Plemmons v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 03 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-3110.,05-3110.
• Citation: 439 F.3d 818
• Parties: Rick PLEMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J.T. ROBERTS, Pulaski County Sheriff; The County of Pulaski, Missouri; Ronald Jones; Michael Gibbens, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

439 F.3d 818

Rick PLEMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J.T. ROBERTS, Pulaski County Sheriff; The County of Pulaski, Missouri; Ronald Jones; Michael Gibbens, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 05-3110.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 17, 2006.

Filed: March 3, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Douglas Harpool, argued, Springfield, MO (Peter A. Lee, on the brief), for appellant.

Jason L. Call, argued, Jefferson City, MO (Paul Graham, on the brief), for appellee.

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Rick Plemmons brought action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Sheriff J.T. Roberts, jailer Michael Gibbens, jailer Ronald Jones, and Pulaski County, Missouri ("Defendants") violated his constitutional rights by showing deliberate indifference to his medical needs while he was an inmate in the Pulaski County Jail. Specifically, Plemmons argues jailers Gibbens and Jones inexcusably delayed in summoning an ambulance even though Plemmons had told them he had a history of heart trouble, then began exhibiting obvious heart attack symptoms. Plemmons also argues Pulaski County failed to properly train Gibbens and Jones to deal with such an emergency. Finally, Plemmons alleges the jailers' delay in calling an ambulance was influenced by Sheriff Roberts' policy requiring his personal authorization for ambulance transfers. The Defendants brought a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, which the district court¹ summarily denied. Defendants now appeal. We affirm.²

I.

Rick Plemmons was arrested on August 10, 2002 for allegedly failing to pay child support. Plemmons was forty-six years old at the time. On August 12, 2002, Plemmons was transferred to the Pulaski County Jail, where he was booked between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. Plemmons alleges he advised jailer Michael Gibbens he had a history of heart problems and had experienced two heart attacks. However, the intake form filled out by Gibbens does not mention Plemmons' history of heart problems. According to Plemmons, on the afternoon of August 12, he began suffering chest and arm pain and was sweating profusely. He stated he does not know the precise time his symptoms began, but he believes they started shortly before 4:00 p.m.³ He claims his cell-mate, John Thompson, notified jail staff that Plemmons was ill a number of times via a "call box" in their cell, and that "Mike," one of the jailers, came to check on Plemmons around 4:00 p.m. Plemmons claims he told "Mike" he was having heart trouble, but states the jailer left without doing anything. Plemmons' condition worsened, and he experienced increased chest pain and nausea. Plemmons alleges that "Mike" and an unidentified jailer came back twenty-five minutes after "Mike's" first visit, and Plemmons told them he thought he was having a heart attack. Plemmons claims the two jailers then took him to the booking area and had him sit on a bench while they finished processing a prisoner. One of the jailers then called to have an ambulance dispatched, which Plemmons claims was roughly ten to fifteen minutes after he was removed from his cell, and more than fifty minutes from the time the jailers were first notified of his condition.

In his deposition, Thompson, Plemmons' cell-mate, offered a slightly different version of events. According to Thompson, Plemmons became ill around 4:00 p.m. Thompson stated he believed Plemmons was having a heart attack and tried to alert jailer Ron Jones by pushing the call box button in the cell, but received no response. Thompson stated that about fifteen to twenty minutes later, Jones walked by the cell and Thompson told Jones that Plemmons was ill, but Jones dismissed Plemmons' symptoms as an anxiety attack before walking away. When Jones walked by a short time later, Thompson told him Plemmons was having a heart attack, and Jones called to have an ambulance dispatched.

The Defendants point out many of the assertions made by Plemmons are contradicted by the jailers on duty that day. Gibbens stated in his deposition he left work at 4:00 p.m. on August 12 and had no personal recollection of Plemmons' heart attack. Jones stated he promptly went to Plemmons' cell after the jail trustee, Charles Eoff, notified him Plemmons was having trouble breathing. He stated he then took Plemmons to the front of the jail, where he immediately called to have an ambulance dispatched. Jones denied he was notified of Plemmons' condition via the call box in Plemmons' cell and stated he did not know Plemmons was having a heart attack, as he recalled Plemmons complaining only of having difficulty breathing. Jail trustee Eoff corroborated Jones' statement that he (Eoff) notified Jones of Plemmons' illness and that Jones promptly checked on Plemmons, then summoned an ambulance.⁴

Dispatch records indicate an ambulance was called at 4:51 p.m. and arrived at the jail at 4:56. One of the paramedics stated Plemmons was "in trouble" when the ambulance arrived, and that Plemmons stated he had been "like this" for forty-five minutes. Plemmons suffered from a severe heart attack, and Dr. William Woods observed in his deposition that damage to Plemmons' heart could have been minimized had he received medical care sooner.

Plemmons also has submitted evidence indicating the jailers' delay in calling an ambulance was influenced by Sheriff J.T. Roberts' policy requiring jailers to notify him before an ambulance is summoned to transport an inmate to the hospital. The record indicates Gary Carmack, Pulaski County Ambulance District Administrator, had previously criticized Roberts for delaying inmate treatment and that Carmack had ordered his paramedics to document the occasions when, as a result of Roberts' policy, patients at the jail were not permitted to be transported from the jail by ambulance against the medical advice of physicians.

Plemmons also has submitted evidence indicating Pulaski County failed to adequately train Jones and Gibbens to respond to Plemmons' heart attack, pointing out Jones stated in his deposition he had never seen the Jail Policy and Procedures Manual and that it was not in use at the time of Plemmons' heart attack. Neither Jones nor Gibbens had received training from Pulaski County to assist them in identifying heart attack symptoms, and, according to Plemmons, neither recognized symptoms obvious to a lay person.

II.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects governmental officials from civil liability when "`their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). In ruling on a qualified immunity issue, courts must apply a two-part inquiry. First, a court must determine whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If a "violation [can] be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions," the reviewing court must then ask whether "the right was clearly established . . . . in light of the specific context of the case." Id. "For a right to be considered clearly established, the `contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099, 1103 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

We review a district court's denial of summary judgment de novo. Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, a denial of summary judgment is not a final decision and thus is not immediately appealable. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity may be reviewed on interlocutory appeal "when the issue presented `is a purely legal one: whether the facts alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law.'" Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Because qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991), its availability "ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial." Id. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534. However, "the nonmoving party is still given the benefit of all relevant inferences at the summary judgment stage, and if a `genuine dispute exists concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on that ground.'" Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir.2000)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Here, the district court denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, stating, "there are material facts in dispute that must be resolved by a jury." To affirm this conclusion, we must first find the evidence in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plemmons, would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude the Defendants engaged in a course of conduct that violated his clearly established constitutional rights. We must then find as a matter of law that no reasonable official could have thought that such a course of conduct was lawful.

III.

A.

We first ask whether the evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plemmons, would lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude the Defendants engaged in a course of conduct that violated Plemmons' clearly established constitutional rights. "The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials' cruel and unusual punishment of inmates...