Plonka v. Weaver, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-1628
| Decision Date | 21 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-1628 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | CAROLINE PLONKA, Plaintiff, v. MARY WEAVER, et al., Defendants. |
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
(MAGISTRATE JUDGE CARLSON)
Presently before the Court is Magistrate Judge Carlson's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 38) to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 25 and 26) and Plaintiff Caroline Plonka ("Plonka")'s Motion to Add Additional Defendants (Doc. 21). Named as Defendants in this case are the Borough of Susquehanna, the Susquehanna Borough Council and numerous Council Members, the Susquehanna Zoning Appeal Board ("ZAB") and various ZAB members, solicitors for the Borough of Susquehanna and ZAB, and Zoning Officer Mary Weaver (hereinafter, collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff Caroline Plonka ("Plonka") contends that over the course of a zoning dispute with Defendants regarding her property, the Starrucca House, her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment were violated, along with her rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions to dismiss will be denied with respect to Plonka's Fourth Amendment claim against Mary Weaver and granted with respect to all other claims. As such, the claims in the Amended Complaint will be dismissed apart from her Fourth Amendment claim against Mary Weaver. In addition, Plonka's motion to add additional Defendants will be denied.
On June 3, 2013, Plonka instituted this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Doc. 1, Ex. 2). It was later transferred to this Court on June 18, 2013. Upon initial screening of Plonka's Complaint (Doc. 3), Magistrate Judge Carlson issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice (Doc. 6). The Court adopted this recommendation, and Plonka's Complaint was dismissed with leave to file an Amended Complaint. Accordingly, on August 26, 2013, Plonka filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 12). In her Amended Complaint she states that the Court is already familiar with the background the case as set forth in her initial Complaint.1 By way of summary,2 in October 2011, Plonka purchased the Starrucca House, a former railroad station and hotel located in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, with the intent of opening a hotel and railroad museum. In October 2012, she returned tothe United States to take possession of the building and to reside there temporarily with her husband and son until renovations were complete. During this period of time, Plonka became acquainted with the Susquehanna Borough Council and Defendant Mary Weaver, the Borough's Zoning Officer. Weaver promised Plonka that she would work with her to get the Starrucca House back in working order.
On one occasion in the fall of 2012, while the Starrucca House was undergoing an electrical inspection by the Borough's building inspector, Weaver, along with a Borough police officer, forced her way into the building and declared that it was unsafe for human occupancy and condemned. Plonka specifically alleges that Ms. Weaver "trespassed upon [Plonka's] property multiple times and even broke into appellants garage and went through appellants belongings as if she were a Police officer with a search warrant." (Doc. 3, 6). Weaver reached her decision after seeing blankets, clothing, and canned food in the building, which had no running water or electricity. Plonka had returned to the country several days before and planned to have the utilities turned on in the building after the electrical inspection. Weaver placed a condemnation notice on the front door of the building and gave the Plonkas forty-eight (48) hours to evacuate the premises; they moved in with a family friend who lived in the Borough and have resided there since November 2, 2012.
Plonka alleges that Defendant Mary Weaver should have set a date with her for an inspection of the building, Weaver's failure to do so violated Plonka's fourteenth amendment rights, and Weaver condemned the building before properly inspecting it. (Doc. 12, 1-3.) Plonka further alleges that Mr. Fred Nemac sent a letter to her with his findings after the electrical inspection stating that temporary electrical power should be turned on to correct the electrical deficiencies and eventually to turn on the water. Id. at 2. Ms. Weaver deniedPlonka a permit to do so. Id. Plonka hired an electrician after having a new meter box for temporary service installed but Ms. Weaver found out and told the electrician not to give service to Plonka's building. Id. The same thing happened with the next electrician Plaintiff hired. Id. at 2-3.
While she was abroad, Plonka had hired a caretaker for the building because she was going to be away for an additional year. Id. at 3. Ms. Weaver did not try to inspect or condemn the building while Plonka was away, and the Town Council and the Borough waited until Plonka's return to take possession of the property. Id. Plonka asserts that this was "clearly a NIMBY case" (where NIMBY stands for "not in my back yard") and that all of the Defendants named in this action "acted under color of state law and are sill acting in concert to keep the German Family out of their 'Boro' and their solicitors are helping them do it." Id.
Plonka's Amended Complaint names numerous Defendants in the caption, although most allegations in the body of the Complaint do not identify specific Defendants. She seeks $250,000.00 in damages from each Defendant in addition to $1,000,000 in damages for her pain and suffering. Id. at 5. On December 10, 2013, Plonka filed a motion to add new Defendants to the case (Doc. 21). On December 23, 2013, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Docs. 25 and 26). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the motions to dismiss be granted and the motion to add new Defendants be denied. On March 10, 2014, Plonka filed Objections to the R & R. (Doc. 39.) Defendant Michael Briechle filed a response to Plonka's Objections (Doc. 40) on March 18, 2014, and the remaining Defendants filed a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Objections (Doc. 41) on March 24, 2014. Therefore, the R & R is now ripe for disposition.
Where objections to the Magistrate Judge's report are filed, the court must conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of the report, Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c)), provided the objections are both timely and specific, Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1984). In making its de novo review, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Owens v. Beard, 829 F. Supp. 736, 738 (M.D. Pa. 1993). Although the review is de novo, the statute permits the court to rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1980); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7; Ball v. United States Parole Comm'n, 849 F. Supp. 328, 330 (M.D. Pa. 1994). Uncontested portions of the report may be reviewed at a standard determined by the district court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7. At the very least, the court should review uncontested portions for clear error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Cruz v. Chater, 990 F. Supp. 375, 376-77 (M.D. Pa. 1998). As such, the Court reviews the portions of the R & R to which the Plaintiff objects de novo and the remainder for clear error.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims. SeeSemerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Detailed factual allegations are not required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929. However, mere conclusory statements will not do; "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Instead, a complaint must "show" this entitlement by alleging sufficient facts. Id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). As such, "[t]he touchstone of the pleading standard is plausibility." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
The inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage is "normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficientlyalleged." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
Dismissal is...
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