Pletcher v. Illinois Racing Bd.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-991,76-991
• Citation: 14 Ill.Dec. 796,372 N.E.2d 1075,57 Ill.App.3d 73
• Parties: , 14 Ill.Dec. 796 Delmer PLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, Anthony Scariano, Ray Freeark, Patricia W. Hewitt, Lucy Reum, Herb Channick, Ray Garrison, Cecil Troy, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1075

372 N.E.2d 1075

57 Ill.App.3d 73, 14 Ill.Dec. 796

Delmer PLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, Anthony Scariano, Ray Freeark, Patricia W. Hewitt, Lucy Reum, Herb Channick, Ray

Garrison, Cecil Troy, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 76-991.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Jan. 30, 1978.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen. of the State of Illinois, Chicago (George W. Lindberg and Paul V. Esposito, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

Robert J. Beranek, Alsip (Allan A. Ackerman, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

GOLDBERG, Presiding Justice:

Delmer Pletcher (plaintiff), a harness racing driver, was suspended for 5 days by order of the Illinois Racing Board. The circuit court reversed. The Board has appealed.

In this court, the Board contends that plaintiff was not denied due process of law by the decision of the State stewards which preceded the action by the Board; due process rights of plaintiff were not violated by the admission of certain testimony at the Board hearing; a quorum was present at the Board meeting at which the suspension action was taken and the decision of the Board is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Plaintiff urges that he was denied due process of law by the decision of the State stewards which preceded the action of the Board; the suspension was a denial of due process of law for lack of a quorum at the meeting of the Board; and the findings of the Board were manifestly contrary to the evidence. Our view of the case requires us to affirm the judgment because the decision of the Board was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

After the trial judge had examined the entire record before him, he held that "fundamental rules of decency and due process require * * * " reversal of the result reached by the Board. The trial judge stated that, in view of his lack of expert knowledge of harness racing, he would not decide whether the decision of the Board was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

There was considerable testimony on the merits of the case from expert witnesses most of whom were qualified and experienced harness drivers. Opinions were expressed on both sides of the factual issue as to whether the suspension of plaintiff was justified as a violation of one of the rules of the Board. Under these circumstances we see no reason why this court may not proceed to a determination of the weight of the opinions expressed by the experts. In so doing, we are proceeding in accordance with the policy expressed by the Supreme Court of Illinois "of deciding constitutional questions only where necessary to a disposition of the case." Bender v. City of Chicago (1974), 58 Ill.2d 284, 287, 319 N.E.2d 34, 35 and authorities there cited.

The controversy revolves about Harness Rule 18.5A. The parties agree that this rule was promulgated by the Board and was in full force and effect at the time of the race in question. The rule states:

"In the event a drive is unsatisfactory due to lack of effort or carelessness, and the judges believe that there is no fraud, gross carelessness, or a deliberate inconsistent drive, they may impose a penalty under this sub-section not to exceed 10 days suspension or a $100 fine."

It is the theory of the Board that plaintiff violated the rule by the manner in which he drove his horse during a race which took place on February 5, 1975, so that plaintiff was guilty of "lack of effort or carelessness * * *." It is agreed that "fraud, gross carelessness, or a deliberate inconsistent drive * * * " are not involved here. Plaintiff drove the same horse in races on January 3, January 10, February 5 and February 10, 1975. The critical race was the one which took place on February 5, 1975. Apparently tapes or films are made of all races. Films of all the races in question were shown at the hearings before the Board and before the trial court. At the hearing before the Board, two stewards testified in support of the Board's theory, and plaintiff and three other harness drivers testified in support of plaintiff's theory. One steward, Robert Milburn, testified to the effect that plaintiff's driving in the critical race on February 5, 1975, was "probably an error in judgment."

The Board also heard testimony from another steward, Maylon Nixon. He testified that after the race the stewards had all agreed informally that plaintiff had not violated the rule in question. Several days later he had a telephone conversation with another...