customary operation of such business. This he claims includes the lawful public consumption of beer on the premises by patrons. Thus we are asked as to the legality of a restricted authorized use, i. e. a bowling alley permitting only soft drinks as refreshments for patrons. While we seriously doubt that the consumption of beer or liquor is a necessary or even a desirable adjunct of a bowling alley, yet our principal problem here is as to whether that restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary. The fact that beer may lawfully be consumed in public is not important, for zoning relates only to restriction of lawful uses. McMahon v. City of Dubuque, supra.

II. Generally speaking, whether the ordinance involved exceeded the council's authority, or whether it was unconstitutional as being in conflict with the due process or equal protection clauses of the state or federal constitutions, the burden to prove the proviso unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory, is upon the one asserting the invalidity. Hermann v. City of Des Moines, 250 Iowa 1281, 97 N.W.2d 893, and citations. The rule is well settled that when constitutional questions are raised all reasonable intendments must be indulged in favor of the validity of the enactment. We have also constantly held a classification or regulation of the use of property within the municipality will not be held arbitrary unless clearly so, and that when the issue as to whether it was an unreasonable or...